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ABSTRACT
TRANSCENDING SUBJECTS: HEGEL AFTER AUGUSTINE,
AN ESSAY ON POLITICAL THEOLOGY
Geoffrey J. D. Holsclaw, B.A., M.Div.
Marquette University, 2013
From where do political reformers and radicals come who are willing and
prepared to challenge the status quo? Where are people formed who are capable of
initiating change within a political system? Some worry belief in transcendence closes
off authentic political engagement and processes of transformation. Others think that a
transcendent orientation is the only means to protect and promote a more free and just
society. Some see a positive commitment to transcendence as inimical to democratic
practices, while others see such a commitment as indispensible for such a project. These
general issues concern transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity as they bear on the
question of political transformation.
Explaining the differences between these fundamental orientations prompts an
investigation of the philosophical and theological systems of Hegel and Augustine.
Examining Hegel and Augustine around the issues of transcendence and freedom offers a
way to understand these more localized disagreements between political philosophers and
theologians, and even between theologians.
This dissertation examines Hegel, because after the recent demise of Kantian
liberalism in the forms of Rawls and Habermas, many are returning to Hegel as the
original critic of Kantian philosophy specifically, and of Enlightenment secularism
generally. This return to Hegel has produced a larger amount of research that dislodges
the easily caricaturized Hegel of dialectical monism and political conservativism,
creating the possibility of a more positive deployment of Hegel within philosophy and
politics. Concerning Augustine, in one sense his theology is perennial for theology,
whether accepted or rejected. But in addition to this, just as with Hegel many are
beginning to question the received Augustine, mining his texts within his own cultural
and theological milieu rather than merely as the beginning of supposedly unfavorable
theological developments. The time is ripe for an engagement between these two
stalwarts of theology and philosophy in order to illuminate the similarities and
differences and make clear their contemporary relevancy.
This dissertations will argue that Hegel best represents a philosophy of ‘selftranscending immanence’ that promotes freedom by standing in opposition to
transcendence, and that Augustine best respresents a theology of ‘self-immanenting
transcendence’ as the only possible hope for the true freedom.
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INTRODUCTION
There is another world and it is this world.
- Franz Wright
Theology seems to have lost its place, unsure to which world it belongs. Does
theology, God, or the gods live within this world or do they journey toward another?
And if to another world, what is its nature and its relation to this world? One could posit
another world superimposed upon this one, interacting unperceivably, relating
irreducibly. But a second could posit another world as merely a reflection, reification, or
projection of this world. This other world is a false, but perhaps necessarily, production
propelled up from below. The first truly affirms another world; the second critically
accepts it. For those truly affirming another world, it is this world that is thereby
changed, cognitively if not materially, in reference to the other. For those critically
affirming another world, it is the other world that is changed, either into a persistent
illusion or an illusive projection. And between these two orientations is a world of
difference, philosophically and theologically.
Transcendence, Immanence, Subjectivity, Freedom
Speaking of this world and another world, a world beyond, speaks of
transcendence and immanence. What is transcendent to what? From what perspective is
something immanent to something else? Transcendence is always transcendence of a
world. But which world, and whose? In the classical perspective transcendence refers to
something like a transcendent world above (invisible, immutable, eternal) making
intelligible the immanent world below (visible, changeable, temporal) of which we are a
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part, subjects caught within and between these two worlds (spirited bodies or embodied
spirits). Transcendence “is that which is beyond the visible and temporal world of
humans, but as such, it is reached by humans in the movement beyond themselves.”1 The
transcendence of the immanent world is a movement beyond, a movement that subjects in
some way accomplish. This transcendence, therefore, is doubled: first as that which is
beyond the world, and second, as the act by which subjects reach this transcendence as a
form of self-transcendence.
In the modern turn toward the subject, however, the doubling of transcendence
(transcendence of the world and transcendence of subjectivity) turns to a doubling of
immanence. After the turn toward the subject, begun by Descartes and completed in
Kant, this world below is not grounded in a transcendent world above, but is grounded in
the subject itself. With Descartes the metaphysics of transcendence is replaced with the
metaphysics of subjectivity such that the world beyond the subject is the non-subjective
world of immanent objects. This rebounds into the shrinking of immanence from
encompassing the entire world of material objects to encompassing the world of thought
representing these objects to a subject. In modernity, “immanence is no longer the world
within our reach…but is our own subjectivity” representing the world of objects.2 This
creates a doubling of immanence: first as the world in opposition to otherworldly
transcendence, and second as the immanence of thought to the subject. In this regard,
modern subjectivity frames the problem of transcendence as the world of immanent

1

Arne Grøn, “Subjectivity and Transcendence: Problems and Perspectives,” in
Subjectivity and Transcendence, ed. by Arne Gron, Iben Damgaard and Soren Overgaard
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. K), 11.
2
Grøn, “Subjectivity and Transcendence,” 12.
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objects the subject is seeking to grasp, rather than as a transcendence beyond the world of
such objects.
Obviously, the issues of transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity are always
intimately woven together and concern a fundamental “matter of orientation in
philosophy.”3 Oriented around the subject, to speak of the transcendence of the world is
to ask if and how there is a world other than subjectivity and how subjectivity must deal
with or takes account of this worldly transcendence. This could be called the question of
epistemological transcendence. But oriented around the world itself, to speak of the
transcendence of the world is to ask about the being of the world and its beyond, if there
is a beyond. This could be called the question of ontological transcendence.4 Each
orientation entails shifting the primary definition of immanence and includes an account
of the self-transcendence of the subject. Epistemological transcendence construes
immanence as that which is thinkable for subjectivity. Ontological transcendence
construes immanence as the totality of beings, or being itself, which may or may not be
thinkable for consciousness. Of course neither orientation cancels out the other, and the
question of subjectivity is integral to both. In either case, transcendence implies some
sort of human self-transcendence as the movement beyond the immanence of thought.5
The complex weaving together of these elements reveal the basis for the title of
this work: transcending subjects. On the one hand, ‘transcending’ can be an adjective
describing “subjects”. This places the emphasis on the subject and its act of transcending,
3

Grøn, “Subjectivity and Transcendence,”12.
The distinction between ‘ontological transcendence’ and ‘epistemology transcendence’
comes from Merold Westphal, Transcendence and Self-Transcendence: On God and the
Soul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Westphal also adds ‘ethical
transcendence’.
5
Grøn, “Subjectivity and Transcendence,” 30.
4
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referring specifically to the self-transcending process by which subjectivity moves
beyond its own immanent world of thought.6 On the other hand, ‘transcending’ could
also be a present participle acting upon ‘subjects’ as its object. This would place the
emphasis not on the subject that transcends, but on the active transcending of
subjectivity, i.e. the subject is being transcended by and to something else. These two
ways of reading the title, that subjects actively transcend and that subjects are
transcended, is the central problem of this study.
An introduction such as this cannot endlessly qualify transcendence, subjectivity,
and immanence in advance of the planned discussion of Hegel and Augustine. Therefore
we will modify William Desmond’s classification regarding transcendence as a baseline
for our investigation.7 What Desmond calls first transcendence (T1) regards the
transcendence of external objects in the world, related but not reducible to conscious
thought. Second transcendence (T2) is the self-transcendence of subjectivity as it relates
to, yet exceeds and is not reducible to, first transcendence. This is the self-transcending
power of thought about external objects and its freedom within this world of objects.
Third transcendence (T3) refers to a beyond in relation to both nature/being (T1) and
subjectivity (T2). This third type of transcendence is typical of religious or metaphysical
thought and recently has received an endless onto-theological critique. Because this
investigation is not concerned directly with a philosophy or theology of nature, we will
combine the first two into a single category in what will be called ‘self-transcending

6

Of course, posing the problem this way seems to make an absolute distinction between
thought and reality, something problematized by Hegel. In due course we will see how
Hegel formulates his own understanding of subjectivity’s own self-transcendence.
7
William Desmond, Hegel’s God: Counterfeit Double? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003),
2-7.
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immanence’. Self-transcending immanence affirms the non-reducible interrelation
between the transcendence of objects and the self-transcendence of subjects. The second
category affirms an actual transcendence in the ontological sense, and I will just use the
word ‘transcendence’ to signify this ontological meaning.
Hegel will guide our understanding of this self-transcending immanence and his
critical affirmation of another world. As we will see, Hegel critically affirms
transcendence as the necessary passage of thought’s self-determining freedom within this
world. For Hegel, to truly affirm another world is to hinder freedom in this world. In
this sense, actual transcendence competes with the freedom of self-transcendence. On the
other hand, Augustine’s orientation towards transcendence offers an alternative vision
and practice of freedom. Augustine sees God’s transcendence not merely as an opposed
‘other’ (whether epistemic or ontological), but gives an account of God’s ‘selfimmanenting transcendence’ in which God comes into this world in order to re-establish
freedom.8 This study will read “Hegel after Augustine,” as the subtitle suggests, arguing
that Augustine offers a fundamental orientation regarding transcendence, immanence,
and subjectivity.
A Radical Political Subjectivity?
This study, however, will farther restrict itself by not merely focusing on these
philosophical and theological problems, but will ask about political possibilities. Within
their broader orientations between transcendence and immanence, Hegel and Augustine
8

Of course, the cogency and plausibility of these distinctions between Hegel’s ‘selftranscending immanence’ and Augustine’s ‘self-immanenting transcendence’ can only
seen at the end of our investigation. As of yet they only have heuristic value in positing
different fundamental orientations in philosophy and theology.
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represent two forms of understanding freedom and social change. The general questions
of transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity will therefore run through the specific
questions of radical political subjectivity and its capacity for both engaging in social
criticism and offering substantial change. It is for this reason the second subtitle claims
this to be “an essay on political theology.”
To understand the issues surrounding the possibility of a radical political
subjectivity within Hegel and Augustine let us first observe a recent interaction between
Romand Coles and Stanley Hauerwas. Coles seeks to express the possibilities of a
radical democracy understood as a receptive generosity. Hauerwas points to a radical
ecclesiology expressing itself as repentant orthodoxy. Their dialogue, captured in
Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: Conversations between a Radical
Democrat and a Christian, will serve to clarify the terms of this inquiry regarding a
political subjectivity capable of social criticism and change.9
Romand Coles: Radical Democracy as Receptive Generosity
Away from the corporate mega-state, which contains a rhetoric of democracy
even while eroding its possibility, Romand Coles seeks a radical democracy, a democracy
never fully in possession of itself, a democracy that is fugitive in nature.10 Unlike the
attempts to gain a share of State power, radical democracy attempts to share power

9

Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical
Ordinary: Conversations between a Radical Democrat and a Christian (Eugene, Oregon:
Cascade Books, 2007).
10
Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 307. Coles is
drawing from Sheldon Wolin’ s Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in
Western Political Thought, Expanded Edition (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004),
ch. 17 where Wolin sets forth this idea.
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through a persistent tending to others as a process of mutual benefit.11 The characteristics
of such a radical democracy consist in tension-dwelling practices between 1) the past and
future, 2) receptive listening and prophetic voicing, 3) immediate goals and deep
transformation, and 4) cultivating local habits and the habit of de-habituation.12 Radical
democracy is enabled by a receptive generosity and reciprocal mutuality where each
person is open to the other, never fully in possession of oneself. This generosity and
mutuality is cultivated by liturgies—body practices—that form in participants the
capacities of patience, care, dialogue, courage, and fortitude.13 Radical democracy,
therefore, is not a system of governance guided by a constitution, but a continual process
guided by the individuals constituting it.
In his desire for radical democracy, Coles admits to being haunted by John
Howard Yoder, whose ecclesial politics, or radical ecclesiology, embodies many traits of
radical democracy (tension dwelling, generous receptivity, reciprocal mutuality, body
practices, and non-coercive relations).14 But even in this haunting, Coles has two crucial
concerns in regard to Hauerwas’ appropriation and extension of Yoder. First (in the form
of a question), could not the centrality of Christ for Yoder (and Hauerwas) lead
unexpectedly to anti-democratic practices of exclusion? In other words, does not the
emphasis Hauerwas places on orthodoxy lead to the inability of practicing generous
receptivity? And second, concerning the ‘liturgical turn’ in theology and Christian

11

Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 141.
Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 278.
13
Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 323.
14
Romand Coles, Beyond Gated Politics, Ordinary (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2005), 137-138.
12
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ethics,15 might an understanding of Christian ethics as Christian practice embodied and
performed in the liturgy lead to an ethical and political orientation of gathering as a
closed community rather than cultivating a community openly scattered throughout the
world?16 Yet even in the midst of these worrisome questions, Coles, ever true to
practicing generous receptivity, acknowledges that these “undemocratic institutions
linked to orthodoxy” might actually constitute the very conditions of a radical
democracy.17 Or said differently, Coles worries that radical democracy might indeed
require a transcendent orientation for its very possibility of being, even while worrying
that this transcendence also precipitates the forms of exclusion that radical democracy
seeks to avoid.
Stanley Hauerwas: Radical Ecclesiology as Repentant Orthodoxy
In relation to Coles’ concern about the ‘liturgical turn’, Hauerwas wonders how
and where people are formed who are concerned with radical democracy. Certainly they
do not simply drop from the sky. Hauerwas notes that Coles’ account of radical
democracy is significantly developed in conversation with Ella Baker and Cornel West,
both of whom were liturgically formed in an ecclesial tradition to be persons capable of
generous receptivity and prophetic voicing. Without these strong religious traditions,
Hauerwas wonders if these types of people are even conceivable?18

15

See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, eds. Blackwell Companion to
Christian Ethics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004).
16
Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical, p. 211.
17
Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 323.
18
Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 111.
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Second, in relation to Coles’ haunting by John Howard Yoder, Hauerwas suggests
that Yoder would like Coles to be haunted by Jesus instead. In fact, Hauerwas confesses
that he also is haunted by Jesus. In addition to this, Hauerwas intentionally places his
body in positions to be haunted by Jesus. “That I go to church,” says Hauerwas, “does not
mean I think that Jesus is only to be found there. It just means that he has promised to
show up there in a manner that can help us discern how he shows up in other places.”19
Hauerwas emphasizes the ‘liturgical turn’ not to form a closed community, bordered off
and secured from others, but as the principle means by which the otherness of Jesus can
haunt the ecclesial community gathered in his name. The ecclesial community does this
so that it might be scattered in the world to live as Jesus lived. It is not a question of
church against the world, but an emphasis on the church for the world.
Lastly, Hauerwas claims that a commitment to orthodoxy protects the radical
democratic ideal practiced by (or for Hauerwas, inspired by) Jesus. Orthodoxy “names
the developments across time that the Church has found necessary for keeping the story
of Jesus straight” such that “rather than being the denial of radical democracy, orthodoxy
is the exemplification of the training necessary for the formation of a people who are not
only capable of working for justice, but who are themselves just.”20 This relation of
orthodoxy and the liturgical training of a people highlight Hauerwas’ understanding that
only in these practices can radical ecclesial and radical democratic processes flourish. Or
rather, only within these practices can a radical subjectivity flourish, and without them it
will stagnate.
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Indeed, in the midst of claims that Hauerwas’ ecclesial focus fosters an
exclusivism based in an imaginary center (be it orthodoxy, liturgy, or Jesus), Hauerwas
seeks to turn this criticism around. He asks, and is never answered by Coles, “what do
radical democrats do if they do not confess sin?”21 For in the practice of confessing and
repenting of sin, the church takes into account its own failure to be what it ought to be. It
does this not as an excuse for evil nor as an eternal postponement of holiness. Rather the
Church knows from the beginning that it is not in possession of itself, that it has not been
sufficiently haunted by Jesus, by the Spirit of Jesus, the Holy Ghost. The confession of
sin affirms the necessity of a critical distance (from society at large and even from
oneself) and this confession is itself a practice of constructive change in turning from evil
to good.
But if radial democrats do not confess sin, how can they ensure that their practices
of democracy do not become self-possessing? And how do they know there is movement
toward what is good? Does radical democracy even have a category such as sin through
which it can make sense of the need for and failures of a generous receptivity? Or in the
terms Coles uses, if radical democracy requires cultivating the radical habit of dehabituation (i.e. breaking with the oppressive habits of the status quo), this practice of dehabituation must assume both the reality of and access to a horizon transcending such
oppressive habits. For Hauerwas, this transcendence is protected rather than prohibited
by orthodoxy, and accessed through confession of sin.
In this brief summary we see both Coles and Hauerwas emphasizing the need for
establishing a critical distance from the status quo in order to initiate constructive change.
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And both agree that some formative subjectivity is required for such critique and change.
However, they disagree about how best to accomplish these goals. But instead of diving
into their respective works and filling out how they have engaged these issues, we will
seek to investigate the deep division between the two, the division separating much
contemporary political theory, be it theological or not. Between Coles and Hauerwas is a
basic difference in orientation regarding transcendence. While both are devoted to the
establishment of justice and freedom, Coles sees a positive commitment to transcendence
as inimical to a radical democratic practice, and Hauerwas sees such a commitment as
indispensible for such a project. Explaining the differences between these fundamental
orientations leads us to the philosophical and theological systems of Hegel and
Augustine. Examining Hegel and Augustine around the issues of transcendence and
freedom offers a way to understand these more localized disagreements between political
philosophers and theologians, and even between theologians.
Why Hegel and Augustine? An Apologetic Purpose
Why, it might be asked, should we turn to Hegel and Augustine? What possible
recourse can be found from these two for a radical political subjectivity? While each
seemingly begins with an odyssey of the subject, do not both end as fascist
curmudgeons? It should be noted, however, that concerning Hegel, after the recent
demise of Kantian liberalism in the forms of Rawls and Habermas, many are returning to
Hegel as the original critic of Kantian philosophy specifically and of Enlightenment
secularism generally. This return to Hegel has produced a larger amount of research that
dislodges the easily caricaturized Hegel of dialectical monism and political
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conservativism, creating the possibility of a more positive deployment of Hegel within
philosophy and politics. Concerning Augustine, in one sense his theology is perennial for
theology, whether accepted or rejected. But in addition to this, just as with Hegel many
are beginning to question the received Augustine, mining his text within his own cultural
and theological milieu rather than merely as the beginning of supposedly unfavorable
theological developments. The time is ripe for an engagement between these two
stalwarts of theology and philosophy in order to illuminate the similarities and
differences and make clear their contemporary relevancy.
While descriptive commentary is useful, this is not the sole purpose in engaging
Hegel and Augustine. Indeed, Hegel is deployed here as one of, if not the most,
sophisticated attempts at articulating ‘self-transcending immanence’ as a philosophical
system in opposition to transcendence. He does this for the purpose of securing a
positive account of freedom (subjective and social) beyond the negative accounts offered
by Hobbes and his followers. Because of this, Hegel makes the ideal test case for
examining those promoting freedom through a philosophy of ‘self-transcending
immanence’ intended to exclude transcendence. On the other hand, Augustine offers a
theological orientation that emphasizes God’s ‘self-immanenting transcendence’ as the
only possible hope for true freedom. In essence, Hegel claims that transcendence
destroys freedom and Augustine claims that transcendence is the only means to freedom.
At its core, this study seeks to show that Augustine gives a better explanation of and
therefore funds a better practice for freedom. And by practice of freedom I mean the
ability to criticize and constructively change the dominant social system in which a
subject finds itself. Through Augustine, then, it will be argued that the possibility of
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social criticism and substantive change better reside in God’s self-immanenting
transcendence than in our own self-transcending immanence.
I do not want to give the impression, however, that I simply reject everything in
Hegel and accept all of Augustine. In general I can affirm aspects of Hegel’s social and
political philosophy, but not his fundamental orientation regarding a self-transcending
immanence. Because of this I can accept aspects of his understanding of the process of
subjective recognition as social intersubjectivity and the self-transcendence of
consciousness. Conversely, I generally affirm Augustine’s fundamental orientation
regarding God’s self-immanenting transcendence, but not necessarily all aspects of his
theology. Examples would be aspects of the Donatist controversy and parts of his views
on reprobation.
Also, it is not the case that philosophy and theology are being pitted against each
other. It is not the case that Hegel is rejected because he is a philosopher and Augustine
accepted because he is a theologian. Indeed, Hegel is very interested in theological issues
and Augustine in philosophical matters. Both Hegel and Augustine relate philosophy and
theology in such ways as to have made themselves prominent figures in both theology
and philosophy. The issues between them are not theology and philosophy, but rather the
fundamental orientation between transcendence and immanence, here focused on
subjectivity and the possibilities of political criticism and change.
Objections
But there is a problem. Actually two. First, by comparing Hegel as a philosopher
of immanence to Augustine as a theologian of transcendence it seems that I am violating
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the very center of Hegelian thought, that there really is no opposition between
transcendence and immanence, the infinite and the finite. To position Hegel as a
philosopher of immanence may seem to swim against the current of his own thought,
placing Hegel within a binary opposition he would deny. The second objection concerns
the positive comparison between Hegelian and Augustinian subjectivity.
Concerning the first objection, one of the essential purposes of Part One will be to
show that Hegel does not accomplish his goal of uniting the infinite and the finite as a
process of accounting for all ‘otherness’. It will be argued that rather than proving his
point by strict scientific deduction, he instead assumes his conclusions. Hegel gives a
plausible philosophical system of immanence, but one which is ultimately chosen rather
than proven. Of course Augustine does not escape this fate either. But for Augustine, it
is not the case that we choose the system but that the system (God) converts us. That
neither Hegel nor Augustine ultimately prove their case makes this study more of an
aesthetic apologetic based in the plausibility and suitability of Augustine’s position over
Hegel’s.
But it must also be said, in regard to this first objection, that Hegel himself is
given to polemic and binary thought. He definitely thinks that Kant, and all other appeals
to transcendence are wrong. Hegel believes that reflective philosophies of Kantian origin
are inferior to and opposed to his own speculative philosophy. And he definitely thought
that reference to an actual transcendence was positively inimical to the self-determining
freedom of modern thought. And in none of these binary oppositions does he think he is
violating his own philosophy. Too often, an over-hasty denial of binary oppositions is a
refusal to examine the deep presuppositions and orientations within philosophical and
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theological systems. This denial either leads to gross misunderstanding or superficial
agreement among and within philosophy and theology. This investigation in no way
desires to minimize the complexity and subtlety of these issues and therefore will proceed
through detailed inquires into both Hegel and Augustine. But it will nonetheless
persistently return to the question of these fundamental orientations between
transcendence and immanence, focused through the possibility of each to produce and
sustain a radical political subjectivity capable of criticism and change.
The second objection will be discussed in full at the beginning of chapter 5, but
needs to be mentioned here. These fundamental orientations between Hegel and
Augustine will be tested through their respective accounts of subjectivity and politics.
Initially this seems to be the most natural place from which to carry out such a
comparison between Hegel and Augustine given the perceived influence Augustine exerts
on western philosophy and theology and subjective turn. But some have begun to
question the all too easy assimilation of Augustine’s understanding of the subject to
modern, especially Cartesian, accounts of subjectivity.22 It is enough here to note that I
am in complete sympathy with the criticisms concerning the relative equivalence of
Augustinian and modern subjectivity, and that it is exactly this lack of congruence that
gives Augustine the resources by which a radical political subjectivity is produced.
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Outline
This study proceeds in two parts, the first concerning Hegel and the second on
Augustine. Each part contains three chapters. Chapter one looks at recent interpretations
of Hegel’s political philosophy given by Robert Pippin and Slavoj Žižek. This will offer
entrance into the field of Hegelian studies and its recent post-Kantian emphasis on selfdetermining freedom. It will be shown that these two contemporary interpretations end in
drastically different positions, with Pippin focused on evolutionary social practices and
Žižek on revolutionary subjective acts. The question arising from this chapter concerns
whether such a dichotomy necessarily follows from Hegel or only from his interpreters.
To answer this question one must be thoroughly acquainted with Hegel’s philosophical
project. Chapter two, therefore, introduces Hegel’s philosophical and social project of
“being at home with oneself in one’s other” (E §24 A2) in two steps. First, his Logic is
examined as the linchpin of Hegel’s philosophy. Entrance will be made by looking at
Hegel’s derivation of the concept of the true infinite from the concept of being. This
derivation of the true infinite (which unites the finite and infinite) is utilized by Hegel to
ward off the need to reference an unthinkable transcendence (an ‘other’) beyond
consciousness. In the second portion of this chapter we will turn to his Phenomenology
and examine both the course and development of consciousness into self-consciousness
and how Hegel utilizes his conception of the true infinite within this development. This
chapter is essential for (1) properly understanding Hegel’s philosophy, for (2)
understanding the claim that his philosophy is committed to self-transcending
immanence, and for (3) its argument that Hegel ultimately fails in providing a
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presuppositionlesss beginning for his philosophy. Chapter three, concluding part one,
will examine the political consequences of Hegel’s philosophy of freedom. This chapter
will determine that the dichotomy between Pippin and Žižek reproduces an inherent
instability within Hegel’s system leading toward his failure in securing a radical political
subjectivity capable of both social criticism and substantive change.
Part two will move from Hegel’s attempt at “being at home with oneself in one’s
other” to Augustine’s pilgrimage of the soul in its return to the God who is both
absolutely other and intimately the same as humanity. Similar to chapter one, chapter
four will examine contemporary interpretations of Augustine’s political theology,
represented by John Milbank and Eric Gregory, each positioning Augustine’s ontological
commitments alongside the concerns of modern liberalism. While not denying these
ontological commitments, but centering on the process of subjective formation, chapter
five examines Augustine’s Confessions and its depiction of the bondage and conversion
of the will. This chapter will begin to outline how Augustine integrates the subjective
and social aspects of the conversion of the will. This chapter will show how this
integration is only possible because of the self-immanenting transcendence of God in the
Incarnation. Chapter six turns from the prodigal rebellion of the will to the pilgrim
journey of the city of God. It looks at how God’s self-immanenting transcendence
founds and establishes a truly just society, changing from a city dominated by the desire
for domination to a city opening in love toward God and neighbor. The conclusion will
gather together the threads of these various arguments to show that concern for a radical
political subject, capable not only of offering criticism but also engaging in change, must
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abandon all Hegelian forms of self-transcending immanence in favor of a more
Augustinian self-immanenting transcendence.
Subjectivity, Matter, and Time
One last issue must be raised so that it can be placed to the side until the
conclusion. This investigation centers on the issues of a radical political subjectivity. As
we will see in chapter two, because Hegel is so focused on question of thought (via a
social self-consciousness) the issue of time and matter are effectively bracketed out of
our exposition. This is not the case for Augustine as he links questions of subjectivity
(and its conversion) to ontological issues that questions of matter are much more difficult
to avoid. Likewise, because Augustine is more concerned with the transformation of
subjectivity, and society, this entails raising issues of temporality (which Augustine is
keenly aware of in the tenth book of the Confessions). But in order to keep this project to
a manageable size, these issues (of matter and time) are for the most part left unexplored
until the conclusion.
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CHAPTER 1: HEGEL IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Thinking immediately involves freedom.1
Introduction
As noted in the introduction, after the demise of a Kantian/Rawlsian political
philosophy of secular rights and duties, many are returning to Hegel as offering a model
of post-secular political philosophy able to both include substantive social practices and
even robust religious life.2 This contemporary return to Hegel exhibits two seemingly
opposed expressions: one in the form of social self-legislating historical practices
resulting in inter-subjective recognition; the other in the form of radical subjectivity
persisting within the dialectic failure of the social reconciliation. The former focuses on
the evolution of social normativity while the latter on the revolution of radical
subjectivity. After the overcoming of metaphysics (post-Heideggerian for contemporary
interpreters, post-Kantian for German Idealists like Hegel), readings of Hegel fall within
these two broad frameworks. The ‘normative Hegel’ is expressed through the work of
Robert Pippin. And the ‘radical Hegel’ offered by Slavoj Žižek. Interpreting the work of
these two will take up the bulk of this chapter as a way of orienting ourselves within the
landscape of contemporary Hegelian studies. In addition to this we will begin to see the
problems within Hegel’s system of ‘self-transcending immanence’.
1
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2
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This return to Hegel, however, can only be properly understood as an overturning
of the metaphysical interpretation of Hegel. For many, Charles Taylor’s Hegel
effectively reintroduced Hegel to American philosophy in 1975, and did so by reading
Hegel metaphysically. Taylor sees Hegel responding to and uniting the two diverse
Enlightenment strands of radical moral autonomy and Romantic expressive unity.3 To do
this Hegel must overcome the oppositions between the “knowing subject and his world,
between nature and freedom, between individual and society, and between finite and
infinite spirit.”4 Hegel did not to want refer to some general pantheism that places
humanity as an insignificant part within the cosmic substance. Instead, Hegel modified
Spinoza and Schelling, so that human subjectivity would not be lost in the cosmic
substance.
But overcoming these opposition requires more than the unity of substance and
subject, and therefore Hegel turns to Geist. Taylor explicates Geist through Hegel’s
account of the human subject.5 In Taylor’s account, the human subject for Hegel is both
a living being (animal) and a thinking/expressive being (rational), and as such is
necessarily embodied in a double sense. As an animal, the human body has a form of life
and therefore also a natural limit. But as a thinking and expressive being, humanity
always creates tangible modes of expressing its thoughts, constituting the second form of
embodiment. But following Kant, consciousness is always both continuous and
discontinuous with this embodied way of life, separating thought from desire, reason
from nature, intention from inclination. This consciousness divides humanity from itself
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resulting in the unfortunate, even if expected, articulation in Cartesian dualism. Within
this embodied alienation “man is thus inescapably at odds with himself.”6 Or in a more
Hegelian idiom, “the subject is both identical with and opposed to his embodiment”
because thinking cannot exist without embodiment even while it struggles against this
embodiment.7
But rather than the non-coincidence of life and expression for the human subject,
cosmic Geist unites the embodiment of life and expression because the universe is
already the embodiment of Geist. For Geist to fully express itself in the universe as free
and rational a consciousness must exist in the universe as an external embodiment (or
expression) of self-determining rational freedom of Geist. This embodied expression of
Geist is finite spirit, or human subjectivity. Human individuals are not merely fragments
of the universe, parts of the cosmic whole, but are “vehicles of cosmic spirit.”8 While
everything in the universe is an expression of Geist expressing itself, humanity is the
culminating vehicle of this expression, especially when humanity comes to know itself as
rationally free.
For Hegel, on Taylor’s reading, the differences between nature and freedom,
individual and society, finite and infinite each express moments of the original unity of
Geist now externally embodied, but returning toward unity as self-conscious freedom.
This is the basis for Hegel’s claim to being an idealist, that the “Idea becomes its other,
and then returns into self-consciousness in Geist.”9 As Geist passes through its other,
which is embodied existence as the universe, we see that “absolute idealism means that
6
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nothing exists which is not a manifestation of the Idea, that is, of rational necessity,” and
that “absolute idealism is related to the Platonic notion of the ontological priority of
rational order, which underlies external existence, and which external existence strives to
realize,” foremost of which is human subjectivity as self-legislating freedom.10 Taylor’s
interpretation of cosmic Geist working through human self-consciousness as the
expression of Geist’s own essence constitutes the metaphysical reading of Hegel. And
that those like Pippin and Žižek seek to overturn this interpretation in their return to
Hegel.
In the first section of this chapter we will examine how Robert Pippin understands
Hegel. The second section will examine the work of Slavoj Žižek and his drastically
different rendering of Hegel. In their reaction against the metaphysical reading of Hegel
proposed by Taylor and others, Pippin and Žižek exemplify two currents in political
appropriation of Hegel. The former is concerned with autonomy established through
social practices, and the latter thinks of autonomy as established against social practices.
These opposed interpretation will serve to introduce Hegel’s main concerns while also
beginning to show the inherent instability caused by the Hegelian system of selftranscending immance. This instability will cause us to drive into Hegel system in the
next chapter.
1. Evolutionary Social Practices: Autonomy through sociality
Against a metaphysically monist, or idealistically spiritualist reading of Hegel,
and the materialist reduction into a historical method, Klaus Hartmann began articulating
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a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel as one working out the categorial structure of
thought or reason.11 This began preparing the way for interpreters like Robert Pippin.
For Hartmann, Hegel’s Logic is reconstructive of human thought. Unlike Taylor for
whom human subjectivity is the vehicle for Geist, for Hartmann “the vehicle of
reconstruction will be concepts or categories” and the procedure of this reconstruction is
dialectical.12 Hegel’s philosophy only attempts an integrative, systematic reconstruction
of thought without presupposition. Within Hegel’s framework, thought encounters its
other in the world or as being. As this other enters into thought and makes a difference to
thought in the mode of negation. The otherness of being is established in thought as
‘being thought’ and therefore as the negation of being itself. The thought of something
‘being though’ is its ‘determinate negation’. This conflict of being and negation, which
brings being into thought, is the dialectic procedure by which content is placed within the
immanence of thought. Because of this process “Hegel’s philosophy appears to us as
categorial theory, i.e. as non-metaphysical philosophy, or as a philosophy devoid of
existence claims and innocent of a reductionism opting for certain existences to the
detriment of others.”13
The perspective of Hegel as providing a pure category theory, claims Hartmann,
strips the needs for picturing, or representing (Vorstellung) how knowledge of things
comes about, i.e. bridging the subject-object divide. The cost of breaking down this
bridge is the price of circularity: reason can only be satisfied when “it can accept things

11

Klaus Hartmann, “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View,” in G.W.F. Hegel: Critical
Assessments, vol. 3, ed. Robert Stern (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 224.
12
Taylor, Hegel, 244.
13
Taylor, Hegel, 248.

24
on its own terms, within the immanence of thought.”14 Because of this circularity one
cannot ask the question of the cause of the universe because such a question is a category
mistake for Hegel. Likewise, the questions of realphilosophie overstep the bound of the
Hegel’s Logic, mistaking itself as a normative rather than reconstructive system.
Hartmann is against a ‘maximal’ reading of Hegel which extends the dialectic of
categories to actual existence and the processes of contingency. This is the metaphysical
reading that Hartmann sees as indefensible philosophically (even though he concedes it is
an exegetically defensible reading of Hegel). Hartmann instead opts for a ‘minimal’, or
non-metaphysical, interpretation that sees Hegel’s achievement as mapping the interior
categories of thought.15
This problem with Hartmann’s interpretation is that order to save Hegel from a
seemingly pre-critical metaphysics of cosmic Geist Hegel is reduced to a Kantian variant.
Hartman separates thought from being and makes being only internal, or immanent, to
thought. This move fails to avoid Kant’s ontological skepticism, a problem motivating
Hegel’s entire system (i.e. Hegel desired to abolish the noumenal/phenomenal divide).
Hartmann’s Hegel argues for the necessity of the categories, but not why we should both
understand the world in those categories and how we have come to this understanding as
both normative for and yet true of the world. And most importantly, the separation of the
Logic from the realphilosophie reintroduces Kantian ethical formalism, a situation Hegel
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also sought to avoid (i.e. Hegel desired to abolish the opposition between nature and
freedom).16
Robert Pippin has taken up the challenge of offering a more consistent reading of
Hegel as a non-metaphysical thinker. Making a strong argument for understanding Hegel
as a post-Kantian philosopher, Pippen seeks a third way between the right Hegelians who
postulate a “philosophically problematic theological metaphysics” and the left Hegelian
who run to the margins of Hegel’s texts looking for useful conclusions and formulations
amid a thoroughly historical methodology (but Pippin is admits he is also offering a left
Hegelian interpretation of agency as socio-historical achievement).17 Pippen presents
Hegel as a non-metaphysical thinker, yet still speculative in his idealism, extending
Kant’s critical epistemology. This ‘absolute idealism’ does not revert back to a
precritical cosmic mind, i.e. the human subjectivity writ large for Talyor, but rather is
Hegel’s solution to the perceived failure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, or said
differently, Hegel’s Begriff is merely a variation on Kant’s “transcendental unity of
apperception.”18 With a rejection of Kant’s strict divide between concept and intuition,
opting for their perpetual interweaving, Pippin argues for a Hegel who is always in need
of a Phenomenology as the historically formed content which is schematized in his Logic.
The focus below will be on Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s practical philosophy as an
extension of Kant’s critical project. For Pippin, Hegel reinterprets Kantian freedom as
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social self-legislation, historically achieved through practices and institutions, resulting in
mutual recognition as inter-subjective institutional relatedness. Each of these movements
articulates Pippin’s version of the self-transcending immanence of Hegelian philosophy.
Pippin’s goal is to show that Hegel can be interpreted non-metaphysically without merely
reducing him to Kant. Instead, within a post-Kantian trajectory, Hegel offers new
answers to these Kantian problems. Kant’s problems and Hegel’s answers will be
explored around Pippin own themes of freedom as ‘self-legislation’.
Kantian Self-Legislation
The problem of freedom within modernity often comes down to attempts to
reconcile the individual and society. To understand Hegel’s contribution to this problem
we must first understand how Kant adopts the problem of self-legislation from Rousseau.
Rousseau sought to reconcile the original independence of natural humanity with the
dependence of humanity in society, or more colorfully, to reconcile the fact that “man is
born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”19 The natural savage, who at one time lived
within himself, now lives outside himself, in society, mistaking this exteriority for
freedom.20 But Rousseau does not opt for a mere return to a natural setting, but poses the
problem of how to achieve independence through societal dependence. This is not the
search for a relatively unconstrained freedom of non-interference as we seek to secure
19
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our needs or desires (from Hobbes to Nozick). Rather, it is a reconciliation of our
particular wills and the general good of society, expressed as the general will. Only in
this ‘general will’ can one achieve freedom as independence without denying the fact of
social dependency. Indeed, the ideal society would be structured to mediate economic
and psychological dependence in order to flourish personal independence. Only in this
society would it make sense that one could be “forced to be freed.”21
Kant take from Rousseau the desire for freedom as more than non-interference,
but rather than basing it on a vague conception of the “general will,” Kant produces an
argument from reason expressed as the categorical imperative. The basis of moral action
is to “act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it
should become a universal law.”22 This universal law, or norm as Pippin prefers, is not
imposed externally, but rather is self-legislated by reason. Respecting others as an end,
rather than a means, is to posit humanity itself as an ultimate value or norm to be
followed. This norm is not something other than the capacity to set and evaluate norms
according to reason, such that the categorical imperative is a self-legislated law, not
externally imposed by nature or force, but internally posited by reason.23 This positing
by reason, for Kant, is a process of individual reflective endorsement where each applies
the standards of reason to one’s own actions. For Kant, this reflective endorsement is
meant to solves Rousseau’s problem of the general will because self-legislating reason is
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not something more than individual reason as will. The cost, however, of Kantian selflegislation as individual reason’s own reflective endorsement is that morality is separated
from politics causing a separation between individual and society. It is here, with the
success of Kantian self-legislation but the failure of social reconciliation, that Pippin sees
Hegel moves the argument forward.
Spirit as Socio-Historical Achievement
Remembering that the “Kantian notion of self-legislation is the center of
everything” for Hegel,24 we can now examine Pippin’s understanding of Hegel’s neoKantian political theory, beginning with his understanding of Geist. Often rendered by
the “almost meaningless and now standard translation” of ‘spirit,’ regularly
misunderstood as a cosmic mind or soul, Pippin understands Geist as the “state of normgoverned individual and collective mindedness…and institutionally embodied
recognitive relations.”25 Pippin’s understanding of Geist draws from a “distinct and
controversial interpretation” of Hegel’s Encylopedia and its linking of nature and Geist as
anti-dualistic, as self-relating, and as the achievement of freedom.26
For Pippin, Geist is neither material nor immaterial because it is not a thing at all
Rather Geist is Hegel’s way of expressing a non-dualistic relation between nature and
mind. Geist is not divine mind manifesting itself in nature, but rather the truth of nature
in which nature vanishes [verschwunden] (PSS 1:24-25), yet not other than nature.27 The
truth and vanishing of nature in Geist indicates the inappropriateness of purely natural
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causality as an explanation for the complexity of certain natural organisms who “come to
be occupied with themselves and eventually to understand themselves no longer
appropriately explicable within the boundaries of nature.”28 The divide between nature
and Geist is therefore not an ontological one, but an explanatory or a normative one, such
that humanity has established for itself that while being part of nature it is inappropriate
to reduce human achievements and aspirations to merely natural phenomena.29
Because of it non-reducible to natural, Geist must be understood as self-relating.
For Hegel, sentient creatures do not merely embody their natures, but employ a mediated
and self-directed stance toward their natures. The reflected, self-conscious stance of
humanity is really the source of the nature-Geist distinction as humanity seeks to render
intelligible its natural embodiment and it reflective achievements.30 Geist is self-relating
because it knows itself as Geist in its distinction from, and yet dependence on, nature. In
this way Geist comes to know itself when it makes the normative distinction between
itself and nature, becoming self-relational in the process. But it must be remembered that
this overcoming or vanishing of nature, is not based in an alternative ontological entity
acting upon nature. Rather, while not reducible to nature, the achieved distinction of selfrelating Geist best considered as “not non-natural.”31
All of this is a way of saying Geist is best understood as an achieved freedom
from, but in, nature. This independence from nature is a capacity historically achieved,
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not naturally given or cosmically received. According to Pippin, Hegel sees the human
mindedness of Geist as
something like achievements, modes of self- and other-relation and so ways of
making sense of, taking a stance with regard to, nature and one’s own nature that
can be reached, or not, and these are of course achievements actually reached by
nothing other than creatures otherwise describable as bits of matter in space and
time.32
Geist, therefore, is freedom from nature, while remaining within it, such that selfactualization is not some cosmic mind or Geist expressing itself through nature and
history. Geist is rather “a kind of socio-historical achievement (the achievement of
certain practices and institutions) which some natural beings are capable of” such that
there is a “continuity between natural and spiritual dimensions.”33 Geist is the capacity
for freedom of thought and action that is a practical and historical achievement, an
achievement not requiring an ontological distinction between nature and spirit.34 As
Pippin says,
Spirit, understood this way (that is, by taking full account of the anti-dualism
claim and the insistence that development is a self-determining development) is
thus not the emergence of a non-natural substance, but reflects only the growing
capacity of still naturally situated beings in achieving more and more successfully
a form of normative and genuinely autonomous like-mindedness.35
This achievement as self-relating freedom connects to the Kantian concerns of selflegislation, but now socially constituted as a historically achieved norm, rather than an
individually, reflectively endorsed norm. That Geist is a product of itself, relating to
itself, mirrors Kant’s concern that one gives oneself one’s own law.
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Geist, as the socially normative sphere of “not non-natural” human existence
represents Pippin’s articulation of self-transcending immanence. Geist is immanent to
natural processes but self-transcends them through its own normative self-relation.
Human sociality as historical achievement is exactly the form of Hegelian selftranscending immanence for Pippin. But as we will see, Hegel’s concept of Geist is
meant to extend beyond merely a socio-historical achievement into an account of mutual
recognition ending in autonomy as social self-legislation.
Mutual Recognition as Condition for Freedom
The last major step in Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel’s practical philosophy
centers on an understanding of mutual recognition, the fact of which establishes and
ensures actual freedom. The language of achievement used by Pippin throughout marks
Hegel’s account of human nature as neither essentialist nor teleological. Because of this
individuals are neither liberal autonomous agents nor communitarian instances of society,
however those are to be construed, because this would be to lapse into essentialist or
teleological renderings of humanity. Neither the individual nor society can become the
sole basis for deducing the other, but rather the individual and society are both considered
as rational achievements. Pippin claims that positing such a gradualist account of
achieved social norms must eventually be able to account for its own understanding of
itself.36 How is this accomplished?
Hegel’s account of the struggle for recognition attempts to fill this process of
achieved social norms. Against the widely accepted Marxist interpretation that chapter
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four of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit offers a struggle for recognition as the
formation of subjectivity, Pippin argues this section, and the entire work, offers an
account of the conditions of freedom. For Pippin, the question of freedom, not the
question of subjectivity, guides Hegel’s discussion such that the struggle is not a
individual, psychological struggle for recognition, but rather a struggle for the adequate
conditions for asserting and realizing freedom. When the positions of Lord and
Bondsman emerge after a struggle to the death, the Lord, who would forsake life to assert
freedom, and the Bondsman not willing to forsake life, the problem that emerges for
Hegel is not the psychological dispositions or motivations of each. Rather the problem is
the objective failure of each to have achieved the goal of freedom because the Lord is
now seeking recognition from one who is unworthy to grant it, and the Bondsman
recognizes the Lord but is not recognized in return. In Pippin’s paraphrase of the
situation,
The dilemma is that the objective social situation is such that neither can find any
way of dealing with each other in normative terms; no exchange of justificatory
reasons is possible in such a context, and so the very determination of what was done
remains provisional and indeterminate…[because] each is striving to be free under
conditions that will not allow the realization of freedom.37
Hegel traces this breakdown of mutual recognition through the social organization of
labor, and then through general figures of consciousness attempting to justify or
legitimate this inequality: the figures of Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy
Consciousness. These failed attempts at securing freedom reveal the need not only for a
socio-pragmatic and historical account of freedom, but also an institutional account of
mutual recognition. Pippin outlines this institutional account consisting of (1) a free
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subject being recognized as such by (2) another such subject in (3) a concrete practice of
mutual recognition (4) achieved as successful norms of mutual justification.38 This
mutual recognition as participating in mutual justification means to treat others and
oneself as reason-givers and reason-responders within a normative social framework.39
Pippin notes that for Hegel this recognition is always institutional, but not
institutional in the strict sense in which Hegel delineates as within the family, civil
society, and the state. For Pippin, in an admittedly deflationary move,40 institutional
recognition is the claim that we are always already giving and receiving practical reasons
within a context, from a social-institutional position, where the rules governing social
interaction are already established. But this is not a positivistic claim about institutional
structures. Rather this is a claim for the discursive nature of giving and receiving reasons
for one’s actions: i.e., one always argues from the position of being a parent in regard to
children, a property owner in regard to one’s possessions, as a business person in regard
to fulfilling a contract, and as a citizen in regard to taxation. Hegel’s point is that these
are already viable institutional positions from which one gives and receives reasons, not
requiring a higher discourse for justification.
Because all institutions are revisable, breaking down and changing, Pippin claims
that Hegel should not be read as a cultural positivist.41 These fundamental changes occur
in institutions not because an agent has done something different, but rather because what
can be justified as reasonable by that agent becomes different. For Pippin, “requesting,
providing, accepting, or rejecting practical reasons…are all better viewed as elements in a
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rule-governed social practice” where justifications for actions are offered to others.42
When a crises arrives within these practices there can be no recourse to a meta-discourse
to resolve the issues (i.e. Kant’s categorical imperative) because one can never exit these
discursive institutions. In the process of justifying one’s actions one must always accept
an opponent’s claim as a move within their own space of reasons, only then countering
by offering and attempting to convince them of your alternative understanding of the
issues. Pippin points to the development of equal right for women as an instance of this
institutional revision and transformation.43 For Pippen, Hegel’s view on practical reason
is that
Human subjects are, and are wholly and essentially, always already under way
historically and socially, and even in their attempts to reason about what anyone,
any time ought to do, they do so from an institutional position.44
Or we could say, these institutional positions are the evolving normative frameworks in
which Geist produces itself, relating to itself as self-legislating freedom. In this
interpretation, Hegel is not relying on a monistic substance or cosmic mind to ground
institutional necessity, but understands Geist as social self-actualization, achieved
through shared justificatory practices of giving and receiving reasons for one’s actions,
and recognizing oneself in those actions and justifications, as well as through the actions
of others.
Evaluation
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In summary, then, Pippin suggests a Hegel having much in common with strains
of American pragmatism and its understanding of social normativity and rationality.45
Pippin’s Hegel has much to say to the problems of contemporary practical philosophy in
regard to how we understand the development of historical and social practices, and how
we communally justify our actions to each other, and therefore achieve recognition,
without adopting an atomistic individualism.46 In these ways Pippen navigates between a
Kantian liberal atomism of individuals self-actualization before the moral law and a
communitarianism that speaks eloquently of social dependence yet offers no real
explanation for how this might function. For Pippin, Hegel is an advocate of
evolutionary social practice promoting a rational freedom such that authentic autonomy is
achieved through sociality. These evolutionary social practices are the life of Geist, the
self-transcending achievement beyond, yet within, the immanence of nature.
Pippin’s reading of Hegel, however, is self-consciously a reconstruction of the
emergence of justificatory social practices of recognition as an achievement. His account
never attempts to explain how a present justificatory practice is actually challenged, and
most importantly by whom.47 But it should be asked, given Pippin’s account, where does
an Antigone come from who challenges Creon? Where does a Socrates come from who
becomes a gadfly within Athens? Where does a Jesus come from who would challenge
both the Jewish and Roman practices? Where is this subjectivity constituted, in order to
45
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challenge, the social practices that have evolved in each shape of Geist? Pippin’s Hegel
offers no resources for such a subjectivity because for him the question of ‘beyond’ is
already outside the orbit of Hegel’s philosophy. As we will see at the end of chapter
three, Pippin, like Hegel, feels no compulsion to offer an account of a radical subjectivity
ready and able to break from social norms precisely because there is no need to break
from them. There is no need to break from them because, for Pippin and his Hegel, the
modern project and its institutions best reflects the normative achievements of humanity.
2. Revolutionary Radical Act: Autonomy Against Sociality.
Slavoj Žižek does not agree with this positive assessment of modern institutions
nor this normative account of Hegel. Žižek agrees that Hegel disallows reference to an
ontological beyond. But for Žižek this is exactly to mobilize a radical subjectivity
beyond social normativity. He accomplishes this by offering a Hegel radically open to
the slippages within reality (ontological and social). Žižek’s Hegel, driven by a dialectics
of failure rather than one of progressive reconciliation, offers a political subjectivity
capable of escaping the dominant social order, able to break with the normative status
quo. This radical subjectivity engages in revolutionary acts against the normative social
order.
Kantian Completion
Žižek constantly seeks to correct the cartoon version of Hegelian dialectics
commonly understood as “the self-mediation of the Notion which externalizes itself,
posits its content in its independence and actuality, and then internalizes it, [and]
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recognizes itself in it.”48 In agreement with Pippin, Žižek understands Hegel not as a
dialectical panlogicist for whom all reality is merely the drama of cosmic mind.
Žižek argues that Hegel does not regress from the Kantian critical insight, falling
back into a pre-critical metaphysics, but instead pushes the Kantian critique into the
spaces Kant feared to go. Hegel concluded beyond Kant
that every tension between Notion and reality, every relationship of the Notion to
what appears as its irreducible Other encountered in the sensible, extra-notional
experience, already is an intra-notional tension, i.e., already implies a minimal
notional determination of this “otherness.49
What Kant lacks in his critique is the very critique of the Ding-an-sich. Kant sees das
Ding as the limit of phenomena, the thing that transcends notional thought. Žižek claims
that Hegel inverts this limitation such that it is not the Kantian Thing in its inaccessible
transcendence that limits our representational grasp. Rather it is the chaotic movement of
the manifold of sensations that must be limited in order for phenomena to appear in the
first place. This act of limiting creates both the possibility of phenomena and the
projection, or illusion, of the Ding-an-sich residing behind or beyond phenomenal
appearances. It is for this reason that “limitation precedes transcendence,” explaining
why ultimately it is phenomena that are central to Hegel, not noumena.50
Rather than Hegel returning to a metaphysics of the Absolute, Žižek sees Hegel as
reproaching Kant for keeping one foot within classical metaphysics and its beyond by
clinging to das Ding, even if devoid of content. Instead of filling in this noumena void

48

Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder: on Schelling and Related Matters, (London;
New York: Verso, 1996), 6.
49
Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 20 (italics in original). Žižek notes Pippin’s
Hegel’s Idealism for this insight.
50
Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative, 37.

38
with Absolute Knowledge, as usually claimed, Hegel instead extends Kant’s
epistemological void into an ontological one.51 The problem with Kant thinking his
Critique of Pure Reason “as the critical ‘prolegomena’ to a future metaphysics” is that
Kant does not realize that it “already is the only possible metaphysics.”52 Hegel
completes this critical turn not with a return to classical metaphysics, nor merely a
notional non-metaphysical logic, but with an additional turn of the critical screw by
claiming that the epistemological limitation for us is also the ontological limitation of the
world itself. This claim, however, is difficult to grasp for those no initiated in German
Idealism.
For Žižek, Hegel completes Kant by supplementing Kant’s formulation that the
conditions of possibility for our knowledge are the same as the conditions of possibility
of the object of our knowledge with its reverse:
the limitations of our knowledge (its failure to grasp the Whole of Being, the way
our knowledge gets inexorably entangled in contradictions and inconsistencies) is
simultaneously the limitation of the very object of our knowledge, that is, the gaps
and voids in our knowledge of reality are simultaneously the gaps and voids in the
“real” ontological edifice itself.53
In this way, rather than placing the antinomies of reason within our epistemological
finitude, postulating a self-consistent thing-in-itself beyond our grasp, Hegel bites the
ontological bullet and posits reality itself as inconsistent. Hegel’s achievement then is
that
far from regressing from Kant’s criticism to pre-critical metaphysics expressing
the rational structure of the cosmos, Hegel fully accepts (and draws the
consequences from) the result of the Kantian cosmological antinomies—there is
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no “cosmos,” the very notion of cosmos as the ontologically fully constituted
positive totality is inconsistent.54
As commentator Adrian Johnston notes, Žižek italicizes “is” rather than “no” when he
says “there is no cosmos” drawing our attention to the fact that for Žižek being itself is
this inconsistency, not merely our knowledge of it, because “being ‘is’ this very acosmos,
this unstable absence of a cohesive, unifying One-All.”55 And for Žižek’s Hegel, because
there is no beyond, no consistent Ding-an-sich in its unknowableness, the play between
appearance and essence, and understanding and reason must change, leading to a changed
understanding of both substance and subject.
The problem with Kant is that he does not push his critical philosophy far enough
because he continues to presuppose that das Ding “exists as something positively given
beyond the field of representation,” where as Hegel pushes this critique by claiming that
“there is nothing beyond phenomenality, beyond the field of representation.”56 In other
words, when traditional philosophy makes a distinction between something’s mere
appearance and its true essence, Hegel always opts for the appearance.
Žižek makes this point regarding appearance and essence with reference to
Hegel’s distinction between positing reflection, external reflection, and determinate
reflection.57 Taking hermeneutics as an example, ‘positing reflection’ is a naïve reading
of a text, claiming immediate intelligibility because the text itself is perspicuous. It is
‘positing reflection’ because it directly posits it object. But under pressure of diverse and
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conflicting interpretations, ‘positing reflection’ gives way to ‘external reflection’ that
posits the essence of the text, its true meaning, as existing behind the text in an
unattainable realm transcending our knowledge. ‘External reflection’, then, is the
admission and accumulation of distorted pieces of the text’s true meaning, reflected
through our finite capacities. This is the Kantian position that the appearance of the text
hides its true essence, which stands behind or beyond the mere appearance. The move
from ‘external’ to ‘determinate reflection’ is to become aware that the positing of an
eternal essence is internal to appearance itself as appearance. According to Žižek, the
necessity of postulating an essence behind the text is that which allows the text itself to
appear. Or as Žižek says, “what appears, to ‘external reflection, as an impediment is in
fact a positive condition of our access to Truth” because “‘essence’ itself is nothing but
the self-rupture, the self-fissure of the appearance…The fissure between appearance and
essence is internal to the appearance itself.”58 This is all another way of indicating
Hegel’s ontological extension of the Kantian critique of epistemology.
This difference between ‘external’ and ‘determinate reflection’ is mirrored in the
difference between understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft). For Hegel,
understanding (Verstand) functions in the realm of the Kantian critique, of ‘external
reflection’, positing a beyond in which objects reside, eluding our discursive grasp. The
movement to reason (Vernunft) is not to add something new to the understanding; it is not
raising the understanding to a higher level within the Absolute. Rather, reason merely
subtracts ‘the beyond’ from the understanding. Between understanding and reason is not
a choice between the two, but the choice to deactivate reference to any ‘beyond’ because
58
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“Understanding, deprived of the illusion that there is something beyond it, is Reason.”59
In the end, one is always at the level of understanding, it just depends on whether there is
reference to a beyond or not. The Hegelian logic of reason (the notion) is not another
logic which accomplishes what the understanding failed to do (knowing things-inthemselves), but is rather the repetition of the logic of understanding without reference to
a beyond, realizing itself as pure self-relation.60 This mirrors the claim that one is always
on the level of appearance, whether or not one posits that the essence stands behind
appearance or one posits that appearance creates the illusion of essence. This complex
issues will be further explored in the next chapter when we examine Hegel’s Science of
Logic.
A further consequence of this relationship between understanding and reason is
that the typical explanation of Hegelian dialectic as moving from an initial harmony of
immediate self-identity into a disharmony of difference, then resulting in a new harmony
of a higher and more complex order, is shown to be false. Instead, as with the difference
between appearance and essence, and understanding and reason, this new harmony is in
fact just the consummation of the loss of the original harmony, rather than a new
substantial unity.61 Hegelian dialectics does not overcome disharmony or difference, but
accepts difference ontologically rather than merely epistemologically. Therefore, “far
from being a story of progressive overcoming, dialectics is for Hegel a systematic
notation of the failure of all such attempts—‘absolute knowledge’ denotes a subjective
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position which finally accepts ‘contradiction’ as an internal condition of every identity.”62
On this view, rather than instituting the totalizing system par excellence, Hegel is
advocating for the very displacement of every totalizing system.63
Self-Divided Substance, and Subject
The interplay between appearance and essence and between understanding and
reason, each moving through or beyond reference to a ‘beyond,’ takes us to the heart of
the Žižekian project by helping us understand what Hegel means in the Phenomenology
when he says that the Absolute, or Truth, be conceived “not only as Substance, but also
as Subject.”64 For Žižek this should be taken as meaning exactly the opposite of what
many suppose it to mean. The subject is not elevated to the status of some absolute
substance or cosmic mind, swallowing all substantial content according to is all
devouring dialectical process. Rather this phrase refers to the debasing of substance to the
status of the divided or fractured subject. Žižek points out that the Phenomenology is the
story of the repeated failures of the subject to truly account for the world and itself. For
Žižek, when Hegel says that the Absolute is “not only Substance, but also Subject,” this
does not mean that subjectivity is constitutive of reality, but rather that
there simply is no such ‘absolute subject’, since the Hegelian subject is nothing
but the very movement of unilateral self-deception…‘Substance as Subject’
means precisely that this movement of self-deception, by means of which a
particular aspect posits itself as the universal principle, is not external to
Substance but constitutive of it.65
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The subject, then, is not elevated to the dignified status of substance, but rather substance
is lowered to the fragmented level of the subject, always trying yet failing to make sense
of the world. The main point for Žižek is that it is the subject that, incessantly searching
behind appearances for an enduring essence, fails to understand it (the subject) is the one
positing the essence behind the appearances. Hegel’s idealism begins when this illusion
is given up. For Žižek, “‘unmasking this illusion’ does not mean that ‘there is nothing to
see behind the phenomena, [for] there is nothing but this nothing itself, ‘nothing’ which is
the subject.”66 What Žižek is proposing here is not a simple denial of reality within an
anti-realist perspective, which is nothing but the subjective idealism of Kant, but rather
the positive functioning and existence of ‘nothing.’ The point around which sensible,
phenomenal reality is organized and made meaningful is nothing, a nothing that is the
subject who suspends all meaning.67 Meaning is ‘suspended’ by the subject in its twofold
sense: that from which something hangs or is held up, or the barring or prohibiting of an
action.
That subjectivity is the nothing around which meaning/appearance gathers means
that subjectivity is always pathologically biased, limited, and distorting because while
there can be no reality apart from the constituting subject (pace Kant), every subject is
situated within reality while at the same time cut off from itself.68 As Žižek says, “There
is no ‘absolute Subject’—subject ‘as such’ is relative, caught in self-division, and it is as
such that the Subject is inherent to the Substance.”69 This structurally biased and split
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subject, as substance, keeps Hegel from being merely a ‘subjective idealist’ like Kant
because the subject, instead of functioning as a Ding-an-sich, is itself both a mere
appearance while also projecting an essential substance.
Subjective Destitution and Sociality
On a superficial reading it might seem that, while expressing their positions in
drastically different conceptual schemes, Pippin and Žižek are really in broad agreement.
Both seek to reconnect the Hegelian project to the Kantian critique against the superficial
historicist appropriation of the dialectic. Both articulate how the subject must assume
responsibility for the world one inhabits: Pippin speaking of Geist as the normative realm
of self-legislating reason; Žižek speaking of the lack of an ‘absolute subject’ guaranteeing
the consistency of reality. But both lead toward the realization that every subjective
position is biased, and therefore constructed. Both see the realm of Geist as a normative
distinction within thought and language placing human freedom as an achievement
beyond nature, yet still within it, and therefore as non-supernatural. Or as Žižek says,
spirit is “the domain of signification, of the symbolic; as such, it can emerge only in a
creature which is neither constrained to its bodily finitude nor directly infinite…but in
between, a finite entity in which the Infinite resounds in the guise of…Another World.”70
But these semblances hide a profound difference between the two, revealed in their
understanding of the political significance of Hegel.
Unlike Pippin who builds from the normative idea of social self-legislation, as a
historical achievement constituted through various practices of mutual recognition,
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Žižek’s Hegel does not build up toward a social theory. Instead, Žižek’s exposition seeks
only to repeat the same constitutive failures within differing conceptual frameworks
(appearance/essence, understanding/reason, substance/subject). For Žižek, Hegel in
method and in practice never moves forward in his analysis unless progress is measured
by uncovering deeper conceptual failures. This Žižekian perspective reveals the
difference between Pippin’s evolutionary perspective of a socially normative practice of
mutual-recognition, and Žižek’s revolutionary perspective that the dialectic exposes the
ideological frame in which such social practices exist and the radical means by which to
exit, in order to transform, those structures.
One way of understanding this is to situate Žižek alongside other political
theorists through his deployment of the concepts of perversion and hysteria. Much of
postmodern political theory looks to the excessive or transgressive aspects of life
violently repressed by the reigning socio-political order. Inverting Hobbes, who sought
to circumscribe the riotous passions of the multitude according to the law of the
sovereign, these theorists seek to re-inscribe all forms of life within the political order. In
this way, an ever broadening and inclusive political field emerges through endless renegotiations and re-articulations of the political field. Žižek’s main targets are of a
continental variety, such as Judith Butler and Antonio Negri. But as will become clear,
Žižek is also indirectly speaking to certain forms of Anglo-American pragmatists like
Pippin. For Žižek, the problem with this view is two-fold. First, giving free reign to all
transgressive identities and lifestyles through transgressive political action exactly
mirrors the processes of global capitalism. The market revels in breaking every rule and
crossing every line, all in the effort of creating new markets for selling new products to
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new consumer-subjects who themselves are trained to transgress. Žižek complains that
those promoting a ‘politics of multitude’ as an ever broadening of the political field
exactly mimic the machinations of global capitalism. The “subject of late capitalist
market relations is perverse” in its attempt to transgress all limits, yet in its very
perversion maintains itself as a version of capitalism.71 Second, perversion remains
within the Kantian matrix of external reflection by positing that the existing law is always
partial and fragmented, and each transgression seeks to reveal this limit with reference to
an unacknowledged beyond.
Why is this? Perversion, which Žižek uses in a technical sense drawing from
Lacan, stays within the political order, albeit in the seemingly exterior form of
transgression. Acts of perversion claim to know the symbolic law (whether the political
laws of the land or the subjective laws of civility, sociality, sexuality, and rationality),
and claim to know exactly how to resist them via overt transgressions. These
transgressive acts, therefore, always ultimately point to the law. Knowing the law, and
then, always with an eye toward the law, transgressing the law’s limit, shows the mutual
implication of the existing political order and its own transgression. The law and its
transgression make an articulate totality where the latter never moves beyond the frame
of the former. To transgress in this way is actually a reasonable form of resistance
within the political order because it seeks to move within the political field as a
broadening, re-ordering, and re-articulation of current and future ‘forms of life.’ It does
this in the form of transgression because if one were truly to move beyond, rather than
merely transgress within, the socio-political order it would mean the loss all contact with

71

Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 248.

47
reality, unhinging all systems of meaning and significance, and thus foreclosing the
possibility of reasonable political action. Transgressive acts, perverting the law, and
therefore showing the law’s own perversion, are different ways of describing what Pippin
might call instances of the provisional and revisable nature of our practices and
institutions seeking mutual recognition, the recognition of the reasonableness of one’s
actions. The law, its transgression, and the law’s subsequent revision are, for Pippin, a
desirable, evolving situation.
Žižek contends, however, that this transgressive strategy ultimately fails because
it is still trapped within (because it mirrors) an economic system that feeds on
transgressive forms of life even as it promotes these transgressions. This transgressive
strategy is doomed to perpetuate the status quo in the form of evolutionary modifications,
rather than offer any truly revolutionary break. Or said differently, this strategy posits an
essence of freedom standing behind the partial and broken appearances of law. This
transgressive social strategy, therefore, fails the fundamentally Hegelian lesson that
positing an essence (of subjectivity, of law, of freedom) beyond its appearance is the
ideological move par excellence, a failure many continental and pragmatic theorist have
missed in their social theories.
For Žižek, the prevailing socio-political order cannot be transgressed in the form
of perversion, but rather must be traversed in the form of hysteria.72 The hysteric is
incapable of finding ones coordinates within the symbolic network, a breakdown that
simultaneously puts the symbolic order in doubt and therefore puts one’s own subjective
position in doubt, causing what may seem to be irrational outbursts. The hysteric is in
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doubt about the symbolic law, not knowing what the law wants from her, and therefore
powerless in following the law.73 Rather than transgressing the political order in vain
attempts at incremental rehabilitation, Žižek proposes traversing the political order in the
mode of hysteria, or as he elsewhere calls it, through a radical “subjective destitution.”74
Rather than seeking subjective affirmation from (indicating source/origin) the political
order (even in the guise of transgression because in transgression one can minimally
affirm one’s own essence beyond the social appearances), for Žižek, one ought to enact a
hysterical subjective destitution from (indicating separation/removal) the socio-symbolic
order. The figure of this subjective destitution in which “the subject accepts the void of
his nonexistence” is symbolic death.75 Only in what we might call a ‘psychic suicide’
where one is biologically alive, yet dead to the symbolic coordinates of social, political,
and economic life, is one placed in “the suicidal outside of the symbolic order,”76 able to
act with a revolutionary freedom. This is the case because the hysteric understands that
she is just as divided as the social substance (the law) is. The hysteric is the political
consequence of the philosophical idea that the absolute is “not only Substance, but also
Subject.”
Many political theorist, however, are unwilling to entertain this type of symbolic
death because it seems simultaneously too excessive as a stepping outside the bounds of
rationality, reasonability according to certain accounts of political ‘realism’ and too

73

Žižek, Sublime Object, 112-114, and The Ticklish Subject, pp. 247-257.
See The Ticklish Subject, 366; Sublime Object, 230; The Indivisible Remainder, 16365.
75
Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 281.
76
Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and
Related Dates
(NY: Verso, 2002), 99.
74

49
moderate in its apparently disinterested stance toward the current state of affairs. These
theorists would claim that such a radical break makes it impossible to reform the political
order because one is so utterly beyond it, so utterly detached: too ideologically minded to
be any politically good. But this is exactly Žižek’s intention when he speaks of
subjective destitution as death, for only when one considers oneself dead to the existing
order will one be able to actually act freely with regard to it.77 Only then will one moves
from piecemeal forms of transgressive resistance against the existing order toward
creating the possibility of another order altogether. This subjective destitution is a radical
transformation through a revolutionary traversal of the existing order, rather than a
gradual evolution through transgressional reappropriations within it.
As a hysterical action of subjective destitution, this move beyond the symbolic
law is characterized by a radical gesture of ‘striking at oneself’, the gesture which
ultimately constitutes subjectivity as such.78 This ‘striking at oneself’ is the means by
which one becomes ‘uncoupled’ from the symbolic order, dying to ones own social
substance. As noted above, perversion assumes some minimal subjectivity that ‘knows’
the limits of the law, and therefore posits itself as beyond the law. This is the ideological
position that assumes an essence behind appearances, and therefore has failed to learn the
Hegel’s dialectical lesson that substance is divided, just as the subject is divided. The
hysteric denies even this minimal subjective support within the social substance, and
therefore is the true figure for political action.
Contra Pippin and Taylor, Žižek’s Hegel only becomes Hegel when he abandons
the Romantic project of the expressive unity of the social substance, achieved through
77
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shared social practices, and instead beings understanding reconciliation not as a healing
of the split between radical subjectivity and social objectivity, but a reconciliation with
the split as a persistent aspect of the social field.79 This reconciliation is the political
implementation of what was already argued philosophically, that dialectical
reconciliation is not a higher harmony, but a reconciliation to the persistence of
fundamental disharmony. The fact that “‘Substance is [also to be conceived of as]
Subject’ means that this explosion of the organic Unity is what always happens in the
course of the dialectical process,”80 and the new unity is not a new harmony at a higher,
more explicit level, but rather the unity of persistent division, both within the subject and
the social substance. Only the hysterical subjective position can persist within this place,
for “a truly free choice is a choice in which I do not merely choose between two or more
options WITHIN a pre-given set of coordinates, but I choose to change this set of
coordinates itself” and therefore act as Christ did.81
Žižek’s many references to Christ underscores the religious aspects of Hegel
totally absent from Pippin’s interpretation, and most non-metaphysical interpretations of
Hegel.82 Žižek understands Hegel as putting forth Christianity as the manifest religion
because Christianity articulates this negative space beyond the symbolic law and its
transgressive supplement, a new place from which political action pours forth.83 For
Žižek, “both Christianity and Hegel transpose the gap which separates us from the
Absolute into the Absolute itself” such that substance and subject are always already
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divided.84 Throughout The Puppet and the Dwarf Žižek seeks to unite fall and
redemption, Adam and Christ, Judaism and Christianity, law and love according to the
dialectic whereby the former is fulfilled by the latter, not in a new harmonious positivity,
but rather through transposing the initial gap of the former into the latter itself.
Ultimately, the gap separating God and humanity is internal to God, exemplified by the
death of Christ. Rather than the death of God leading to our freedom from God, as for
Nietzsche, Žižek claims that the death of God, and our participation in that death, allows
us to suspend the symbolic law, just as Christ did. This is the forgotten core of
Christianity, not that God is dead and we have killed him, but that God (the substance) is
dead and all of us (subjects) have died with God.
Evaluation
Žižek’s reading of Hegel is self-consciously politically oriented toward the
successful breaking out of the regimes of global capitalism by offering a robust
ontological account of the necessary failure of both the social structure and the subject, a
failure which opens the very possibility of an authentic political act against and beyond
the dominant order. While Pippin’s Hegel offers few resources for this type of radical act
putting previous justificatory practices into question, it seems that Žižek offers little
reason why someone would enact a psychic suicide in order to enter the outside of the
symbolic order.85 Why not rather engage in perverse acts where one can have the
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symbolic cake and transgressively eat it too? Žižek, it should be noted, does offer
numerous examples of people willing to make such an act (Antigone, Oedipus, Jesus,
King Lear), but the use of such examples only return us to the problem of a prior social
normativity. If Žižek’s best arguments for prompting a radical act in others is to refer to
a counter tradition of those resisting the status quo, then these example begin to function
as a normative tradition for Žižek. But the use of such a counter tradition seems to imply
its own law and its symbolic order, all of which Žižek seems opposed to in placing the
subject beyond symbolic support.
Conclusion
After the metaphysical Hegel proposed by Taylor comes these two drastically
opposed and yet typical interpretations. Broadly speaking, Pippin’s Hegel offers a
retrospective account of the emergence of normative practices as the pre-condition of
freedom. He leaves aside, however, the emergence of the individual subjects capable of
resisting such engrained practices. Žižek’s Hegel is explicitly oriented toward offering an
account of the subject within and beyond the ideological interpellation of society’s
dominant social practices. But the place from which this subject acts, the place of its own
subjective destitution, is always a prior (counter-) normativity that Žižek must
simultaneously presuppose and yet disavow. Pippin offers a Hegel emphasizing the selftranscending immanence of normative practices (yet assuming a prior subject formation),
and Žižek offers a Hegel emphasizing the self-transcending immanence of the radical act
(yet assuming a prior normative formation via religion). In either case, the normative
Polygraph: An International Journal of Culture and Politics 17 (2005): 221-244, esp.
235-238.
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Hegel of evolutionary social practices and the radical Hegel of revolutionary subjective
acts are interpretations of Hegel opposed to each other in fundamental ways. This
fundamental opposition prompts the question of which is more adequate to the texts of
Hegel and which is more adequate to the questions of contemporary political theory. Can
Hegel hold together both normative social practices while also offering the possibility of
a radical subjectivity capable of resisting such practices if the need were to arise? Being
able to answer this question first requires a deep understanding of Hegel’s philosophical
systems. Only then will one be able to adequately assess his political implications.
Chapter two will offer an entry into Hegel’s system through an examination of his
Science of Logic and then a reading of his Phenomenology. Chapter three will then
assess Hegel’s political philosophy with an eye toward resolving this fundamental
opposition between Pippin and Žižek in regard to Hegel philosophy of self-transcending
immanence.
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CHAPTER 2: CONSCIOUSNESS AND FREEDOM: LOGIC AND
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
When we think freely, voyaging on the open sea, with nothing under us
and nothing over us, in solitude, alone by ourselves—
then we are purely at home with ourselves.1
Introduction
The previous chapter focused primarily on the normative and the radical Hegel,
displaying the divergent interpretations regarding sociality and subjectivity, especially in
regard to politics. These divergent interpretations sought to unify Hegel’s system and his
realphilosophie rather than excluding the former in order to focus on the latter. To
evaluate these interpretations it is necessary to explore Hegel’s system in greater detail.
Essential to Hegel’s philosophical system is the dual role of negation as the motor
of conceptual development and the true infinite as the completion of the Kantian
revolution. Hegel’s understanding of negation and the true infinite allow him to deal
with otherness as internal to the processes of consciousness (eventually expanded to
intersubjective self-consciousness) rather than as an alien limitation to consciousness
itself. Overcoming the limitations of otherness is required, for Hegel, in order to ensure
consciousness as self-determining freedom. This chapter will focus on Hegel’s
development of the self-determining freedom of consciousness, leaving the practical and
political implication of this freedom for the chapter three.
The first section of this chapter will establish the self-transcending immanence of
Hegel’s speculative philosophy. His system is self-transcending because thought is
always process of ‘going beyond itself’. But his system is ultimately grounded in
1
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immanence because Hegel finally admits of no transcendence beyond this selftranscending movement of thought. This will be established through a reading of the
opening chapters Hegel’s Science of Logic where he deals with the dialectic of beingnothing and the finite-infinite. It will be argued that Hegel includes ‘otherness’ within
consciousness through an initial exclusion of transcendence. This exclusion operates by
prefiguring every ‘beyond’ as merely ‘nothing’, a ‘nothing’ that is then re-including as
‘negation’, the dynamic of thought itself. ‘Nothing’ is always deemed the indeterminacy
of thought.
Hegel justifies this movement from ‘nothing’ to ‘negation’ in his Logic through
reference to his Phenomenology of Spirit, claiming that in the earlier work he overcomes
the distinction between subject and object, showing that no-thing is outside or other than
pure knowing. Because of this claim the second section of this chapter will examine the
Phenomenology according to three instances in which consciousness encounters
otherness: the encounter with the ‘supersensible beyond’ by consciousness in chapter III;
the encounter with the Unchangable (God) by the Unhappy Consciousness in chapter IV
(an encounter only finally resolved at the end of chapter VI); and the encounter with the
God-man by religious consciousness in chapter VII.2 The parallel purpose in examining
these encounters is to understand Hegel’s developing notion of consciousness as the
emergence of self-consciousness as Geist, culminating in the absolute knowing of chapter
VIII. Throughout the exposition of the Phenomenology I will continue to make reference
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to Hegel’s deployment of negation and the movement of the true infinite in order to show
the coherence of his thought throughout.
The third and final section will argue that Hegel does not prove his case
concerning the unity of subject and object because instead of truly encountering all forms
of otherness, pre-eminently the otherness of a transcendent God, Hegel always preconfigures this otherness as the indeterminate nothing of thought. By pre-configuring the
otherness of God the Phenomenology merely assumes what it attempts to prove, trading
on arguments that only properly belong within the Logic. In light of this circularity I will
argue that the best place from which to make the argument concerning the unjustified
exclusion of transcendent otherness is neither within Hegel’s treatment of religion, nor
the earlier encounter of the Unhappy Consciousness, but the earlier encounter with the
‘supersensible beyond.’ The goal, then, of this chapter is to show both that Hegel’s
philosophy is aptly described as self-transcending immanence, even while showing that
Hegel only assumes but does not justify such a philosophical perspective.
Of course this summary cannot replace actual arguments and is hardly intelligible
without them. This is the difficult journey before us, a journey into the freedom of
thought, a “voyaging on the open sea, with nothing under us and nothing over us…purely
at home with ourselves” (E §31 A). Throughout we will follow Hegel as he attempts to
fathom the depths of this infinite sea of thought, asking whether he has actually measured
the depths of the infinite or only established the length of consciousness. Throughout I try
to present the most favorable interpretation of Hegel’s positions in order to both truly
understand his project and to allay fears that I am criticizing a caricature. It is for these
reasons this chapter is the longest and densest.
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1. Nothing Is Infinite: Science of Logic
The Thought of the Logic
The purpose of Hegel’s Science of Logic is to clarify the categories of thought and
through them “to raise mind to freedom and truth” (SL 37/WL 5:27). This is not logic in
the standard sense of rules governing logical argumentation, giving proper order to
thoughts. Rather the Logic outlines what thought itself is. For Hegel, “logic is to be
understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought.” To ensure its
ontological and theological impact, he adds that the Logic “is the exposition of God as he
is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind” (SL 50/WL 5:44).
To make sense of this Hegel distinguishes the science of logic as he conceives it from
other sciences. In other scientific investigations the subject matter of the science
(biology, physics, economics) is distinguished from the scientific method of
investigation. But this is not the case when investigating thought because thought is both
the matter and method, or the content and the form. Hegel emphasizes it is not the case
that thought is merely a rational form given to a received content (as for empiricists and
even Kant). It is not the case that the matter or content
of knowing is present on its own account as a ready-made world apart from
thought, that thinking on its own is empty and comes as an external form to the
said material, fills itself with it and only thus acquires a content and so becomes
real knowing. (SL 44/WL 5:36-37)
Rather, content and form are already united in thought. Consequently, what logic is
cannot be stated beforehand for this would again make logic into content external to
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thought. Knowledge of what logic is emerges “as the final outcome and consummation
of the whole exposition” (SL 43/WL 5:35).3
But if the way into logic is already within logic, how and where is one to make a
beginning? And is the beginning really a beginning if the truth of the system can only be
known at the end? If the goal of the Logic is to raise the mind to freedom and truth as the
system of pure reason, while at the same time not taking for granted a presumed content,
then for Hegel its beginning “may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by
anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science” (SL
70/WL 5:69). As he says in the Encyclopaedia Logic,
All…presuppositions or assumptions must equally be given up when we enter
into the Science, whether they are taken from representation or from
thinking…Science should be preceded by universal doubt, i.e. by total
presuppositionlessness (Voraussetzungslosigkeit). Strictly speaking this
requirement is fulfilled by the freedom that abstracts from everything, and grasps
its own pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking—in the resolve of the will to
think purely. (EL §78)
This resolve to think purely, the resolve to “consider thought as such” (SL 70/WL 5:68)
is the immediate beginning of logic. As Houlgate notes, the resolve to think thought “sets
aside all assumptions about what it is, [and] is left with nothing to think but the simple
thought that it is.”4 To this resolve to only think thought it must be added that the
beginning be immediate. If the beginning were mediated it would no longer be a
beginning for then it would be mediating between something else, something a
presupposed. This immediate beginning must likewise be both without determination
relative to something else or have any determinations within itself. For Hegel this
3
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immediate and indeterminate with which logic begins is pure being (SL 70/WL 5:69), the
beginning of a presuppositionless science of logic.5
The Presupposition of the Logic
Before following this beginning of pure being we need to pause a moment to
understand the claims of this presuppositionless science. To do this we must look at the
link between the Logic and the Phenomenology, setting the groundwork for the
relationship between both explored in sections one and two of this chapter. Early critics
criticized Hegel for failing in his supposed presuppositionlessness. Schelling claimed
Hegel actually presupposed (1) the subject who thinks even while suppressing this
subjective position, and Hegel (2) presupposes the absolute that is being thought.6 In
Hegel’s mind, however, these criticisms are knocking on an open door because both
objections had already been granted by Hegel in his Phenomenology. Hegel had shown
in that early work that one could not start with the subject of ordinary consciousness
without inevitably ending up with the Absolute beyond the dichotomy of subject and
object. The thinking subject and the overcoming of this subject and its object(s) within
the Absolute arrive together. In the Logic Hegel points to the Phenomenology as having
exhibited consciousness
in its movement onwards from the first immediate opposition of itself and the
object to absolute knowing. The path of this movement goes through every form
of the relation of consciousness to the object and has the Notion of science for its
result…Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of
5
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consciousness. It contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its
own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought. (SL
48-9/WL 5:42-3)
It is in this sense that Hegel claims that the Logic presupposes the Phenomenology
because the Phenomenology “contains and demonstrates the necessity, and so truth, of the
standpoint occupied by pure knowing” (SL 68-9/WL 5:67). On Hegel’s account, the
claim to being presuppositionless rests on presupposing the conclusions of the
Phenomenology. This of course raises the status of the Phenomenology as the
presupposition of a presuppositionless science.7 But this will only become the focus in
the second section of this chapter.
Being-Nothing and Becoming
Having established the interlocking presuppositions between the Logic and the
Phenomenology, we will now examine the opening argument of the Logic concerning the
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dialectic of being-nothing and its transition into becoming. As noted above, the
beginning of a science of logic must be that which is most immediate and indeterminate,
which Hegel claims to be pure being. “Being, pure being, without any further
determination” (Sein, reines Sein, - ohne alle weitere Bestimmung). When considering
the first category Hegel does not even use a copula. No predication of existence is given
for this would add a determination to indeterminate being. The first negative definition of
pure being, “without any further determination,” is given a farther negative expansion in
the following statements:
In its indeterminate immediacy (unbestimmten Unmittelbarkeit) it is equal only to
itself. It is also not unequal relative to another; it has no diversity within itself nor
any with a reference outward.
Pure being has neither internal composition nor external relation. As such, for pure
being “there is nothing to be intuited” because “it is only this pure [empty] intuiting
itself” (es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst). And because pure being is best
thought as nothing, the nothingness of thought, Hegel concludes by saying, “Being, the
indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.” (Das
Sein, das unbestimmte Unmittelbare ist in der Tat Nichts und nicht mehr noch weniger
als Nichts) (SL 82/WL 5:82-3). Pure being, the most basic thought from which Hegel
seeks to derive his science of logic, in its complete and utter indetermination, has been
found to pass into its opposite and has become neither more nor less than nothing.8
Of this nothing Hegel continues in the next section: “Nothing, [the] pure nothing
(Nichts, das reine Nichts): it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence
of all determination and content—undifferentiatedness in itself.” While re-worded
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slightly, the same basic phrases apply to nothing as they did to being. Nothing lacks all
determination and is equal to itself without any internal differentiations. But amid the
empty intuiting of nothing there is a distinction found between the empty intuiting of
something (etwas) and pure nothingness. Because of this, “To intuit or think nothing has,
therefore, a meaning: both are distinguished and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or
thinking” (so ist [existiert] Nichts in unserem Anschauen oder Denken) (SL 82/WL
5:83).9 The thought of nothing, it seems, has surprisingly found a basis of existence, an
existence within thought. Through its absence of determination nothing is determined to
be the same as pure being because nothing has existence within thought.
Being, then, slides into nothing and nothing into being. This is the being-nothing
dialectic leading to the identity of being and nothing as each passes over into the other.
Or rather, “the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being—does not pass over but
has passed over—into nothing, and nothing into being” (SL 83/WL 5:83).10 In the
manner of writing the first two paragraphs Hegel indicates what logically must occur, that
being “has passed over” into nothing and nothing into being. This “has passed over” is
already accomplished at the end of the paragraphs on being and nothing. By the time
Hegel is half-finished describing being he is already articulating aspects of nothing, and
once nothing is articulated it is found to have passed back into being.11 In addition to the
truth of the identity of being and nothing Hegel also claims that they are “not
undistinguished from each other,” but “on the contrary, they are not the same” for they
“are absolutely distinct.” Immediately after claiming this absolute distinction, however,
9
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Hegel adds that they are “unseparable and inseparable and that each immediately
vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate
vanishing of the one in the other: becoming” (SL 83/WL 83).
One way of understanding this is considering the identity and difference of the
morning and evening star. While each has a difference sense both have the same
reference, Venus. Likewise, being and nothing each have the their own sense (being is
that which applies to everything and nothing is that which applies to no-thing), even
thought they both have the same reference as the emptiness of thought.12 This analogy
emphasizes the identity of being and nothing.
To give full weight, however, to Hegel’s claim that being and nothing are
“absolutely distinct” the opposite of this analogy is preferable. As Hegel’s exposition of
being and nothing indicates, it is exactly the logical (or linguistic) sense of each term that
is identical in that each is “indeterminately immediate,” but it is the ontological reference
that is different, i.e. being is being and nothing is nothing. Instead of their senses
(connotations) being different and their reference (denotation) the same it seems the only
way to affirm the absolute distinction between being and nothing is to conclude that
while their sense (connotation) is the same it is their references (denotations) that are
different. If this is the case, then, as Michael Rosen says, it seems Hegel is claiming that
being and nothing are “non-identical indiscernibles” and the concept of becoming is the
mutual vanishing between them.13 But if “non-identical indiscernibles” accurately
describes the non-relation of being and nothing, from where comes the difference
12
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between them that gives rise to the category of becoming?14 If being-nothing are “nonidentical indiscernibles” how is enough difference found between them to warrant
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Critics point out that the dialectic of being-nothing only arrives at becoming because
illicit presuppositions are smuggled into the process, or that becoming is merely assumed
in advance. Beyond the objections to a presuppositionless beginning mentioned above
(that Hegel assumes the absolute), critics claim that the very language used to express
pure being predisposes the development toward becoming by presupposing later
developments within the Logic, namely the categories of reflection developed in the
second part on Essence. Terms such as “indeterminate immediacy” and “equal to itself”
are negations of reflective categories such that pure being is determined through the
negation of these categories. In addition, it is claimed that Hegel presupposes the
everyday use of language in which thought originally lives leaving Hegel’s dialectic in
need of retrieving its more primordial hermeneutic. In these ways it is claimed Hegel
illegitimately makes use of what comes later in (or outside of) the Logic rather than
letting the categories develop immanently (see Dieter Henrich, “Anfang und Mthode der
Logik,” in Hegel im Kontext [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971], 85-90; HansGeorg Gadamer, Hege’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies trans. by P. Christopher
Smith [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976], 93, 99).
One response is to ignore these objections all together by claiming that Hegel
never seriously intended a presuppositionless science but always presupposed the totality
of his system. Beyond presupposing the Phenomenology, Klaus Kartmann suggests
Hegel’s Logic must be understood as a retrospective justification of the whole, or a
reconstruction of the richness of thought back through its antecedents. Robert Pippin
suggests that here as elsewhere Hegel is merely assuming a position which he already
thinks is untenable in order to move beyond it, i.e. that the idea of “indeterminate
immediacy” is always a failure (See Klaus Hartmann, “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical
View,” in G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments, vol. 3, ed. Robert Stern [London and New
York: Routledge, 1993],154; Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfaction of
Self-Consciousness [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 182-186).
A less dismissive response claims these criticisms move too quickly in that Hegel
is not defining pure being, but is rather describing it with the available language. It is not
the case that Hegel defines being as in-determinate (the negation of determinacy) or immediacy (the negation of mediation) for this would be to say too much by giving
determinations to indeterminate being. Rather “indeterminate immediacy” and
expressions like it turn ordinary language (which is naturally reflective) against itself so
as to properly indicate the thought of pure being. Hegel uses “ordinary determinate words
with rich and varied meanings to bring to mind (and “thematize”) an utterly
indeterminate thought” (Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, 84 [emphasis in
original]. See also 82). In order to indicate pure being Hegel seeks to purify ordinary
language of its presuppositions rather than building his argument upon them. These
“self-canceling expressions” (Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, 79), indicative of
a “hermeneutic self-alienation” (Clark Butler, Hegel’s Logic: Between Dialectic and
History [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996], 27), are the means by which
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another category? In other words, the problem is not the transition between the
“indeterminate immediacies” of being and nothing, but how this transition transitions into
something else, into becoming, moving from the indeterminate to the determinate.
The Failure of Being: From Verstand to Vernunft
To keep the mutual vanishing of being and nothing from reducing into a mere
tautology admitting no productive movement then some minimal difference must be
found through which the oppositions can be resolved.15 Hegel seems only to state that
some minimal difference exists rather than prove that it does. As Gadamer says,
“Though it is convincing that one cannot think Becoming without thinking Being and
Nothing simultaneously, the converse, that when one thinks Being and Nothing one must

Hegel practices the “absolute culture and disciple of consciousness” required to dwell and
labor in the realm of shadows, which is the system of logic (SL 58/WL 5:55).
15
One way of understanding this problem is to remember that Hegel mentions three
moments of thought: 1) the understanding (verständige) fixes determinations, 2)
dialectical or negative reason (die dialektische oder negativ-vernünftige) opposes these
fixed and one-sided determination with others, 3) and speculative or positive reason (die
spekulative oder positiv-vernünftige) unites opposed determinations (E §79-82 and SL
28/WL 5:16). If we apply these movements to the opening dialect in a relatively
straightforward manner we see the understanding isolating pure being, abstracting and
purifying its determinations, a process rendering pure being completely without
determination. In seeking clarity and precision of thought the understanding inadvertently
renders pure being unintelligible and therefore in fact nothing. In turning its attention to
nothing the understanding finds that something is being thought and therefore nothing is.
The understanding cannot isolate either concept without immediately passing into its
opposition. This passing into oppositions is the natural consequence of understanding’s
commitment to fixed determinations, giving rise to dialectical reason as the mutual
vanishing of being and nothing into each other. Speculative reason resolves the
opposition with the concept of becoming, which settles into a stable result from its
unstable unrest (SL 106/WL 5:113). The problem is that this still does not get at the nonrelational identity of being-nothing if speculative reason is not already presupposed. See
John Burbidge On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of a Commentary (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1981), 42-45.
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think Becoming is not at all convincing.”16 Therefore, if Hegel is not to fall to the
criticism that he either assumes becoming from the beginning or is relying on some
subjective opinion (which he denies to be the case [SL 92/WL 5:95]), then there must be
a reason that enables Hegel to justify the difference which gives movement at the
beginning of the Logic. To see how he does this we must look more closely at the
operations of Verstand and Vernunft at the beginning of the Logic.
The work of the understanding (Verstand) in relation to reason (Vernunft) is to
separate and fix the abstract determination of any concrete object or idea, preparing it for
the later unifying process of reason (SL 610-11/ WL 6:286-87).17 This is the ideal
relation between Verstand and Vernunft where separating and fixing determinations
slides seamlessly into a fluid unity of concepts.18 What this means for the beginning of
the Logic is that the understanding begins the logical process by isolating pure being
through a movement of abstraction, separating it from all other relationships.
But the question we must ask is “from what” is the understanding isolating and
abstracting? Certainly it is not phenomenological consciousness for this would be to
repeat the Phenomenology. The understanding is not isolating and abstracting from
“determinate being” for this would be to presuppose a later category. If we are to take
Hegel seriously that the Logic presupposes the conclusions of the Phenomenology then it
16

Gadamer, Hege’s Dialectic, 87.
Also see the three-fold designation the separates Vernunft into the two moments of
dialectical and speculative in addition to Verstand (E §79-82 and SL 28/WL 5:16).
18
Of course Hegel often takes a negative perspective of Verstand as the failure of
Kantian philosophy which only fixes determinations, sets up rigid dichotomies, and
erects limits (Beschränkens) to thought, refusing to move beyond this perspective and
thinking itself the apex of philosophy. Especially in his early essays Hegel would oppose
Verstand and Vernunft (FK 62, 64-65/GW 296, 299-300; DS 90-91/Diff 21-23; SL
45/WL 39) even while also indicating their significant relationship (compare PS ¶32/PG
37 and DS 94/Diff 27; E §79-82 and SL 28/WL 5:16).
17
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follows that the understanding is isolating and abstracting from “the standpoint occupied
by pure knowledge” (SL 68-9/WL 5:67). As David Gray Carlson explains: “The
beginning [of pure being] is simply the immediate version of absolute knowing” as
constructed by the understanding.19 The understanding isolates and abstracts from within
and out from absolute knowing. If this is the case then the difference noted in the
vanishing of being and nothing is not the difference between being and nothing. Rather
the difference is between pure knowing (as known by Vernunft) and the pure immediacy
of being (as articulated by Verstand). The concept of becoming does not come on the
scene through the dialectic between being and nothing. Rather, becoming is better
thought as marking the difference between the immediacy of pure being (as spelled out
by the understanding) and its difference from pure knowing (as known by reason). “Pure
being was supposed to be absolute knowing—the Understanding’s propositional
summary of it. But it ended up being nothing at all—a failure,” a failure speculatively
resolved in the positive movement of becoming.20
In light of this failure of the understanding to provide a true beginning, what
precedes becoming is not the mutual vanishing of being and nothing, but the fact of
vanishing itself, that thought is vanishing from itself. “What precedes ‘becoming’ is
thinking which fails to form a thought of its own being,” finding itself to be nothing at
all.21 This failure of thought (by the understanding) in comparison to pure knowing (by
reason) generates the perspective from which the difference between being and nothing is

19

David Gray Carlson, “The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning of Hegel’s Logic,” in
Hegel’s Theory of the Subject, ed. David Gray Carlson (New York: Palgrave Macmillian,
2005), 211.
20
Carlson, “The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning of Hegel’s Logic,” 207.
21
Carlson, “The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning of Hegel’s Logic,” 217.
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discerned. Becoming is the true first thought of the Logic, not because becoming was
presupposed, but because being-nothing failed to be a thought.
We must, however, press more deeply into this failure of thought. As Angelica
Nuzzo suggests, while the Logic certainly begins with being, it actually begins from
nothing.22 When Hegel asks, “With what must science begin?” his answer is being. But
Nuzzo suggests that how Hegel actually begins is different. When Hegel begins with
being we are told nothing about it. We are not even given an actual propositions but
mere phrases (Sein, reines Sein…Nichts, das reine Nichts). And as we have seen, it is not
the case that nothing vanishes into being and being into nothing, but an “already having
vanished” into each other. This pure vanishing is nothingness, “the most radical
challenge to the logic of the understanding,”23 proving to be the downfall of Verstand in
its failure to think.24 Here Hegel is staging the last stand of the critical (Kantian)
philosophy that makes function as its own absolute. The promise and failure of Kantian
philosophy is exposed in these short paragraphs where Verstand is shown to immediately
falter when separated from Vernunft. The encounter with nothingness as the mutual
vanishing of being-nothing reveals the immediate deadlock of Verstand when elevated to
a systematic position, revealing the needs for its assimilation within are larger vision of
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Angelica Nuzzo, “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason: How Does Hegel’s Logic
Begin,” in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, ed. Nectarios G. Limnatis (London:
Continuum, 2010), 23.
23
Nuzzo, “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason,” 20.
24
Therefore, those like Gadamer who claim the being-nothing dialectic is a failed thought
are right in their observation but wrong in their conclusion that this failure invalidates
Hegel’s logic. See Gadamer, Hege’s Dialectic, 88. Sympathetic interpreters like Pippin
also claim the thought of pure being to be a failure, but that it was intended to be. See
Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism, 184.
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Vernunft. The failure of Verstand to think results from its encounter with nothingness,
the nothingness of thought.
In view of this conclusion, while the Logic formally begins with being, true
thought only begins at becoming, and all this comes from nothing(ness). Of course, if the
Logic begins from nothing then it seems to have fulfilled the conditions of a
presuppositionless science. This science is freely self-determining exactly because
nothing is determining it. When isolated from Vernunft, Verstand realizes that nothing
(nothingness) is out of reach (negatively).25 But, when Verstand is integrated with
Vernunft, it is equally true that nothing (no-thing) is out of reach (positively) because
now thought thinks both all that is and the nothing that is not. The nothingness of thought
as the failure of thought is now is now barred from being beyond thought (a Kantian
beyond), and is re-included as the non-thought of thought issuing in the concept of being
which transitions into determinate being (Dasein).26 As we will see, this initial
internalization of nothing in the form of non-thought becomes the productive power of
negation within thought. This science, then is neither indeterminate as abstract nor
determined by external content, but is fully self-determining.
Finite-Infinite and the True Infinite
The immediacy of pure being gives way to the new concept of determinate being
(Dasein). Determinate being, through many twists and turns, finally culminates in the
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Nuzzo, “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason,” 21.
To say that “nothing (nothingness) is out of reach” for the understanding rebounds
from the non-thought of nothing to the first thought of becoming as unstable unrest. But
to say “no-thing is out of reach” is to enter the stable result of becoming—determinate
being—the next immediacy understanding takes under consideration.
26
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contradictions of finitude, leading to our desired goal of the true infinite. These
contradictions of determinate being stem from the relationship between something and its
other. With the concept of determinate being comes the problem of distinguishing one
determinate being from another. Hegel show that’s the concept of something (Etwas)
logically entails something else as part of its own internal structure. The color blue is
only truly known through its opposition to other colors, just as sea is distinguished
through its opposition to land. In this way “negation is now immanent” in each
determinate something as its relationship to its other (SL 125/WL 5:135).27 This
immanent negation is the limit (Grenz) between both something and its other such that to
pass beyond this limit is to change into something else (SL 126/WL 5:135). Being within
its limit is the only way determinate being can be itself without changing into its other.
But this limit is also its limitation (add German) in relation to its other (add reference). In
other words, having a limit is also to be limited, and this being-limited is the
internalization and embrace of something’s (Etwas) own non-being (i.e. the being of its
other is something’s non-being). Embracing this contradiction (being through non-being)
is the condition of finitude.
The contradiction of finitude is that the limit of something is both its being and
non-being such that finite things both are and yet are coming to an end. As Hegel says:
Finite things are, but their relation to themselves is that they are negatively selfrelated and in this very self-relation send themselves away beyond themselves,
beyond their being. They are, but the truth of this being is their end. The finite
not only alters, like something in general, but it ceases to be; and its ceasing to be
is not merely a possibility, so that it could be without ceasing to be, but the being
as such of finite things is to have the germ of decease as their being-within-self:
the hour of their birth is the hour of their death. (SL 129/WL 5:139)
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Emphasis in original.
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Finite being, which is the logical consequence of determinate being, reveals itself to be a
permanent ceasing-to-be because things (determinate beings) are always changing into
something else; constantly being birthed and yet always tending toward their own death.
In this way negation reigns on the level of the finite as the ceaseless process of
‘becoming.’
But the reign of negation within the finite sows the seeds from which the infinite
will grow. This reversal happens because the perpetual ceasing-to-be of finite being is
not a passing into nothingness, for this would place thought back into the position of nonthought with which the dialectic began (SL 131/WL 5:141). Finite being does not cease
to be as a return to nothing, but constantly passes over into another finite something.
Taylor summarizes it in this way:
A finite thing goes under of necessity. But in going under it does not simply
disappear. The negation from which it suffers is itself a determinate one, and
hence in breaking up it is replaced by another determinate thing—e.g., wood
which is burnt become smoke and ash.28
In its ceasing-to-be, finite being itself has not ceased to be even if a particular finite thing
has. This process goes on perpetually as a transition between determinate beings. Finite
being, in going beyond itself (in ceasing to be), unites with itself (as continual process of
ceasing to be) and thus is found to be infinite (SL 136-7/WL 5: 148-9).
The arrival of the infinite is given much fanfare by Hegel. He proclaims that “at
the name of the infinite the heart and the mind light up for in the infinite the spirit is not
merely abstractly present to itself, but rises to its own self, to the light of its thinking, of
its universality, of its freedom” (SL 137-8/WL 5:150). The freedom of thought, so
earnestly sought from the beginning, is now glimpsed in the thought of the infinite. This
28
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celebration, however, is prematurely ruined by the understanding (Verstand) and its
‘spurious infinite’. We must pass through this spurious infinite in order to achieve the
true conception of the infinite. For as with the being-nothing, there is a dialectic between
finite-infinite that must be properly grasped.
The spurious infinite is “the infinite of the understanding” (das Unendliche des
Verstandes) which strictly opposes the finite and infinite. The understanding sets up a
determinate opposition so that “there are two worlds, one infinite and one finite, and in
their relationship the infinite is only the limit of the finite and is thus only a determinate
infinite, an infinite which is itself finite” (SL 139-40/WL 5:152).29 The understanding
thinks the infinite as the ‘beyond’ or ‘negation’ of the finite, acting as the limit of the
finite. The infinite is in-finite, the negation of the finite, and is therefore connected with
the finite as its opposite. As a negative determination in relation to finitude, the infinite
only exists through this negation as a structural opposition. Because of this structural
opposition the infinite has the finite as its limit. But as Hegel has shown, everything with
a limit is in fact finite. Therefore to make the infinite the non-finite is exactly to reduce
the infinite to finitude.
The spurious infinite, as the negation of the finite, merely extends the dilemma of
something and its other and their infinite alteration. As with the pure alteration from one
finite thing to another in the ceaseless process of ceasing-to-be that gave rise to concept
of the infinite in the first place, now the concept of the infinite itself is caught in a
continuous alternation between one infinite and its finite limit. This first infinite, reduced
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As I will show later, this mirrors the problem the understanding runs into in the
Phenomenology when it tried to account for sensible appearance by invoking a
supersensible world.
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to finitude, turns around and generates its own infinite, which is again reduced to
finitude, ad infinitum.30 In this situation of structural opposition between the finite and
infinite, all that is left is “the alternating determination of the finite and the infinite” (SL
141/WL 5:155), an alteration that Hegel calls an “infinite progress” where the finite and
infinite mutually affirm and negate each other in their attempts at independence (SL
142/WL 5:155-56). Hegel summarizes the problem created by the understanding and its
fixed determinations (opposing the finite and infinite) as the problem of an “abstract
transcending of a limit, a transcending which remains incomplete because it is not itself
transcended” (indem über dies Hinausgehen nicht selbst hinausgegangen wird) (SL
142/WL 5:155). What Hegel means by this is that the categories and perspective of
finitude (i.e. determination through a limit), which is essentially the perspective of the
understanding, cannot grasp the truth of the infinite because it instead reduces the infinite
to the finite. The finite perspective of the understanding (Verstand) needs to be
transcended again (this suggest a certainly parallel between the being-nothing and finiteinfinite dialectic to which we will return below).
To transcend this perspective one must move from what is implicitly present in
the ‘infinite progress’ to what is implicitly present in the ‘infinite alteration.’ As Hegel
says, “In this alternating determination of the finite and the infinite from one to the other
and back again, their truth is already implicitly present, and all that is required is to take
up what is before us” (SL 143/WL 5:156). What he means is that from the perspective of
the understanding the finite and the infinite each come into being through the other.
From the side of the finite, the finite is negated and the beyond of the finite is seen as the
30

Houlgate gives an excellent summary of the relation of the two series of infinite
alterations in The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, 409-412.
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infinite. But this negation is again negated (or transcended [Hinausgehen] as Hegel
typically says here) and the finite is returned to itself through its other. The finite is
therefore united to itself through the infinite (the other of the finite). Likewise, the
infinite is negated by the finite as the limit of the infinite (that through which the infinite
is known). With the positing of the finite comes a limit that must be transcended such
that the infinite returns to itself through the finite (the other of the infinite). Each is the
self-sublation of the other, or rather “both the finite and the infinite are this movement in
which each returns to itself through its negation” (SL 147/WL 162). What the
understanding overlooks is
the negation of both which is actually present in the infinite progress, as also the
fact that they occur therein only as moments of a whole (Ganzen) and that they
come on the scene only by means of their opposite, but essentially also by means
of the sublation (Aufhebens) of their opposites. (SL 147/WL 5:162)
This becoming itself through its other is the true meaning of ‘negation of negation.’ With
the union of these moments (the finite becoming itself through the infinite and the infinite
through the finite), both thought and the thought of being are truly self-relating as the true
infinite, and therefore it is the highest instance (so far) of self-determining thought now
seen as self-transcending (a transcending of the need to transcended a limit). In this it is
“a matter of complete indifference which is taken as the beginning” because each is a
derivation of the other (SL 148/WL 5:163). Only the finite perspective of the
understanding (Verstand) seeks to claim the priority of one over the other.31
The significance of the true infinite lays in it being the truth of becoming. Hegel
makes this clear when he emphatically notes that the determination of the true infinite
31
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cannot properly be called the “unity of the finite and infinite” because this would imply a
static and inert relationship. Rather the true infinite
is essentially only as becoming, but a becoming now further determined in its
moments. Becoming, in the first instance, has abstract being and nothing for its
determinations; as alteration, its moments posses determinate being, something
and other; now as the infinite, they are the finite and infinite, which are
themselves in the process of becoming. (SL 148/WL 5:164)
Only by conceiving the true infinite as becoming does its true nature manifest itself. The
true infinite resolves the contradiction of finite being, which is the result of the
conceptual development beginning with determinate being (Dasein), such the true infinite
“as the consummated return into self, the relationship of itself to itself, is being (ist Sein)”
(SL 148/WL 5:164). Inversely, the true infinite reveals the true nature of the finite as
actually lacking being. Indeed, the finite, known through the moments of the finite(spurious)infinite dialectic, is merely ideal. Only the true infinite actually is, a
proposition Hegel claims every true philosophy and religion affirms (SL 154-5/WL
5:172; E §95R). This then is the true infinite, the basis of Hegel’s idealism and the
benchmark of true philosophy, around which his entire system rotates. This true infinite
springs from ‘negation’ within thought (negating the opposition between finite and
infinite) as the overcoming of the ‘nothing’ beyond thought.
Why Nothing Is Infinite
To fully appreciate Hegel’s derivation of the true infinite (and its significance for
other parts of his system) we must connect the first movement of being-nothing and
becoming with the later movement of finite-infinite and true infinite. After all, with the
arrival of the true infinite Hegel suggest the circle is the proper the image for the true
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infinite because in the circle “the line which has reached itself, which is closed and
wholly present, without beginning or end” (SL 148/WL 5:164). The circular nature of
this his thought suggests it is appropriate to retrace earlier moments. To connect the
beginning with the end (the true infinite) it is first necessary to set out the structural
analogues between being/nothing and finite/infinite. After this the implications will be
discussed concerning the nature of self-determining, or self-transcending thought.
We must first notice that just as the finite and the infinite are moments within the
true infinite so too are being and nothing moments of becoming. In the earlier discussion
on being-nothing Hegel remarked on the deficiency of claiming the direct “unity of being
and nothing” because this expression is a one-sided truth that cancels out the absolute
distinction between them (SL 90-3/WL 5:92-6). Hegel likewise adds a remark about the
deficiency of emphasizing the unity of the finite and the infinite because a commitment to
their unity must be immediately corrected by an opposing commitment that they “are
absolutely different and opposed to each other” (SL 151/WL 5:167). But he then points
out that this new position must also be corrected again by claiming again that the finite
and infinite are “inseparable” (untrennbar). Because of this need to pile on
qualifications, the infinite process mutates into the alternating determination of the unity
(Einheit) and separateness (Trennung) of the finite and infinite, which is, nevertheless,
inseparable (untrennbar) (SL 151/WL 5:168). In the end, for Hegel, the emphasis lands
on the inseparability of the finite-infinite, after proper qualification.
It is exactly at this point, however, that the same question presents itself
concerning the difference between being and nothing, but now in the reverse form. For
being-nothing it was asked how their difference was maintained within their mutual
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vanishing. Specifically, from where was the difference marked? But here the question
concerns the affirmation of the inseparability of finite-infinite. In other words, why the
necessity of inseparability? To answer this question we must take our previous analysis
of how the Logic actually begins and extend it to the dialectic of the finite-infinite.
The previous analysis concluded that while the Logic formally begins with pure
being, true thought only begins at becoming, and all this comes from nothing.
Concerning the dialectic of the true infinite, finite being now stands in the place of pure
being and the spurious infinite for nothing. Hegel supports this himself by identifying the
spurious infinite as “the nothing of the finite” (das Nichts des Endlichen) (SL 139/WL
5:151), which is here explicitly under the rule of the understanding (Verstand). As with
the being-nothing alteration, the finite-infinite alternation ultimately collapses into an
inseparable unity-in-separation, all governed by the understanding (Verstand) in its
encounter with nothing (the nothing of the ‘beyond’ being rather of ‘pure’ being).
As with becoming, the true infinite comes also from nothing in the form of the
spurious infinite, the nothing of the finite. The nothing that is beyond every finite as its
limit is equal to the nothing before becoming, each governed by Verstand in its isolation
from Vernunft. The failed thought of the spurious infinite (the ceasing-to-be which itself
must cease to be, or the perpetual transcending of a limit which must itself be
transcended) is just the explicit articulation of the initial failure of Verstand to think pure
being as a beginning.
Is it any wonder, then, that after each of these failures Hegel adds remarks about
the impossibility of a beginning? After his discussion of being-nothing Hegel comments
on the impossibility that the world had a beginning. To ask about the beginning of the

78
world is to deny the unity of being and nothing, giving nothing its own independence
from which being would then come. But this cannot be the case because “in nothing—or
nothing—is no beginning (im Nichts oder das Nichts ist nicht Anfang) (SL 104/WL
5:110). As noted above, one cannot start with or in nothing, only from nothing as nonthought. Likewise, after the dialectic of the finite-infinite Hegel considers the question,
“Can the infinite become finite?” He answers that the meaning of this question
presupposes the separability of the infinite from the finite such that the infinite could then
go into or become finite. But this is a denial of their inseparability. As Hegel states,
either the infinite has eternally gone forth in finitude (which is Hegel’s position and is his
denial of creatio ex nihilo), or the infinite has remained by itself “without having its other
present within it” (SL 154/WL 5:171), a reversion back to the spurious infinite. The
thought of nothing and the thought of the spurious infinite are both non-thoughts. Or
rather, both encounter nothingness under the guidance of the understanding, and therefore
fail.
As before, the failure of the spurious infinite reveals the failure of Verstand in
isolation from Vernunft. Just as the difference between being-nothing was not the
difference between them but the difference between the beginning of Verstand and the
pure knowing of Vernunft, so too the inseparability of finite-infinite is not truly between
the finite and the infinite but between Verstand and Vernunft. Finite-infinite is deemed
inseparable because Verstand has found that it is inseparable from Vernunft if it is to
function properly, a lesson taught to Verstand through its two encounters with
nothingness. In this way the nothing of understanding (Verstand) becomes the infinite of
reason (Vernunft).
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While Hegel does not explicitly make this claim, he has shown all along why
‘nothing is infinite.’ Taken in the negative sense in regard to the spurious infinite, it is
‘nothing’ cancels the spurious infinity and its beyond, i.e. there is no-thing beyond the
finite now known as the true infinite. As a proposition this would claim, ‘The spurious
infinite is nothing.’ On the other hand, taken positively concerning the true infinite,
‘nothing’ is the non-thought necessitating the true infinite, i.e. it is from nothing that true
infinity comes. In both cases the nothingness of thought produces the self-enclosed
infinity of being. That ‘nothing is infinity’ is another way of saying that Hegel takes into
account both the immanent and the self-transcending nature of thought. Thought is
immanent to itself because Hegel has attempted to show that there is ‘nothing’ before
thought (within the being-nothing dialectic) and ‘nothing’ after thought (within the finiteinfinite dialectic), and ‘negation’ is ‘nothing’ as it functions within thought. Thought is
self-transcending because it is that which goes beyond all limits, preeminently seen in the
transcending of the mutual limitations between the finite and the infinite leading to the
true infinite.
Self-Transcending Immanence
This, then, is the logic of thought thinking itself that references nothing other than
itself. ‘Nothing’ and its resultant infinity is the ‘key’ to unlocking the Logic, and Hegel’s
system. Dieter Henrich claims one must have this key in order to understand the Logic,
but laments that one never finds an exposition of this key within the Logic itself.32 The
above analysis shows that we need not glean this key as a global inference from Hegel’s
32
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system, but rather we find the key of nothing through the operations of pure knowing
integrating Verstand with Vernunft, traced through the movements of being-nothing and
finite-infinite. The self-transcendence of thought includes the logical category of
‘nothing’ by excluding nothingness as a non-thought, thereby internalizing ‘nothing’ as
dialectical development through negation. In these opening chapters of the Logic, Hegel
has shown the self-transcendence of thought within the very immanence of thought.
Thought is self-transcending as the transcending of itself (as Verstand) by itself (as
Vernunft). And yet it is an immanent because these movements have always been
discerned from the perspective of Vernunft as pure knowing, the perspective by which
thought discerns the difference between being and nothing, and the inseparability of the
finite and infinite. These movements are the self-transcending immanence of thought
thinking itself.
In a very Hegelian sense, to take up this key is to ‘have already’ opened the door
and entered in. This is the reason for the eerie sense of always having been inside
Hegel’s philosophy, especially when reading the Phenomenology or the Logic. One
never meets Hegel at the door, but rather finds oneself already quite at home in his
system, not sure how you got in or perhaps how to get out. Or even better, when we take
up this key we find ourselves already deep at sea on the waters of free thought. For when
Hegel says that “when we think freely, voyaging on the open sea, with nothing under us
and nothing over us, in solitude, alone by ourselves—then we are purely at home with
ourselves,” (E §31) we must understand him quite literally, that there is ‘nothing’ under
thought (below or before being) and ‘nothing’ above thought (beyond being).
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This first section has argued that while the Logic formally begins with pure being,
true thought only begins at becoming, and all this comes from nothing. The Logic
includes ‘nothing’ by first excluding it as the non-thought of being. The Logic then
internalizes this ‘non-thought’ as the productive process of negation. The failure of
‘nothing’ is taken up as ‘becoming’, which is developed as determinate being through its
internal negations. This development culminates in the contradictions of finitude and
finally issues in the thought of the true infinite. This section concluded with why
‘nothing is infinite’ and how this exemplifies the self-transcending immanence of thought
for Hegel.
The Logic, however, only concerns what self-transcending immanence is in its
element of pure thought or pure knowing. It is the Phenomenology that attempts to
explain why one would adopt such a stance. Because it attempts to justify taking this
stance, the Phenomenology acts as the presupposition of the Logic. Now that we have
come to grasp what Hegel thinks to be the center of his system, i.e. the true infinite
known through the self-determining development of thought itself, begun from nothing
but itself, it is now time to examine the presupposition of such thought as it is articulated
in the Phenomenology. As we will see, nothing and the true infinite are integral to the
project of the Phenomenology, each playing prominent roles in the unfolding drama of
consciousness.
2. Infinite Self-Consciousness: Phenomenology of Spirit
If nothing as negation is the key to Hegel’s system, the Phenomenology of Spirit
was intended to be the door. From the side of the Logic we noted Hegel’s claim that the
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Phenomenology left behind the oppositions of ordinary consciousness that separates
subject and object (form and content), and thus demonstrating the necessity of the
standpoint of absolute knowing. To pass through the door of the Phenomenology is to
exit the realm of ordinary consciousness and enter the abode of speculative philosophy.
This second section will examine just how Hegel seeks to accomplish this passage into
absolute knowing and ask whether he actually accomplishes it.
On the side of the Phenomenology, Hegel indicates his goal to elevate natural
consciousness into the airy realm true knowledge (PS ¶77/PG 72), a process that can lay
aside “the love of knowing and be actual knowledge” (PS ¶5/PG 14). Instead of speaking
of immediacy and mediation or the question of beginnings as in the Logic, Hegel frames
his discussion as understanding truth “not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” (PS
¶17/PG 23), which entails that “all content is its own [Substance as Subject] reflection
into itself” (PS ¶54/PG 53). Uniting content and form as substance and subject is
accomplished through the patient labor and suffering of the negative (PS ¶18-19/PG 2324). The system of true knowledge “that Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed
through the representation of the Absolute as Spirit (Geist),” and when Geist knows itself
as Geist becomes the science Hegel intends to establish (PS ¶25/PG 28-29), becoming the
presupposition of the Logic.
As Hegel hopes to show, the life of Geist does not shrink back from death, but
endures and dwells in death as a “tarrying with the negative” (PS ¶32/PG 36). Here H. S.
Harris sees an allusion to Jesus as the first figure to embrace death as an individual
subject representing universal substance, preparing the reader for the Calvary of absolute

83
spirit at the end of the Phenomenology (PS ¶808/PG 591).33 This tarrying with the
negative feels like death for ordinary consciousness unaccustomed to the rigors of
scientific thought. To purify ordinary consciousness of it commitment to representational
thinking (a thinking which separates subject from object) it must pass through its own
stations of the cross (PS ¶77/PG 72),34 a “way of despair” that acts as the “education of
consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science” (PS ¶78/PG 72-73). This emphasis on
negation as the feelingof death reveals the fundamental congruence between the Logic
and the Phenomenology regarding the way of thought. Within the austere atmosphere of
the Logic there is no need to speak of life, death, or despair. But below, in the rough and
ready world of phenomenal consciousness, Hegel is bracing the reader for a severe
journey.
The goal of this journey is that “point where knowledge no longer needs to go
beyond [transcend] itself (sich selbst hinauszugehen), where knowledge finds itself,
where Notion (Begriff) corresponds to object (Gegenstande) and object to Notion” (PS
¶80/PG 74). Two thing to note from this formulation: first, that the Notion and object
would correspond and vice versa is exactly what the Logic assumes as its beginning in
pure knowing. And, second, the idea of something not needing to go beyond itself should
immediately remind us of the status of the true infinite as self-transcending. But Hegel
continues by making this key statement: “Consciousness, however, is explicitly the
Notion of itself. Hence, it is something that [immediately] goes beyond limits, and since
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these limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond itself” (PS ¶80/PG 74).35
Having encountered the Logic, when we read that consciousness is that which goes
beyond or transcends (das Hinausgehen) limits, we should immediately think of how
Hegel describes the true infinite as having transcended the transcending of limits. He is
saying that consciousness is that which transcends all limits, and is therefore selftranscending as that which “goes beyond itself.” Hegel is preparing us for the eventual
realization that consciousness (expanded into self-consciousness and Geist) is itself the
true infinite as absolute knowing.
As our interest is both on the role of Verstand in placing limits (especially the
limit of the beyond, Jenseits), and how consciousness transcends these limits, we will
trace three movements in which consciousness goes beyond its own limits. And because
Hegel likens the freedom of thought to “voyaging on the open sea, with nothing under us
and nothing over us” (E §31), this investigation of the Phenomenology will take the form
of three sounds in which Hegel seeks to plumb the deep sea of consciousness. The first
sounding concerns the understanding (Verstand) and its encounter with the supersensible
beyond, an encounter that prompts the transition from consciousness to selfconsciousness. This transition into self-consciousness sets up the second encounter
between the Unhappy Consciousness and its in God as transcendent other. The
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movement beyond this limit encompasses the rest of the Phenomenology, provisionally
accomplished on the socio-historical level through mutual forgiveness at the end of
chapter VI, but made explicit by Christianity in the incarnation and crucifixion in chapter
VII. This explicit encounter within Christianity constitutes the third and final sounding
we will take, noting how it issues into the thought of pure knowing as the absolute.
These soundings, especially the second one, will also lay the groundwork for
understanding Hegel’s social theory examined in the next chapter.
After these sounding are made this section will end by asking whether Hegel has
indeed accomplished his goal of uniting subject and object by overcoming all otherness.
It will be shown that just as the Logic only includes ‘nothing’ by first excluding it as a
non-thought, so too the Phenomenology includes ‘the beyond’ and ‘otherness’ by first
excluding them as non-thoughts. This inclusion through preemptive exclusion results in
a lack of true encounter with the ‘beyond’ or ‘other’ of thought, always reducing it to the
indeterminacy of non-thought. And if this is the case then Hegel, even in the
Phenomenology, will merely have assumed his own argument rather than having proved
it.
Consciousness and the Infinite: First Sounding
Force and Understand
The Phenomenology opens with three chapters on consciousness, examining three
forms of consciousness and the types of objects that are opposed to this consciousness.
In each form consciousness is attempting to secure certainty of knowledge regarding the
object with having to make reference to itself. In each case this ultimately fails. The first
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two forms of consciousness (chapters I and II) seek to establish certain knowledge of the
object by referencing, first, a purely sensuous ‘This’, and second, a perceived ‘Thing’.
The sensuous ‘This’ succumbed to internal contradiction as space (‘Here’) and time
(‘Now’) were introduced to identify the ‘This’, a space and time quickly multiplying into
a plurality of Here’s and Now’s creating a structural instability only resolved through the
introduction of the activity of consciousness. Likewise, the supposedly independent
‘Thing’ entered a plurality of relationships with itself and other things rendering its
supposed independence void. Attempting to avoid making consciousness the constitutive
center of the object, the understanding next posits ‘force’ as the unity of objects. Chapter
III of the Phenomenology investigates this attempt to establish knowledge of objects
through reference to ‘force’. From the perspective of the understanding (Verstand) the
new object of investigation in chapter III is “force,” but for the phenomenologist looking
at the entire process (which is the perspective of Hegel and the reader) the new object is
the understanding itself.36
The first move of the understanding is to substantialize force, thereby saving this
new object as somehow in the world. This force is both the inner ‘principle’ unifying
each thing and the outer ‘expression’ of its diverse properties (PS ¶135/PG 109-111). As
both ‘principle’ and ‘expression’ force is the “unity of itself and its externalization.”37
But substantializing force way causes its two moments (inner and outer) to split into two
forces, the active and passive forces within and between objects. The substantializing of
force causes it to fall apart into the play of many forces.
36
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While moving quickly and somewhat forced,38 Hegel’s claim is that the
understanding’s attempt to give force substance results in placing the ‘truth of force’
within the ‘thought of force’. If the ‘truth of force’ is at the same time the ‘thought of
force’ then “the realization of Force is at the same time the loss of reality” because force
cannot be perceived in things as a substance but only conceived behind, above, or
beyond, these things (PS ¶141/PG 115). For Hegel, this realization is the movement from
the first thought of force (as substance) to the second thought of force as only “an object
for the Understanding,” an object which “is the inner being of things qua inner” (PS
¶142/PG 115-16).
With the realization that force is the inner qua inner of things (not the sensible,
perceived, or substantial), and that it is through the understanding that this non-sensible
inner is known, the understanding comes to see that it is that which “looks through this
mediating play of Forces into the true background of Things” (PS ¶143/PG 116). This
admission of the necessity of mediation is a conclusion consciousness has been
attempting to deny ever since positing the immediacy of sense-certainty (against the
mediation of space, time, or language), or by positing the immediacy of the perceived
object (against the mediation of other objects).
But the understanding again attempts to dodge this result by externalizing its own
mediation between the sensible and the inner world of things by positing ‘appearance’ as
that which mediates between the understanding and the inner world (of the things) (PS
38
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¶143/PG 116-17). Appearance is the sensible (sinnlichen) world of experience in
contrast with the supersensible (übersinnliche) world of the beyond (Jenseits) (PS
¶144/PG 117). The construction of this syllogism (between consciousness and
supersensible mediated by appearance) is the first time consciousness willfully posits a
mediation rather then suppressing it, inferring the supersensible on the basis of the
sensible (PS ¶145/PG 117). The positing of this supersensible beyond as a means
understanding the unity of experienced objects brings us to the cusp of our first sounding.
Understanding and the Beyond
Concerning the supersensible beyond, Hegel begins with a typically Kantian
conception of it as “empty, for it is merely the nothingness of appearance,” the
unknowable “inner being of Things” (PS ¶146/PG 117). Hegel contends that this
emptiness is not based in any limitation (beschränkt) of reason (Vernunft), but merely
because the terms demand that the beyond of consciousness (Jenseits des Bewußtseins) to
be an empty void in which nothing is known (PS ¶146/PG 118). This initial definition of
the beyond should immediately remind us of how the Logic began with the nothingness
of pure being as the failure of thought, a failure of thought indicating the failure of the
Kantian understanding (Verstand) concerning the limits of reason (Vernunft). Here Hegel
is not concerned with the derivation of the categories of logic, but with exposing the false
priority of Verstand within Kantian epistemology.
Unlike Kant who understood the noumenal realm as marking the limits of reason,
Hegel faults the conception. If the supersensible beyond has no link with sensible
phenomena then every quest for true knowledge will fail. But because the supersensible
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beyond (übersinnliche Jenseits) has come into existence as a inference from the sensible,
the supersensible beyond must be connected intelligibly to appearance, such that the
supersensible is the truth of the sensible. Or as Hegel says, “the supersensible is
therefore appearance qua appearance” (PS ¶147/PG 118). To say that the supersensible
world is the truth of appearance means the supersensible world is the true interpretation
of the sensible; it is appearance thought through.39 To understand this we must closely
follow the thread of Hegel’s argument concerning understanding and force.
When the understanding looks upon the “play of forces” known as the world of
appearance, it learns to think the supersensible beyond standing behind this play. The
understanding posits a law as that which gathers and guides this play of forces (Phen.
¶148/PG 119-20), such that the “absolute alternation”40 of the play of forces contrasted to
the law as the “stable image of unstable appearance” (PS ¶149/PG 120). While the
sensible world is known as the incessant change of alternating forces, the understanding
posits a law within the supersensible world acting to balance all equations, uniting the
difference on both sides of the equal sign.
But, as could be easily guessed by Hegel’s typical procedure, the stable image of
the supersensible world rapidly runs into its own internal contradictions. Indeed, the
“tranquil kingdom of laws, the immediate copy of the perceived world, is changed into its
opposite” (PS ¶157/PG 127). This occurs because law as an abstraction is empty and
39
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indeterminate. If this is the case then the supersensible beyond still as empty as a
Kantian beyond and is therefore of no use for securing knowledge. Only a law is
determinate. But no single law can explain the multiplicity of forces leading to plurality
of laws within the supersensible beyond.
The understanding, however, moves to blame itself for these failures, suggesting
that the multiplicity of laws is merely its own attempts to “explain” the inner workings of
the supersensible world. This attempt fails because these explanations are themselves
tautologies, making distinctions (within understanding) without a difference (to the
supersensible world) (PS ¶154-55/PG 124-26). In taking up “explanation” as a possible
solution the understanding begins to see itself as “the law of appearance.” If these
explanation have no relationship to the supersensible beyond then this beyond is again
rendered empty. To avoid this situation all the distinctions created by the
understanding’s attempt at ‘explaining’ the multiplicity of laws must also be posited
within the supersensible world for otherwise connection to knowledge of the object
would again be lost (PS ¶156/PG 126-27). Because of this, the “absolute alternation” of
forces thought to be mitigated by understanding’s explanation is now see to have
penetrated into the heart of the “tranquil kingdom” causing its inversion into a “second
supersensible world (zweite übersinnliche Welt)” (PS ¶157/PG 127). This is an inversion
from the stable kingdom of laws to the unstable alternation of laws.
The admittance of second supersensible world is the second time the understanding
is compelled to do something it otherwise would not want to do. The first was the initial
admittance of the supersensible beyond after the understanding failed to describe force as
a substance available to sensuous perception. In the attempt to find a stable realm of laws
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behind the world of fluctuating appearance, understanding has instead found that nothing
is ever at rest, neither itself nor the supersensible world. Both the sensible and the
supersensible are worlds in constant motion. Instead of perpetually seeking to find
stability in a realm beyond change, the understanding must altogether eliminate “the
sensuous [representation] of fixing the differences” (die sinnliche Vorstellung von der
Befestigung der Unterschiede) within a stable order as an attempt at securing knowledge
and must instead allow that the supersensible is itself “pure change” (reine Wechse), or
“inner difference” (der Unterschied als innerer) (PS ¶160/PG 131). Rather than positing
a infinite regress of supersensible worlds (third, fourth, fifth, etc.), which it would do
while under the sway of “sensuous representation” (sinnliche Vorstellung), the
understanding must eliminate this way of thinking and learns to think “pure change” as
the “inner difference” of objects themselves. When the understanding does this it learns
to think the totality of differences within the supersensible “as an infinity” (als
Unendlichkeit), which is nothing other than itself (PS ¶160/PG 131).
Understanding and Infinity
This incredibly compressed argument makes sense when compared to the
derivation of the infinite in the Logic. Here in the Phenomenology, the sensible plays the
role of the finite while the supersensible is the spurious infinite. To halt a infinite regress
of higher supersensible worlds posited to guarantee the truth of the sensible, the
understanding must change its perspective on the situation, just as was the case for the
spurious infinite. To do this the understanding must think the pure change of “inner
difference” (innern Unterschiedes) as “a difference which is no difference” (ein
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Unterschied, welcher kein Unterschied ist) (PS ¶161/PG 131). This “inner difference”
where sensible and supersensible are united through ““a difference which is no
difference” parallels the need to view the finite and the infinite in their separateness
(Trennung) while remaining inseparable (untrennbar). In both cases the infinite is the
name Hegel gives to that change of perspective needed to resolves the inner
contradictions off an infinite regress.
What this means for the development of consciousness within the Phenomenology
is that the three terms previously held apart, the two extremes ends of (1) the
understanding and (2) the supersensible mediated by (3) appearance, have all collapsed
together. The understanding comes to know that the supersensible is nothing other than
its own experience of itself (its operations of knowing). The understanding had
misrecognized this situation because it had posited something besides itself (the
supersensible beyond) as the cause of the sensible world. As Hegel says rather
poetically, when the (sensible) curtain hanging in front of the inner being of things is
taken away, consciousness comes to sees itself there in the empty place (PS ¶165/PG
135). The pulling of the curtain in which consciousness sees itself expresses the
mirroring effect of consciousness becoming aware of itself through its own process of
thought. Consciousness, now conscious of itself, is therefore a self-conscious
consciousness (PS ¶164/PG 134-5).
As was the case in the Logic, Hegel’s opening investigation into the operations of
consciousness culminates in a failure that is a success. At each step, consciousness has
failed to secure the independence of the object. The object of sense-certainty vanished
within emptiness of spatial and temporal indexicals. The object of perception was lost
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within its contradictory relationships. And the supersensible beyond only proved to be the
work of the understanding itself. In each case, but especially with the supersensible
beyond, consciousness attempted to separate substance (object) from subject
(consciousness). But these failures redoubled in consciousness coming to know itself as
self-consciousness. The failure of consciousness to secure knowledge of its objects
without reference to its own operation has revealed that consciousness is also selfconsciousness.
This failure, preeminently as the collapse of the supersensible beyond, constitutes
the first sounding of the Phenomenology as consciousness encounters its beyond.
Consciousness has come to know itself as a self-transcending immanence because it
transcends its objects of knowledge even while remaining immanent to itself as a
conscious self-consciousness. The exposition of this self-consciousness and its own form
of the beyond we will now turn in the second sounding as we follow Hegel in plumbs the
depths of thought.
Self-Consciousness and the Infinite: Second Sounding
With the curtain of appearance raised, the social drama of self-consciousness
begins. Moving from the shadows of the “nightlike void of the supersensible beyond,”
self-consciousness now steps center stage, lit by the “spiritual daylight of the present”
(PS¶ 177/PG 145). Now an engaged actor, rather than passive observer, selfconsciousness participates in the dramatic struggle of life and death, demands
recognition, confesses sins and offers forgiveness. Certainly the shadowy figure of the
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‘beyond’ will make a return appearance, but for now all attention is focused on selfconsciousness.
The stage on which self-consciousness acts is “the native land of truth” (PS
¶166/PG 137) on which self-consciousness now seeks its own self-certainty rather than
the certainty of its objects.41 As Gadamer says, “truth is no longer like the foreign
country of otherness into which consciousness seeks to penetrate.”42 Instead of
transgressing the barriers of a forbidden land (i.e. the supersensible beyond), selfconsciousness is now at home in the land of truth, the master of its own domain.
Unfortunately, self-consciousness soon finds other forces at work in this land, and most
importantly, finds that it is not alone.
The focus of this sounding will not be on the social and political aspects of
Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness and recognition, as these will be investigated more
closely in the next chapter. Rather, the focus will be on how Hegel places of selfconsciousness between the otherness of life below and the otherness of the beyond above.
The former reveals how self-consciousness is in truth a spiritual being not reducible to
natural life. The latter indicates the potential problems of this spiritual being, its failures
and success. While many focus more on the middle section of chapter IV concerning the
master/slave dialectic, we will spend more time on the before and after his dialectic
seeking to understanding how self-consciousness as Geist separates itself from both
natural life and a supernatural God.
The Self-Conscious Life as Desire
41
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With the shift to self-consciousness we should not think that consciousness is
forgotten or discarded. Instead, the rather static consciousness is contained within the
more dynamic self-consciousness. Explaining this in reference to otherness (the problem
so fundamental to consciousness), Hegel notes that self-consciousness “is essentially the
return from otherness” such that in this return consciousness and “the whole expanse of
the sensuous world is preserved” (PS ¶167/PG 138-9). In the return from the otherness
of objects (which were found not to be truly other but already within constituted by the
understanding), self-consciousness now finds itself at home in the world. It is no longer
merely aware of the world and its forces, but is aware of itself within a world that is its
own. As Harris says, “Being at home in the world is a matter of making a home in it.”43
This making of a world rather than observing it is what Hegel calls desire. Indeed, “selfconsciousness is Desire in general” (es ist Begierde überhaupt ) (PS ¶167/PG 139).
Self-consciousness finds that rather than merely being a thinking being it is also a
living being. Its own life, and the continuation of this life, is the principle object of desire
through which objects are filtered (PS ¶168/PG 139-40). That self-consciousness is a
living being means it no longer has theoretical objects of cognition but practical objects
of desire. But the demands of this biological life threaten the independence of selfconsciousness and its life of thought. To regain its confidence as more that mere
biological life self-consciousness eliminates other objects (through consumption or
destruction) in an attempt to prove that they really are not and that it really is (PS
¶174/PG 143). In this way self-consciousness gains its self-certainty as more than merely
natural; i.e. self-consciousness (as infinite thought) goes beyond itself (as finite life).
43
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This elimination of other objects proves that self-consciousness is still the master of its
domain. The desire for self-certainty (that is its more than a living being) is satisfied as
self-consciousness returns from the otherness of life.
This satisfaction, however, is short lived. This is the case for two reasons. First,
another desire is always produced by the needs of biological life. And second, whenever
self-consciousness negates an object as proof of its mastery self-consciousness
simultaneously destroys the condition by which it proves its own mastery (PS ¶175/PG
143). The satisfaction of self-consciousness seems forever deferred within the endless
task of negating natural objects.
This is the case unless a new kind of object appears. The problem with natural
objects is that self-consciousness is the one negating them. But if there were an object
that “effects negation within itself” (selbst die Negation an ihm vollzieht) because “it is in
itself the negative” (er ist an sich das Negative), then self-consciousness could achieve its
goal (PS ¶175/PG 143). This new kind of object, able to negate itself, would persist
before self-consciousness because the needed negation comes from the side of the object.
Because this negation is a self-negation of and by the object itself, this new kind of object
would give a lasting confirmation that self-consciousness is truly a self-consciousness.
But the only object that is (1) independent of the self-consciousness but (2) can also selfnegate its own independence and thereby prove the independence of self-consciousness,
is another self-consciousness.44
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If this is true, then “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another
self-consciousness” (PS ¶175/PG 144).45 The desire of self-consciousness to confirm
itself as more than mere biological life is satisfied only through another selfconsciousness who is also more than its biological life. This recognition, gained through
another, is the means of securing self-certainty for self-consciousness. When the desire
for life is transformed into the desire for another self-consciousness (the desire to be
recognized by another self-consciousness), then self-consciousness enters the more than
merely natural life of Geist. As Hegel says in anticipation of later developments, the
fullness of this life of Geist is the “unity of the different independent selfconsciousnesses” as they enjoy “perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and
‘We’ that is ‘I’” (PS ¶177/PG 145). Unfortunately, the full experience of this “I that is
We and We that is I” must await the long process of Geist’s development ending in
chapter VI (to which we will turn at the end of this sounding).
What concerns us for the moment is the movement of the infinite in the process of
recognition. Hegel tells us “self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the
fact that, it so exists for another” (PS ¶178/PG 145). All of this occurs through a
“process of recognition” between two self-consciousnesses which is “infinity realizing
itself in self-consciousness” (PS ¶178/PG 146).46 Hegel goes on to elaborate how the
first self-consciousness comes to recognize itself through its other and how this other
self-consciousness comes to recognize itself through the first self-consciousness (PS
¶184/PG 147). This elaboration parallels Hegel’s discussion of how, once the true
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infinite is understood properly, it makes no difference whether one starts with the finite
or the infinite because the finite always receives itself back from the infinite and the
infinite receives itself back from the finite. As he says in the Logic, each is the selfsublation of the other, or rather “both the finite and the infinite are this movement in
which each returns to itself through its negation” (SL 147/WL 162). If we replace finite
and infinite with self-consciousness and its alternate self-consciousness, then we have the
process of recognition whereby each returns to itself through the its other. This is the
movement of the true infinite played out on the level of self-consciousness, a movement
of recognition that Hegel calls “spiritual unity” (geistigen Einheit) (PS ¶178/PG 146).
Through this process of mutual recognition Hegel is explaining “the transition
from a natural to a spiritual being,”47 such that within the native realm of truth selfconsciousness is a spiritual being within/as Geist. For Hegel this is the nature of selfconsciousness as it returns from otherness: it first returns from the otherness of cognitive
objects and then the otherness of another self-consciousness.
The Unhappy Consciousness
This opening investigation into self-consciousness is necessary before
encountering Hegel’s famous ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ and its confrontation with an
extreme form of otherness, the Unchangeable God. As just noted, for self-consciousness
to truly recognize itself (to gain self-certain of itself) another self-consciousness is
required. But Hegel’s account of the initial encounter between these two self-
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consciousnesses is not a cordial mutual recognition. Rather, this process of recognition
begins as a struggle to the death, a struggle then raised to a new level of opposition
between the Stoic and Skeptic consciousnesses, culminating in the Unhappy
Consciousness as the internalization of both, all experienced as a contradictory of
existence (PS ¶206/PG 163).
From where does this experience of contradiction come? It comes initially from
the incomplete movement of recognition between the master and the slave. In the
struggle for recognition one self-consciousness fights another for the right to be
recognized, resulting in one negating itself (denying its independence) before the other.
The slave thinks it better to side with life rather than pursue its own self-recognition in
the face of death. But the master’s victory is short lived. In the self-negating act of the
slave, moving from independence to dependent, the slave becomes unequal to the master
and therefore loses its ability to confirm the mastery of the master (PS ¶191-2/PG 151-2).
The condition of possibility for recognition is lost in the servitude of the slave. Because
of this loss, as Jean Hyppolite says, “the path of mastery is a dead end in human
experience; the path of servitude is the true path of human liberation.”48 The path of
servitude leads to liberation because while working for the master the slave comes to
understand itself as both the master of itself and master of the world, even if not yet
master of another self-consciousness. Rather than merely consuming objects as the
master does, the slave learns that it can create objects. Through these independent
objects of creation, the slave comes to see its own independence from the master (PS
¶195/PG 154).
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Through this work the slave remembers (returned through the otherness of its
created objects) that it is not merely a living being, but also a thinking being. From this
achievement of independence comes a new experience of freedom in the form of Stoic
self-consciousness. The Stoic understands it true identity as thought freed from the
servile work in the world below, dwelling instead within in a tranquil kingdom above.
The Stoic expresses the “pure universality of thought” whether on the throne or in chains,
seeking to “maintain that lifeless indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the
bustle of existence…into the simple essentiality of thought” (PS ¶199/PG 157). Much
like how the understanding posited the “supersensible beyond” as the dwelling place of
inner essences, now the Stoic places itself in the pure realm of thought above the
polluting fluctuations of everyday life.
But this abstract freedom of thought cannot persist. Just as there was no tranquil
kingdom of law for the understanding but instead only constant alteration (Wechsel), so
too the abstract and lifeless freedom of the Stoic is inverted as the permanent change
(Wandel) of everything (PS ¶205/PG 161). The Skeptical self-consciousness understands
that because it is essentially thought it is unchangeable, but because it has thoughts it is
also always changing. The Skeptic revels in this contradiction between unchangeable
thought and changeable thoughts by focusing this contradictions outside itself, rather than
within. This is, however, a self-contradictory state for the Skeptic who willfully
suppresses its own duplicity (ignoring its own embodied existence) even while exposing
the duplicity of the Stoic (PS ¶205/PG 161). In the end, neither the Stoic nor Skeptic
have embraced existence below, each opting for different escapes into the realm of
thought above. Only the Unhappy Consciousness knows that it cannot use the freedom
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of thought to flee its finite existence (i.e. it is both a living and a thinking being) (PS
¶206/PG 163). The Unhappy Consciousness comes on stage as the full expression of the
contradictory existence of self-consciousness caught between infinite thought
(unchangeable) and finite being (changeable).
All throughout, however, self-consciousness has not given up its attempt to gain
self-certainty. In view of this desire, the Unhappy Consciousness seeks to unify itself
with the Unchangeable (now projected as God) as a way to garner a minimal level of selfcertainty. The Unhappy Consciousness seeks this unity with the Unchangeable in three
phases: the immediate phase of pure feeling; the external phase of work and enjoyment;
and the mediated phase of penance. The first seeks union with the Unchangeable through
the “pure feeling” of devotion through its “infinite yearning.” But in seeking to lay hold
of the Unchangeable in its beyond (Jenseits), the Unhappy Consciousness only ends up
laying hold of its own feeling because it cannot think the beyond, much less go into there
to find the Unchangeable. “Where that ‘other’ is sought, it cannot be found, for it is
supposed to be just a beyond, something that can not be found” (PS ¶217/PG 169).
Hegel’s positioning of the Unchangeable God in the ‘beyond’ (Jenseits) of thought
parallels the understandings encounter with the “supersensible beyond” (übersinnliche
Jenseits), revealing the symmetry between consciousness and self-consciousness.
After this failure of immediacy, the Unhappy Consciousness goes back into the
world to find union with the Unchangeable (PS ¶218/PG 170). The Unhappy
Consciousness now finds the world not merely as something to negate through its
consumptive activities, but as already both null (nichtig) in its separation from the
Unchangeable and yet sanctified (geheiligte) as created by the Unchangeable, mirroring
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the plight of the Unhappy Consciousness itself (PS ¶219/PG 170-1). This return to the
world again takes the form of work as it had for the slave. In its work and the enjoyment
of the goods produced, in recognizing the gifts of creation and the power of freedom to
work the land, which both come from “the Unchangeable beyond” (dem unwandelbaren
Jenseits) (PS ¶220/PG 171), the Unhappy Consciousness gives thanks and therefore gains
a sense of unity with the Unchangeable (PS ¶222/PG 172). But this unity again breaks
down because the thanksgiving is an inauthentic surrender to the Unchangeable. The
Unhappy Consciousness knows that it was active and free in its work, not the
Unchangeable to whom is attributed true activity and freedom. The Unhappy
Consciousness has only recapitulated the freedom of the slave at a more fundamental
level (PS ¶222/PG 172-3).
In having proved itself independent through work and yet still lacking union with
the Unchangeable, the Unhappy Consciousness renounces all such attempt to negate
something in its search for self-certainty, and instead considers its own independence as
if it were itself nothingness (Nichtigkeit) (PS ¶224/PG 173). Self-consciousness repents
of its pursuit of self-certainty and negates itself before the transcendent master, the
Unchangeable God. In this way the Unhappy Consciousness has made itself nothing. Of
course the irony for the reader of the Phenomenology, and especially readers of the Logic,
is that the beyond (Jenseits) of the Unchangeable is itself actually nothing, a truth that the
Unhappy Consciousness is not yet privy.
But as always, the failure of thought as it encounters nothing, in this instance the
Unhappy Consciousness (as something made into nothing) before the Unchangeable (a
nothing thought to be something), is productive for thought. While the Unhappy
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Consciousness knows itself to be nothing, this knowledge of itself as nothing comes only
in relation to the Unchangeable. The self-negation of the Unhappy Consciousness
(through repentance) is mediated through an experience of the Unchangeable (PS
¶226/PG 174). This mediation is accomplished between the Unhappy Consciousness and
the Unchangeable by a middle term “which presents the two extremes to one another, and
ministers to each in its dealings with the other.” This mediator, likely a priest though
only called a servant (Diener) (PS ¶228/PG 175), administers the forgiveness of the
Unchangeable to the individual consciousness that has surrendered itself in repentance.
When the Unchangeable is mediated to the Unhappy Consciousness it receives its selfcertainty through the Unchangeable, but in an unequal manner (PS ¶230/PG 176-7).
Forgiving the Unhappy Consciousness
It is hard to underestimate the full significance of this resolution for the Unhappy
Consciousness and the introduction of a mediator. The role of the mediator (priest) is
essential because it re-inserts humanity within the process of recognition. The full
significance of this is not experienced until the end of chapter VI where ‘conscience’
overcomes of the moral point of view at, setting the stage for the expression of mutual,
rather than one-sided, forgiveness.
In Hegel’s view, Kantian morality mirrors Stoic detachment resulting in the
impossibility of actually knowing and acting morally. The rise of ‘conscience’ breaks this
deadlock because one’s actions are immediate known to be morally good (PS ¶637/PG
468). Moral deliberation according to abstract maxims is replaced with the immediacy of
personal moral conviction. Conscience makes itself objective in the world through its
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actions. The problem, however, with basing one’s morality on one’s own conscience is
that every (objective) action can elicit divergent (subjective) interpretations. Because
every individual conscience believes itself to be good, each actor must consider
alternative interpretations of its actions (by rival consciences) to be evil (PS ¶649/PG
477-8). This ends in a plurality of individuals acting conscientiously, all claiming the
good for themselves and evil in others (PS ¶653-9/PG 479-85). This conflict repeats the
earlier struggle for recognition, but now on the level of justifying moral action.
This conflict of interpretations splits the individual consciences between those
who act and those who judge. Those who act bite the bullet and risk entering their action
into the conflict of interpretations, opening themselves to the interpretations of others
who seek to unmask their convictions as mere self-serving hypocrisy. In this way, the
ones who act commit themselves to the truth and goodness of their action, even if others
might call it evil (PS ¶662/PG 486). Those who judge refuse to enter into such a conflict
of interpretations and would rather retain their moral purity as the judge of those who act
(PS ¶664/PG 487). The former (actors) take their stand within changeable particularity
and the latter (judges) within unchangeable universality. This is a repetition of the
estrangement between the Unhappy Consciousness and the Unchangeable, but now on
the intra-human (social) level between those who act and those who judge.
This creates a situation of mutual hostility and moral instability between the
estranged parties. The solution for Hegel is for each party to confess its one-sided
commitment to either particularity (actors) or universality (judges), and thereby forgives
one another. When mutual forgiveness occurs then reconciliation between the two
parties is accomplished. This reconciliation allows for the achievement of a true mutual
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recognition. This confession make here is not abject debasement of oneself as it was in
the act of penance for the Unhappy Consciousness (actor) before the Unchangeable
(judge). Rather, this confession is a giving over of a one-side and subjective position in
light of a dawning equality of one-sidedness (PS ¶666/PG 490). In other words, each
confesses the sinfulness of their own finitude.49 The actor and the judge each desire to
claim the perspective of infinite thought within finite being. Only in confessing their
own one-sided commitment (to either acting or judging) and only in forgiving each other
can each come to recognize one another, realizing that infinite thought within finite being
is only accomplished through their mutual recognition.
Hegel states that this process is how “the wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no
scars behind” (PS ¶669/PG 492). The beginning of this wound goes all the way back to
the struggle for recognition, a wound deepened in the encounter between the Unhappy
Consciousness and the Unchangeable. This wound appears in various forms throughout
the Phenomenology: from the divide between duty to family (Antigone) and duty to city
(Creon) in the Greek city-state up to the divide between Enlightenment Freedom and
Revolutionary Terror. All of these wounds are resolved in the mutual forgiveness within
a community of actors/judges that unites infinite thought and finite existence. Through
mutual forgiveness self-consciousness accomplishes what it has been seeking from the
beginning of chapter IV. In mutual forgiveness it has now achieved self-certainty
through a process of mutual recognition.
What we have seen in this sounding from IV of the Phenomenology (completed
only at the end of chapter VI) is the development of self-consciousness as that which
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“goes beyond itself.” As that which goes beyond itself as more than natural, selfconsciousness did not achieve recognition in its struggle to the death, eventually
developing into the Unhappy Consciousness limited by God (the Unchangeable). This
limitation was provisionally mitigated by the mediation of God’s presence through
another human being. Self-consciousness only goes beyond this limit in a community of
those who confess and forgive their mutual limitations (the sinfulness of their finitude).
This mutual forgiveness is the infinite process of mutual recognition expressing the “I
that is We and the We that is I” as perfect freedom and independence (PS ¶177/PG 145).
In this mutual forgiveness, Hegel says, God is no longer the Unchangeable above
humanity, but is now found within human community, mediated not through a priest set
apart, but through each person who renounces their own one-sided perspective. As Hegel
says in the concluding lines of chapter VI:
The reconciling Yea, in which the two ‘I’s let go their antithetical existence, is the
existence of the ‘I’ which has expanded into a duality, and therein remains
identical with itself, and in its complete [emptying] (Entäußerung) and opposite,
possesses the certainty of itself: it is God manifested in the midst of those who
know themselves in the form of pure knowledge. (PS ¶671/PG 494)
In the mutual forgiveness that secures mutual recognition and self-certainty, God is seen
to be no longer locked in the beyond above, but walking on the earth below, manifested
in the infinite recognition between individuals. This life of Geist, as mentioned earlier, is
the “unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses” as they enjoy “perfect
freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’” (PS ¶177/PG 145). This
unity of ‘I’ and ‘We’ as an accomplished mutual recognition, securing the self-certainty
of self-consciousness as more than merely life below and yet not limited by God above, is
our second sounding. This second sounding has shown how Hegel seeks to overcome the
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otherness of natural life and the otherness of the God beyond through the mutual
recognition within human community. This overcoming of otherness in human
community is the life of Geist. By “going beyond itself” as more than life below shows
self-consciousness to be self-transcending. By eventually establishing mutual recognition
without reference to a beyond self-consciousness shows itself to be immanent. In this
way Hegel establishes self-consciousness as self-transcending immanence.
Religion and the Infinite, and Beyond: Third Sounding
Our third and last sounding concerning Hegel’s system relates to the “God
manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge”
(PS ¶671/PG 494), but now known explicitly from the standpoint of religion rather than
from morality. At the beginning of chapter VII Hegel makes it clear that religion has
already made its presence felt along the way, even if unrecognized. Religion first
appeared for consciousness in the form of the supersensible (Übersinnlichen) of the
understanding (Verstand), and then for self-consciousness in the form of a beyond
(Jenseits) for the Unhappy Conciousness (PS ¶673/PG 495).50 But now, with religion
comes the explicit self-consciousness of Geist as Geist instead of the implicit form
encountered in the community of mutual forgiveness (PS ¶672/PG 495).
As with the other soundings, it is impossible to cover in detail all that Hegel has
to say regarding religion. Instead we will again focus on those parts that present his
philosophy as self-transcending immanence. This means we will jump from God

50

The other instances of religion that Hegel notes are the underworld for the Greeks,
heaven for the medievals, and the re-instatement of the ‘supersensible beyond’ in the
Enlightenment.

108
appearing (erscheinende) in the mutually forgiving community to God revealed
(offenbare) as the basis of such reconciliation, focusing primarily on Christological issues
rather than Hegel’s Trinitarian reformulation. This sounding will again outline the
encounter between self-consciousness and its beyond, showing how Hegel attempts to
move beyond the object/subject divide (or the substance/subject divide) as a means of
articulating his philosophy of self-transcending immanence.
Incarnation
Hegel’s concise definition of the “simple content of the absolute religion” focuses
on the “incarnation (Menschwerdung) of the divine Being, or the fact that it [divine
Being] essentially and directly has the shape of self-consciousness” (PS ¶759/PG 552).
For Hegel, through the Incarnation divine Being reveals itself as a self-consciousness,
breaking down the divide between substance and subject. But how does this object (the
Incarnation) reveal God to be both substance and subject?
To understand how the incarnation reveals divine being to be substance and
subject we must look at the unity established by and the movements of the Incarnation as
Hegel understands it. On a historical level, the Incarnation unites the two previously
disparate movements of consciousness found in Greek ethical life and Roman law. On a
religious and historical level, the development and contradictions of Greek ethical life
and Roman law recapitulate the developments of the Stoic, Skeptic, and Unhappy
Consciousness (PS ¶748-53/PG 545-49). In Hegel’s mind, these forms of consciousness
“stand impatiently expectant round the birthplace of Sprit (Geist) as it becomes self-
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consciousness” (PS ¶754/PG 549). The allusion, of course, is to the birth of Christ
(situated within world history but stripped of its place in Israel’s history).51
Hegel calls the Incarnation the unity of these two movements (Greek and
Roman). He reminds us that implicitly, “Spirit has in it the two sides which are presented
above [Greek ethical life and Roman law] as two converse propositions: one is this, that
substance [empties] (entäußert) itself from itself and becomes self-consciousness; the
other is the converse, that self-consciousness [empties] (entäußert) itself from itself and
gives itself the nature of a Thing, or makes itself a universal Self.” (PS ¶755/PG 549).52 It
should be noted that each is an self-emptying of itself, not caused by another. Through
this reciprocal self-emptying (gegenseitige Entäußerung) where each becomes the other,
“Spirit comes into existence (Dasein)” (PS ¶755/PG 550). This dual self-emptying
should of course immediately remind us of the dual self-emptying in the form of
confession and forgiveness needed to complete of mutual recognition (PS ¶671/PG 494).
Likewise, this movement of dual self-emptying should remind us of the dual movements
through otherness of the finite and infinite, and the mutual vanishing of being and
nothing.53
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Through the unity of these movements Geist has entered existence and becomes
an object of “complete immediacy” such that “God is sensuously and directly beheld as a
Self, as an actual individual man” (PS ¶758/PG 552).54 As we know all too well,
however, immediacy is always problematic for Hegel. That Geist, the supposed unity of
consciousness and self-consciousness, is in the Incarnation as an immediate individual
means that the Incarnate One is merely a sensuous other standing against consciousness.
The Incarnate God-man is merely a sensuous ‘this’ or a perceived ‘thing’ (PS ¶762/PG
555).55 To resolve the deadlock of immediacy and its indeterminacy, the immediate self,
as the “immediately present God,” must vanish (Verschwinden) into its negative moment
(negatives Moment) so that it might be taken up into “the universal self-consciousness of
the [religious] community, a self-consciousness which reposes in its own substance, just
as in it this Substance is a universal Subject” (PS ¶763/PG 556). The Incarnate God-man
must vanish from immediate, individual existence so that it can be taken up within the
universal, communal self-consciousness. This vanishing allows for a more proper union
between Substance and Subject because now the Incarnation is not merely an immediacy
in opposition to self-consciousness.56 The necessity of vanishing and the moment of
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negativity prompts Hegel to deepen his account of the Incarnation by referencing the
crucifixion.
Crucifixion
As mentioned, the immediacy of the incarnate one must vanish (Verschwinden) in
order to be raise up into universal self-consciousness as the unity of substance and
subject. Unlike the conceptual vanishing between being and nothing, on the historical
level of existence this vanishing becomes the necessity of death. To makes sense of this
Hegel turns to his account of the Trinity as a framework for understanding the necessity
of the death of the Incarnate One in order to move into life in the Spirit. Hegel maps the
Trinity onto his logical framework of 1) abstract indeterminacy, 2) determinacy as and
through otherness, and 3) return from otherness as self-determinacy.57 The first moment
of the Trinity is that of pure thought, or the content of consciousness as “pure substance,”
the Father. The second is a passing into otherness, “or picture-thinking as such” (das
Vorstellen als solche), identified with the Son or Word/Logos. The third moment “is the
return from picture-thinking and otherness” to “the element of self-consciousness,” which
is Spirit (PS ¶767/PG 557-8). Hegel expands this by first considering the immanent
Trinity (PS ¶769-72/PG 558-61) and then the economic Trinity in creation and the
community of reconciliation (PS ¶773-87/PG 561-74).58 In each case, in the thought of
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the religious community, picture-thinking (Vorstellen) dominates as the “standpoint
which takes the moments of the movement which Spirit is, as [if they were] isolated
immoveable Substances or Subjects, instead of transient moments,” making the
speculative truth of the Trinity into an heirlooms of religious traditions (PS ¶771/PG
560).
The main concern for our purposes is the transition from the second to the third
moments, from the Incarnation of the God-man to the community of Geist, as the
complete content of the manifest religion. Hegel had introduced the Incarnation as the
culmination of the Unhappy Consciousness in the historical sequence of Greek and
Roman life, now adding how the Incarnation is a moment in the conceptual life of the
Trinity. As for pure being, which could not remain abstractly indeterminate but had to
become determinate being (Dasein), so too divine essence in its abstraction must take on
existence. But as we have seen, this immediate existence must again become universal as
its return from otherness. The first other-ing of itself as divine Being (its self-emptying)
in Incarnation must be negated by a second other-ing so that it might be raised to
universality again. This second other-ing, or second negation, is the death of the GodMan, so that it can then passes into the life of Geist. As Hegel says, “This death is,
therefore, its [divine Being] resurrection as Spirit” (PS ¶779/PG 565-6). Why?
Two points will make this clear. First, when self-consciousness could not secure
the truth of itself, it turned into the Unhappy Consciousness in its wretched changeability
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and posited beyond itself the Unchangeable. The Unhappy Consciousness could not
unite itself with the Unchangeable, and instead had to confess its own brute existence as
evil (in its non-unity with the Unchangeable). Happily, the Unhappy Consciousness was
absolved of this burden by the priest, the middle term between the changeable and
unchangeable. In this way the Unhappy Consciousness could claim for itself a mediated
union through self-negation. The evil of existence (finitude) is partially overcome
through this mediation. But, secondly, we must also remember the figure of the one who
acts out of conscience and is considered evil for doing so. The action is deemed evil
because by definition because it is both finite in its objective occurrence and finite in its
subjective interpretation (the self-interpretation of the actor but also of those judging the
action). Only when the actor and the judge renounce their (sinful/evil) particularity and
forgive each other can they entire a universal self-consciousness as “reciprocal
recognition which is absolute Spirit” (PS ¶671/PG 493).
What Hegel has already mentioned as the outcome of self-consciousness before
the Unchangeable (the feeling of wretchedness) and as the process of conflicting
interpretations concerning moral action (the imputation of evil), is now rendered
explicitly ontological in the Incarnation.59 In the Incarnation the divine essence takes on
the (evil/sinful) finite existence.60 And this assumption of finitude is only complete with
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the death of the God-Man, for the nature of finite things is always their ceasing-to-be.61
Therefore, in unity with human nature and its natural existence, the divine essence must
die. But this death loses its merely natural meaning (natural life/death is no use to selfconsciousness in seeking its self-certainty) and becomes “transfigured” (verklärt) from
the “non-being of this particular individual, into the universality of the Spirit who dwells
in [its] community” (PS ¶784/PG 571).62 Once this universality is achieved, this
transfiguration of death allows the spiritual community to die daily (confess its evil
particularity/finitude) while also be daily resurrected (into universality/infinity). The
incarnate one must die so the spiritual community can learn to mutually forgive itself of
its finitude. In this way, self-consciousness is able to “go beyond itself” (PS ¶80/PG 74),
surpassing the natural limit of finitude.
But this is only what happens from the human side of the divine-man. Hegel also
considers what happens from the side of divine essence, and it is here that he reintroduces
the idea of a mediator, first seen as the one who mediated between the Unhappy
Consciousness and the Unchangeable.63 Hegel says, “The death of the Mediator is the
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death not only of his natural aspect…but also of the abstraction of the divine Being” (PS
¶785/PG 571). Hegel goes on to explain this is the death of divine abstraction by saying
that this death
contains, therefore, at the same time the death of the abstraction of the divine
Being which is not posited as Self. That death is the painful feeling of the
Unhappy Consciousness that God Himself is dead…This feeling is, in fact, the
loss of substance and of its [taking a stance] (Gegenübertretens) over against
consciousness; but it is at the same time the pure subjectivity of substance, or the
pure certainty of itself which it lacked when it was object, or the immediate, or
pure essence. This Knowing is the inbreathing of the Spirit (Begeistung),
whereby Substance becomes Subject. (PS ¶785/PG 572)
Hegel has been preparing us all along for this painful feeling that “God is dead,”
appearing now at the apex of the journey of consciousness in its purification. We have
finally entered the way of the cross whereby self-consciousness learns to “tarry with the
negative” (PS ¶32/PG 36).
This lose of divine substance in its abstraction is at the same time the recovery of
this substance in the form of subjectivity. Through the collapse (death) of the mediator,
the previously opposed terms of divinity and humanity now collapse into the
“subjectivity of substance,” mirroring both the collapse of the opposition between the
understanding and the supersensible beyond mediated by appearance, and the collapse of
the opposition between the one who acts and the one who judges mediated by mutual
confession. As with the overcoming of the beyond (Jenseits) for the understanding
within consciousness, in the death of the mediator the God of the beyond has now
emptied itself into the community of Geist. Within this community there is no longer a
‘beyond’ to go beyond because the need has been transcended. Consciousness expanded
into self-consciousness, as that which “goes beyond itself” (PS ¶80/PG 74), no longer
needs to go beyond itself into a ‘beyond’, but has return to itself through its other (in this
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case, divine Being). Therefore, just as consciousness came to terms with its
supersensible beyond as its own activity, so too self-consciousness comes to terms with
the divine beyond through the death of the mediator. What was the drawing back of the
curtain (of appearance) by which consciousness came to see itself is now, in the death of
the mediator, the tearing of the veil (in the Temple) by which self-consciousness comes
to see itself as divine within Geist.
The death of the God-man shows that the God of the beyond is not really other
than self-consciousness, uniting Substance and Subject. This content of the manifest
religion expresses the same movement of mutual self-forgiveness (PS ¶786/PG 572).
That the moral community of mutual forgiveness and the religious community express
the same content is block for the religious community because its thought is still
governed by Vorstellung. The religious community, therefore, takes the emptying
(Entäußerung) of Substance to be an action of Substance itself (as God), rather than as
the action of self-consciousness as both Substance and Subject (PS ¶787/PG 573).
Because of this the community of Geis must make one final step on its journey to
absolute knowing.
Absolute Knowing
If chapters VI and VII of the Phenomenology each end with mutual forgiveness,
on the social and religious levels, it is because these two movements represent the unity
of consciousness and self-consciousness in the form proper to thought itself. The initial
shift from consciousness to self-consciousness was that of replacing a theoretical stance
of knowledge with a practical one, i.e. self-consciousness seeking its own self-certainty
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through objects and then through others. But this practical quest resulted in the
debasement of self-consciousness before the Unchangeable beyond.
The odyssey of self-consciousness arrived on the shores of moral ‘conscience’ as
the immediate conviction of moral knowledge, the unity of theory and practice. After the
division of this community of conscience (into those who act and those who judge)
comes its reconciliation through the mutual renouncing of one-sidedness and the offering
of forgiveness for sin of finitude. In this way the unity of theory and practice is not within
the particular existence of individuals but the universal self-consciousness of the
community as Geist. This is the moment of “God manifested in the midst of those who
know themselves in the form of pure knowledge” (PS ¶671/PG 494), the moment that
prompted the movement through religion. After passing through religion, Hegel
reiterates this social reconciliation as the appearance of pure knowing (PS ¶793/PG 579),
and now shows how they must fit together as two moments of true reconciliation, or
absolute knowing.
Religion and conscience are two sides of the same reconciliation. The former
possesses an “absolute content” (the religious Vorstellung of incarnation and crucifixion),
while the latter is “a form devoid of content” (the moral action of conscience), the
unification of which “closes the shapes of Spirit” (PS ¶794/PG 579). In a manner that
draws together several strands throughout our exposition, Peter Kalkavage summarizes:
In religion, reconciliation is only in itself or divinely objective, in morality
[reconciliation is] only for itself or humanly subjective. Each side must make up
for the lack in the other by giving itself to the other. The objective divine must be
infused with the form of self-certainty, and moral action must be infused with
absolute content or truth. Once this mutual infusion occurs, self-consciousness
will experience the world in which it actually lives as the home of divine
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presence, the house of God. It will know divine truth divinely, that is, as
Science.64
However, unlike Kalkavage, we cannot only emphasize that the world is now filled with
the presences of God. It was self-consciousness that had entered world as the “native
realm of truth” seeking its self-certainty there, a search it has never given up (PS ¶166/PG
137). For Hegel, self-certainty has now been raised and divine truth has been lowered to
self-consciousness as the community of Geist, the community of pure knowing. This is
the case because the form of self-certainty achieved from the human side as the unity of
substance (mutual recognition through forgiveness) and subject (individual conscience
and action) is united with the content of truth in the form of divine substance that has
now become subject. Because the (religious) content was in the form of Vorstellung, and
therefore only implicit as absolute knowing, the unification must comes from the side of a
communal self-consciousness as a giving itself its own content (PS ¶797/PG 582). In
realizing that Geist is that which gives itself its own content it comes to know that it is
both substance and subject as pure knowing.
Consciousness, as that which expanded into self-consciousness as the community
of Geist, has encountered and moved through the dual ‘beyonds’ of consciousness (the
supersensible) and self-consciousness (the Unchangeable), such that truth can now be
considered both substance and subject. Consciousness no longer presupposes an
independent object existing over and against it, but knows itself through its other. This
purifying of ordinary consciousness, its elevation into Geist through Geist, is the
preparation for philosophical science. From this elevation Geist can enter the ether of
Science (PS ¶ 805/PG 589), or as Hegel says later “the realm of shadows, which is the
64
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system of logic” (SL 58/WL 5:55). This ending leads us to the beginning of the Logic
with pure being, returning us also to the beginning of this chapter.
Beyond Others: Summary
These, then, are the three soundings taken from the Phenomenology. This has
been a long journey through the cultivation of consciousness beyond the limits of the
understanding, to the emergence of self-consciousness and its search for recognition, and
the self-consciousness of Geist in coming to know itself in religion. Each of these
soundings encountered the ‘beyond’ and exhibited the movements of the true infinite in
overcoming this ‘beyond’.
First, when the understanding begins by positing an infinite regress of
supersensible worlds in order to account for appearance, the understanding finally
acknowledged the supersensible as its own operation. The supersensible beyond that
began as a pure void (nothing) and then found to be pure change (negativity), is finally
known as the operations of the understanding in reference to the true infinite, a
realization that splits consciousness into the consciousness of its objects and the
consciousness of itself, or self-consciousness. This is the first and most important,
though understated, encounter with a ‘beyond’ that is found not to be a beyond after all.
The second sounding concerned this self-consciousness and its search for selfcertainty. When another self-consciousness is encountered a process of mutual
recognition occurs that fulfills the desire of self-consciousness to know itself through its
other (not other objects, but another subject). Hegel calls this process of recognition
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“infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness” (PS ¶178/PG 146),65 where each selfconsciousness becomes the middle term by which each returns to itself through the other.
This dual movement mirrors the movements of the true infinite.66 This spiritual unity
between self-consciousnesses is the first step within the life of Geist.
This, however, was only the immediate and abstract conception of mutual
recognition. As we saw, the actual existence of such mutual recognition quickly bumped
up against a limitation from above. Springing from the failed attempt at recognition
between master and slave, passing through the stages of the Stoic and Skeptic, the
Unhappy Consciousness could not reconcile its own finite being with the infinity of its
thought, both of which (being and thought) it equality is. The Unhappy Consciousness,
therefore, posited the Unchangeable as the truth of thought and assumed the position of
the changeable. This is the second instantiation of the ‘beyond’. The Unhappy
Consciousness makes peace with this situation by seeking union with the Unchangeable
through a mediator. This uneasy mediation with the beyond is only overcome much later
in Hegel’s narrative in the recognition of mutual forgiveness within a moral community.
This forgiveness overcomes the one-sidedness of either a commitment to existence
through action (being) or to the moral purity of non-action (thought). In this community
of forgiveness elf-consciousness has now been reconciled to itself, and as Hegel noted,
God is no longer locked in a beyond above, but dwells with and among humanity below.
The third sounding is a repetition of the second but explicitly from a religious
point of view, seeking to understand the self-consciousness of Geist within human
65
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community. The apex of this journey was the incarnation and crucifixion of the divineman as the content of the Manifest Religion. From the side of the divine, thought and
being (or subject and substance) are reconciled through the dying of the abstract God of
the beyond. This process begins with mediation by a third term (mirroring the priest of
the Unhappy Consciousness), but ends with the vanishing of this mediating term
(mirroring the canceling of appearance between understanding and the supersensible),
resulting in self-mediation through the other. Through the Incarnation and death of the
divine-man, the ultimate other as the God of the beyond is now part of the movement by
which self-consciousness comes to know itself in its other.
Each of these soundings resulted in an encounter with the infinite as the resolution
to, or reconciliation of, various impasses posed by the ‘beyond’. In each sounding,
seeking to fathom the depths of thought, Hegel lets out more line until he is able to reach
the bottom (or the beyond) of thought and rebound back to the surface as the selfcertainty of self-consciousness. But has Hegel really measured the depths, or has he
merely measured length of consciousness’s line? In the English system, the measurement
of depth is recorded in fathoms. A fathom is the approximate distance between a man’s
outstretched arms, coming from the Old English fæthm meaning outstretched or
embracing arms.67 With this Old English meaning in mind, we will conclude this chapter
by asking if Hegel has actually fathomed the depths of thought and being or only
embraced everything within the reach of consciousness, excluding all the rest? Have the
depths truly been measured or merely been made fathomable to consciousness?
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3. Beyond Nothing and the Unfathomable
In answering these questions, to begin directly with the infinite in the
Phenomenology is already to begin too late. Nor is it helpful to question the exact
relation between the finite and the infinite in the Logic. The problem criticisms of Hegel
focused on the true infinite is that this engages Hegel at the end of his arguments rather
than at the beginning. One cannot ask about the possibility of an infinite beyond the true
infinite because this leads to the immediate reply that the form of the question belies the
operations of the Verstand and its fixed oppositions.68 To ask whether Hegel has truly
fathomed through we must return to the beginning and ask about how Hegel positions the
unfathomable.
Nothing Other Than Thought
As we saw in our initial survey of the Logic, the dialectic of the finite-infinite that
results in the true infinite (the one we find in operation throughout the Phenomenology) is
based in the earlier dialectic of being-nothing resulting in becoming. There it was argued
that while the Logic formally begins with being, true thought only begins at becoming,
and does this all from nothing. This nothing was the failure of Verstand to think any
thought (i.e. pure thought, “thinking thinking thinking”). It was concluded that the
nothing beyond finitude is equal to the nothing before becoming, each governed by
Verstand in its isolation from Vernunft. In this way the nothing of understanding
(Verstand) becomes the infinite of reason (Vernunft). In both cases, the nothingness of
68
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thought produces the self-enclosed infinity of being. This is the key to Hegel’s
dialectical development as the internalization of nothing through negation. By excluding
‘nothing’ as non-thought, has Hegel really fathomed all thought and being or reduced
thought and to the embrace of consciousness?
In other words, is reducing the ‘beyond’ of thought to non-thought thinking the
beyond? Is nothing the source of thought only as a failed thought? Plato certainly
posited the good beyond thought and being and did not consider this good as merely
indeterminate and abstract (or in any other way deficient).69 Following the lead of
Plato’s Parmenides, Neoplatonists developed a conception of the ‘one’ beyond being and
thinking, identified as itself unlimited,70 insights that developed into the tradition of
negative theology. The impulse for positing the good or one beyond being is similar to
Hegel’s motivation in preventing an infinite regress when explaining phenomena. But as
we have seen, Hegel’s opening moves in the Logic bar this approach of stopping the
regress in a plentitude beyond thought and being. As a philosophy of self-transcending
immanence, Hegel desires an alternative to a ‘good’ or ‘one’ beyond being and thinking,
for these would inhibit self-determining freedom (at least in the horizons of German
Idealism). Hegel preemptively eliminates these options by excluding everyone beyond
consciousness as merely ‘nothing’ and then re-including this nothing as negation.
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As we saw in the first section, Hegel has not really argued against considering
such a transcendence that could be productive beyond or other than being and thought.
He has only shown that ‘nothing’ is that from which thought must recoil in its journey
toward pure knowing. In essence, he only presupposed the lack of true transcendence.
Because the presupposition for this Logic is found in the Phenomenology, to criticize the
Logic in this way requires stepping back and asking whether the Phenomenology has
actually accounted for all forms of ‘otherness’ in its attempt to break down the divide
between object and subject (Substance and Subject).
Nothing Other Than Consciousness
In turning to the Phenomenology, the place to start is not Manifest Religion and
its content of incarnation and death of the divine-man. Certainly this passage initiates
various death of God and/or post-metaphysical theologies,71 as well as less radical
interpretations of Christianity.72 While Manifest Religion seems the most explicit
encounter between consciousness and its other, and therefore the best place by which to
judge whether the Phenomenology has truly encountered all others, this encounter is
already thoroughly saturated by the themes of mutual recognition and the movements of
71 See Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (London: Westminster
Press, 1966); Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University Of
Chicago Press, 1987); Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology,
and Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); John Caputo, The
Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2006); Slavoj Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
72
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Lauer, Hegel’s Concept of God (Albany: SUNY, 1982); Peter C. Hodgson, Hegel and
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the infinite. This saturation of themes makes it very difficult to know whether
consciousness is truly encountering its transcendent other or if consciousness has already
pre-formed this religious content on its journey toward pure knowing.
Moving back to the Unhappy Consciousness and its encounter with the beyond in
the form of the Unchangeable is also a false start. This encounter was also already
configured by the (failed) process of mutual recognition in its search for self-certainty.
The freedom of self-consciousness is initially limited by its natural life from below.
Through the sublimation of natural desire in the form of social desire (the desire for
recognition), self-consciousness enters the domain of Geist. This spiritual life, however,
cannot be given from a supernatural beyond for this would also set up another limitation,
now from above rather than from below. Hegel needs to show that self-consciousness as
Geist is neither natural nor supernatural, even while being spiritual.73 Indeed, the entire
movement from the Unhappy Consciousness to Manifest Religion is Hegel’s attempt to
articulate the spiritual but not supernatural nature of self-consciousness. This is the case
because, for Hegel, the supernatural, the beyond, or transcendence, is assumed to be a
detriment to the self-determining nature of consciousness, an assumption basic to postKantian German Idealism.
Because the encounter of the Unhappy Consciousness with the Unchanging is
also already saturated by the process of mutual recognition as self-determining freedom,
the best place from which to question Hegel’s encounter with otherness is the first one
with the supersensible beyond (übersinnliche Jenseits). There we saw that the
understanding conceived of the supersensible as “merely the nothingness of appearance”
73
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(PS ¶146/ PG 117), mirroring how the spurious infinite was conceived as the nothing of
the finite. But this indeterminate nothingness was quickly filled through an attempt to
articulate the truth of appearance as supersensible. It was only when the understanding
eliminated its commitment to sensible representation that it could then conceive of the
supersensible as itself “pure change” or “inner difference” (PS ¶160/PG 131), based in
the idea of infinity. After the arrival of the true infinite the understanding came to know
that the supersensible and appearance as the productive power of the understanding itself.
When understanding saw this it was able to shift from mere consciousness to selfconsciousness.
Other Than ‘Nothing’
But as we asked for the finite-infinite and being-nothing dialectics, from where
does this unity of appearance and the supersensible come? The conception of the
spurious infinite cannot be used to justified the introduction of the true infinite here in the
Phenomenology. The arguments concerning the true infinite in the Logic, no matter how
tempting it is to import as explanations, are invalid from the standpoint of the
Phenomenology. For Hegel, rather than allowing an infinite regress to proceed above
consciousness, being only stopped with reference to a beyond in some form (God, the
One, the Good), the infinite regress is halted by positing the unity of the supersensible
and appearance within consciousness as the understanding’s own product. Hegel would
rather bite the bullet of contradiction within consciousness rather than admit it above
consciousness. Crafting his argument is this way only reveals that Hegel had already
assumed the conclusion of the Phenomenology (and the arguments of the Logic) in these
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opening movements. But if he has assumed these conclusions then he has not overcome
all opposition between subject and object and has not overcome all otherness to thought.
He has only preemptively excluded the types of otherness that would challenge his
system.
As with the Logic where ‘nothing’ as the first other of thought is included an
indeterminate non-thought, here in the Phenomenology the first true other of
consciousness is returned to consciousness as the “nothingness of appearance”, that
which is not an object of consciousness. This other is already determined (by
consciousness) to be indeterminate and therefore deficient. That ‘nothing’ is determined
to be indeterminate by thought ensures that thought can become self-determining. The
possibility that this other of thought could be ‘overdeterminate’ and therefore productive
of thought, rather than merely deficiently indeterminate as a thought, is not possible for
Hegel.74 It is not possible because anything other than indeterminate ‘nothing’ would
allow for the persistence of something other than consciousness and therefore inhibit the
self-determining nature of thought as the unity of subject and object. For Hegel, it is
consciousness and consciousness alone which ‘goes beyond itself’ as a self-transcending
immanence.
Conclusion
It these three soundings from the Phenomenology we have found that Hegel does
not reach the bottom of thought (or being). Rather, he takes the end of the line (the self-
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transcending nature of consciousness) as the determination of thought and claims that
nothing else exists. In many ways, the act of lowering this line was merely the pretense
for catching a glimpse of consciousness reflected in the water. Hegel has perhaps given a
persuasive gloss on his metaphysical vision,75 but has not justified it without circularity
(between the Phenomenology and Logic: i.e. relying on the derivation of the true infinite
of the Logic to make compelling the various transitions within the Phenomenology). If
these criticisms hold then we have achieved the goal of this chapter, to show both that
Hegel’s philosophy is aptly described as self-transcending immanence, even while
showing that Hegel only assumes but does not justify such a philosophical perspective.
Of course, these criticisms only hold for certain interpretations of Hegel. They
challenge strong logical and ontological interpretations of Hegel committed
presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s philosophy.76 If one assumes the Phenomenology as
the presupposition of the Logic then one would still need to account for the lack of any
real encounter of a transcendent beyond which is not already preconfigured and made
amenable to consciousness by reduction into indeterminate nothingness.
These criticisms also challenge religious interpretations that support Hegel’s
reconfiguration of Christianity. Given Hegel’s strong aversion to ontological beginnings,
the only theistic reading of Hegel would have to be panentheistic, reading God as the
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infinite irreducible to the finite and creation as the finite irreducible to the infinite.77 But
as we have seen, while on the one hand Hegel notes the necessary separability of the
finite and the infinite, he more strongly insists on their radical inseparability within the
immanence of thought. Indeed, Hegel’s self-transcending immanence puts him at
considerable distance from Christian orthodoxy, more than most supportive religious
interpreters acknowledge because they are happy to begin with the finite-infinite dialectic
(the end of Hegel’s arguments) rather than being-nothing dialect (the beginning).
These criticisms, however, do not effect the normative or radical interpretations
offered by Pippin or Žižek. These interpretations like already Pippin’s or Žižek’s assume
that the pursuit of modern freedom needs no further justification or proof, and that Hegel
had always presupposed this position. These types of interpretation cannot be criticized
on logical or ontological grounds. Rather to meet them we must must enter the practical
arena of political freedom. Indeed, just as Hegel always positioned his critique of Kant
within the practical realm of morality, so too must we now turn to Hegel as he seeks to
actualize modern freedom beyond the self-transcending immanence of thought into the
social self-determination of ethical life.
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIETY AND FREEDM: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
For that is just what freedom is: being at home with oneself
in one’s other.1
Introduction
The last chapter outlined Hegel’s philosophy as a self-transcending immanence.
There I argued that this self-transcending immanence of thought functioned through an
exclusion of the overdeterminate through its reduction to an indeterminate ‘nothing’, reincluded as the negativity of thought expressed as the true infinite. In this way ‘nothing’
as negativity appears within consciousness, expanding into social self-consciousness, as
that which “goes beyond itself.” I argued there that Hegel had not included all otherness
within thought, but excluded in advance what could not be assimilated into the project of
absolute knowing, meaning that his system is not truly presuppositionless.
These criticisms of Hegel, however, only applied to the more traditional readings
of Hegel that seek either to justify his system or coordinate it with Christian orthodoxy.
The critique that Hegel does not presuppositionlessly establish his system, however, does
not apply to those who understand Hegel as offering an interpretation and justification of
modern freedom as self-determination (like Pippin and Žižek) because they see Hegel
affirming the project of modern freedom. The previous critique of Hegel’s logical system
and its lack of presuppositionlessness fails the more political interpretations of Hegel who
claims that his entire project exactly presupposes modern freedom. Interpreters like
Pippin and Žižek, as noted in the first chapter, do not think Hegel attempted to
independently justify his system through a presuppositionless beginning. Rather, they
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see Hegel as offering an interpretation of modern freedom that both presupposes the
value of modern freedom itself and refuses reference a transcendence beyond. To engage
these interpretations I will have to step off Hegel’s phenomenological ladder, come down
from the logical ether, and enter the realm of socio-political existence as Hegel
understands it.
This chapter will consider Hegel’s political philosophy as articulated in his
Philosophy of Right, particularly examining his understanding of a free will within ethical
life (Sittlichkeit) as the unity of individual subject and the ethical substance, extending the
unity of substance and subject gained in the Phenomenology. After this exposition the
limits of ethical life will be explored around the questions of societal change and
transition, showing why Hegel did not offer a theory of society transformation. This
chapter will conclude by indicating the impossibility of holding together ethical
substance with individual subject, illustrated by the immediate breakdown of the
Hegelian legacy, a bifurcation continued in interpreters like Pippin and Žižek. This
breakdown of the Hegelian project indicates the inherent instability of self-transcending
immanence as an orientation from which to think political subjectivity, directing us to
rethink its very possibility. From that breakdown we will then move to the second part of
our investigation and explore the Augustinian orientation toward transcendence and
immanence as more productive of a political subjectivity capable of offering social
critique and initiating social change.
1.The Subject and Substance of Politics
Unlike Karl Popper’s depiction of Hegel as the reactionary advocate of Prussian
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totalitarianism,2 it is much more accurate to think of Hegel as “a reform-minded liberal
who based his political philosophy on the analysis and fulfillment of individual human
freedom.”3 As we have seen throughout, Hegel is profoundly concerned with the
freedom of thought, which if it is not to remain indeterminate must become determinately
expressed in actually existing individuals and institutions. Indeed, only through the
mediation of individuals and institutions is modern freedom truly expressed and
experienced as the “I that is We and We that is I.” This first section will examine the
relationship between subjective will and social substance in Hegel. The second major
section will examine the institutions of modern life: family, civil society, and the state.
Against the negative freedom of non-interference, Hegel develops the tradition
running from Rousseau and Kant of a more positive freedom in which society is not a
necessary restriction on freedom but is both the positive expression and condition of
one’s freedom.4 Hegel attempts to combine the unity of the individual and general will of
Rousseau with the moral self-legislation of Kant. To do this Hegel unites the subjective
(individual) and substantive (institutional) aspects of the will, such that the will retains its
identity through its other.
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Unlike interpreters who would sever Hegel’s speculative from his political
philosophy,5 Hegel bases the Philosophy of Right solidly on his logical system and
deploys its common terms: indeterminate, determinate, self-determinate, negation, and
otherness. The immediate topic, however, is not the logical realm of reason, but the
practical realm of freedom (which in the end are the same for Hegel):
The basis of right is overall, the domain of spirit [or spiritual] (Geistige); its more
precise location and standing point is the will, which is free. Freedom thus
constitutes the substance and determination of right, and the system of right is the
realm of actualized (verwirklichten) freedom, the world that spirit brings out of
itself as a second nature. (PR §4)
Here Hegel outlines the key aspects of the Philosophy of Right. First, freedom is an issue
of the will, a free will, for a “‘will,’ without freedom, is an empty word, just as freedom
is actual only as will, as subject” (PR §4A). But what does it mean for a will to be free?
Hegel’s answer leads to the second key aspect: actual freedom (of the will) is a system of
determinations acting as a spiritual second nature.6 This is the substantive side of
freedom. Hegel is attempting to unite freedom as substance and subject, just as he had
done for truth in the Phenomenology. And just like the Phenomenology, this freedom
must pass through otherness in its return to itself. As he says in the Encyclopedia,
freedom is a process of self-recognition through otherness in which Geist is “purely at
home with itself, and thereby free, for that is what freedom is: being at home with oneself
in one’s other” (E §24 A2). This first section will move through two sub-sections. I will
first explain freedom as it concerns the form and content of the will from the subjective
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side as articulated in the Introduction of Philosophy of Right. Then I will investigate the
substantive side concerning ethical life and its interaction with the subjective as discussed
in the third part of the book.
Form and Content of the Will
Hegel begins his Philosophy of Right with the form or the concept of will,
following the familiar movements of indeterminate, determinate, and self-determinate.
The will contains two essential moments, which together (as a third moment) form the
unity of the will. The first moment is the act of pure, abstract indeterminacy that
suspends every immediately given content, be it from nature, needs, desires, or drives
(PR §5). This is the one-sideness of “negative freedom, or the freedom of the
understanding” (PR §5R). By negative freedom Hegel does not mean the freedom of
non-interference of the classical liberal tradition (Hobbes, Locke, Mills), but the freedom
that comes through abstraction, to abstract oneself from among possible alternatives or
contents.7 Left in its one-sideness, this conception of the will thinks of freedom as the
capacity to choose between options, which for Hegel “has to do only with the abstraction
of freedom, not with its idea and its truth” (PR §10R). The second moment of the will is
the transition from pure indeterminacy to a concrete determination in a particular action.
In this movement “the I steps into existence (Dasein) in general; this is the absolute
moment of the finitude or particularization of the I” (PR §6). This act is the negation of
infinite possibilities through the active willing of limitation (Beschränkung) in order to
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enter a determinate course of action (PR §6A).8 In this moment the will renounces its
merely abstract ability to choose between alternatives and instead chooses to make itself
determinate through a particular action. These alternative moments of the will mirror
Hegel’s discussion of the beautiful soul as it splits into the one who judges and the one
who acts. But as we will see, here in the Philosophy of Right the overcoming of this
contradiction is not a movement into religion but into an ethical life guided by habits and
dispositions. But this is to get ahead of Hegel’s argument.
These two moments of the will are, for Hegel, only abstract moments unified by a
third moment in which (1) the abstract indeterminacy and (2) the determinate limitation
of the will becomes “at home with itself” as “the self-determination of the I” (PR §7).
This third moment is less an actual moment in a sequence of willing, and more of a
stance of the will toward itself. Rather than finding itself alienated in its own action
(alienated because self-consciousness knows itself to be infinite but finds itself within the
finitude of its action), the subject renounces this one-sidedness and determines itself to be
that which is self-determining because it has determined its own course of action. This
self-determination of the I is best understood as the “relating of negativity to itself,” a
self-relation that does not deem determinacy an alien limit. Rather, this limit is a limit
that the will chooses for itself (PR §7). This “relating of negativity to itself” is the
practical correlate of how ‘nothing’ and negativity functions within logical thought. The
unity of the will as a process of consciousness “going beyond itself” in setting its own
limits (the determinate negation of abstract negation) is the process by which the will can
8
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be at home with itself (neither merely indeterminately abstract nor lost in the world of
determinacy). The unity of these moments constitute the freedom of the will, mirroring
the true infinite as “negativity relating itself to itself” (PR §7R). This is the form of the
will as self-relating negativity going beyond every limitation except the ones it sets for
itself (i.e. self-determines).
But from where does the content of the will come? As with the objects of thought
in the Logic, if the content of the will comes from outside itself, then the will cannot be
self-determining and free. This problem is carried over into the first instance of the will,
the natural will, in that its content comes from outside itself. The “immediate or natural
will” is compelled by “drives, desires, and inclinations through which the will finds itself
determined by nature” (PR §11). These drives, desires, and inclinations direct actions
toward the continuation of life and are therefore necessary. This content, however, is not
yet self-determined. This lack of self-determination is compounded because even the
process of determining to act through an evaluative hierarchy of desires does not make
this content self-determining. It just highlights the mere subjectivity of the finite will (PR
§14).
This evaluative hierarchy, sometimes confused with true freedom, is called
willfulness (Willkür) by Hegel. It consists of the ability to abstractly choose between
options that are not one’s own (i.e. natural drives and desire) (PR §15). Hegel notes that
this is the most common idea of the will (the ability to chose between alternatives), but he
claims this is only the partial truth of the will, caught half way between natural
determinism and actual freedom. Willfulness, in this regard, is only the will within the
contradiction of finitude (PR §15R). It is caught in this contradiction because at one time
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it might choose a certain course of action. But later, in the same situation, the will might
just as well choose another course. The mere willfulness (Willkür) can always change its
mind in the future and therefore never transcends its finite situation but only embarks
along a spuriously infinite series of disconnected choices (PR §§16-18). Therefore,
beyond the natural immediacy of drives and desires and a contingent willfulness, there is
a need for a rational organization of the will that unites its form with a self-determining
content.
As was the case with thought needing to be purified of its common sense separation
of subject and object, true freedom must move through the purification (Reinigung) of
natural determination (form) and subjective willfulness (content) according to a “rational
system of the will’s determinations” (PR §19). When natural drives and subjective
willfulness have been purified, cultivated, or educated into a rational system (PR §20),
then the will becomes a “self-determining universality” (PR §21). This “self-determining
universality” takes up its natural content and making this content its own as a second
nature.
If a rational system can cultivate the will properly, then, the will becomes “truly
infinite because its object is itself, and therefore is neither other to it nor a [limit]
(Schranke) for it; instead, in its object it has returned into itself” (PR §22). Here Hegel
expresses the same ideas used to speak of self-consciousness: the truly free will returns to
itself through its other, which in this case is both the other of its own determinate action
in which it finds itself, and as we will see, the other as “the rational system of the will’s
determinations” giving truly free content to the free will’s form (this second ‘other’ is the
theme of the next sub-section).
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After this Introduction, the elaboration of this rational system is the task Hegel sets
for himself in the Philosophy of Right, a task that moves through the two initial moments
of ‘abstract right’ and ‘morality’. Abstract right examines the immediate freedom of
persons in relation to objects, and morality investigates the mediated freedom of subjects
in relation to themselves.9 But as usual, each of these are only abstract moments needing
unification within a more comprehensive category, which in this case is ‘ethical life’
(Sittlichkeit) giving substantive existence to the subjective will (PR §§33, 141). To this
objective ethical life we will now turn, giving special attention to how it perfects the
subjective will.
The Substance and Subject of Ethical Life
Hegel’s discussion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is immediately preceded by his
reflections on morality, culminating in the interrelation of the good and conscience.10
While conscience seeks to directly will the good as the objectively absolute, the center of
conscience acting out of conviction (inaccessible to others) tends to makes subjectivity
absolute.11 This occurs because the good, as the “substantial but still abstract universal of
freedom” requires practical determination. This practical determination ends up being
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conscience itself. But “conscience, as the purely abstract principle of determination”
requires that it to be universally objective (PR §141), can only reference itself as this
universal. This leads to a vicious cycle accenting on subjectivity because the only path to
the universality of the good comes through the subjective conviction of conscience.
Because of these deficiencies the good that is discovered within the morality degenerates
into a sophisticated form of willfulness masked as conscience. The emptiness of the
good and its filling by subjective conscience are the backdrops against which Hegel
shapes his doctrine of ethical life.12
For Hegel, ethical life is the unity of the objective and subjective determinations of
freedom. Ethical life is the “concrete identity of subjective will and the [objective] good”
(PR §141).13 Ethical life is not merely indeterminate or abstract, but is
the living good that has its knowing, willing, and, through its acting, its actuality, in
self-consciousness, but that has its foundation—which is in and as itself—and its
motivating aim in ethical being. This is the concept of freedom that has become
both a present world and the nature of self-consciousness. (PR §142)
What was previously thought to be an opposition between the objective good and
subjective will, bridged through subjective conscience, is now unified by ethical life, not
requiring a bridge translating thought (the universal good) into (particular) action. Just
how these are unified requires looking at ethical life from both an objective and
subjective point of view.14
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As Hegel sees it, the problem of (Kantian) morality is its lack of determinate
content by which to direct and motivate one’s life. Reference to an abstract good does
not ensure freedom but instead perpetuates individual caprice under a moral veneer.
What is needed is a concrete “ethical objectivity” practically accessible to all so that each
can practice the good while knowing it to be good (beyond mere subjective conviction).
The good, in ethical life, becomes a stable and objective content through its laws and
institutions. These laws and institutions becomes the ethical (objective) substance that is
then made concrete in each individual subjectivity (PR §§144). Unlike typical forms of
liberalism that prioritize the individual, ethical life is the foundation of the individual’s
expression and experience of freedom and therefore must be given priority. This is so
much the case that Hegel claims that the objectivity of ethical life is the substance and
necessity in which individuals are mere “accidents” (PR §145, §145R). Priority must be
given to the “substantiality of the ethical” for otherwise one must “proceed atomistically
and build up from the foundation of the individual,” a procedure that “is devoid of spirit
because it leads only to an aggregate. Spirit, however, is not something individual; it is
the unity of the individual and the universal” (PR §156A). This perspective agrees with
Hegel’s continuing emphases that individuality, whether of objects or subjects, must pass
how the norms that structure them are internalized in the motivation of the inhabitants.
Taking the first route, we portray Ethical Life as a condition of subjective freedom.
Taking the second route, examining the institutions which make up the moral world, we
illuminate the conditions of objective freedom…[T]hese should not be represented as two
independent perspectives from which the details of Ethical Life can be charted. They are
interdependent or complementary aspects of it. We cannot articulate the norms of
subjective freedom without showing how they are actualized in the institutional structures
of social life. And we cannot describe the institutional or practices of social freedom
without detailing how these institutions are constructed from the intentional activity of
those moral subjects who behaviours such institutions comprise” (Dudley Knowles,
Hegel and the Philosophy of Right [London: Routledge, 2002], 223-24). See also Wood,
Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 196-98.
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through otherness as an essential constituting moment.15 Atomistic individualism (and its
aggregate) can never fully express the life of Geist in its passage through otherness and
therefore cannot be the basis of Geist and its ethical life.
Prioritizing ethical life, over and beyond individual subjectivity, often raises fears
of a creeping totalitarian impulse in Hegel, of which liberal individualism has always
been thought to be the cure. The trepidation that individuals are merely disposable
‘accidents’ within the necessities of ethical life is only compounded when we read that
the state (the highest instance of ethical life) is “God’s march in the world” as the “might
of reason actualizing itself as will” (PR §258A). But one should not be too hasty in these
concerns as Hegel frequently claims that the freedom of subjectivity is neither abolished
nor abandoned, but fulfilled in ethical life:
The right of individual humans to be subjectively determined as free is fulfilled
when they belong to an ethical actuality, because their certainty that they are free
has its truth in such an objectivity; within the ethical they actually possess their
own essence, their inner universality. (PR §153)
Ethical life is not the negation of individual particularity, as if at first one is an individual
who is then, later, absorbed into the ethical collective. This would merely be to first
assume atomistic individualism (thereby giving it priority) and then to reverse that
perspective ending up with ethical life. But Hegel’s ethical life is not a more
thoroughgoing Hobbesian Leviathan sweeping up individuals as they renounce their
individual right to unfettered freedom, all under cover of a sentimentality for the ancient
Greek way of life. Rather, ethical life is the ground and foundation for individual freedom
without which ethical life would have no “worldly being” or existence (existiert) (PR
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§154).16 While giving priority to ethical life, Hegel understands this priority as the social
and structural condition of individual freedom, without which ethical life would itself be
an empty abstraction. The concern that Hegel is opening the totalitarian door can only be
made from the liberal opposition between individual and society. But this is exactly the
position Hegel refuses to allow because then subject and substance would persist in
opposition to each other. But for this to be understood properly we must look at the
subjective side of ethical life, its duties and habits.
For subjective self-consciousness, the objective determinations of ethical life (its
laws and institutions) seem to present themselves as external objects (PR §146). This,
however, is only an illusion or abstraction of the understanding. Ethical substance is “not
something alien to the subject” but expresses the subject’s own inner essence and
therefore constitutes its true selfhood (PR §147). The subject and substance of ethical
life are so intertwined they admit only a conceptual distinction within their substantial
unity. The substance of ethical life is the water in which subjective freedom swims
unthematized and unreflected.
This unreflected immediacy (PR §147) is exhibited in the duties and habits of
subjects, which partly constitute the “rational system of the will’s determinations (PR
§19) (the other part being the objective laws and institutions). While duty within Kantian
morality is always viewed as an external restriction (Beschränkung) to subjective
freedom, in ethical life “individual humans are liberated to their substantive freedom”
through duty because duty ensures both (1) liberation from natural willfulness and
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individual moral reflection, and (2) the liberation from an indeterminate subjectivity that
never attains actual freedom (PR §149). While this might seem counter-intuitive to the
liberal mindset, Hegel is being perfect consistent with his conception of the will. He
makes this clear saying,
Duty is a restriction (beschränkt) only on the willfulness (Willkür) of subjectivity; it
collides only with the abstract good to which subjectivity adheres. When we say
that we want to be free, this means at first that we want abstract freedom, and every
determination and articulation of the state is taken to be a restriction of this
freedom. But this reveals duty as a restriction not on freedom, but only on an
abstraction of freedom [as willfulness]. (PR §149A)
This understanding of duty continues Hegel’s critique of Kantian limitations and, by
extension, liberal freedom as a whole. As Allen Wood concisely states, “Ethical duties
are not only things I ‘ought’ to do, they are usually things I spontaneously want to do.
Leaving them undone does not so much offend my [moral] conscience as empty my life
of its [ethical] meaning.”17 In Hegel’s mind, what might seem ‘other’ to one’s freedom is
actually seen as “being at home with oneself” through the other of duty.
This spontaneous desire to do one’s duty comes from a cultivated habituation
resulting in virtue. Ethical life fully reflected in subjectivity takes the form of virtue, the
highest of which is rectitude (PR §150). In an understated way meant to further question
the supposed difficulties of modern moral reflection, Hegel notes that it is relatively easy
to know what to do in each situation, and that virtue is not a great achievement. Virtue is
merely doing “what is prescribed, expressed, and known to be appropriate for one in this
situation” (PR §150R).18 Virtue is only thought to be a great achievement in ancient
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societies which have “not yet evolved into the free system of self-sufficient development
and objectivity,” thus requiring the exceptionally virtuous person to compensate for the
general lack of freedom (PR §150R). From a moral point of view, rectitude might seem
like a subordinate virtue compared to the more heroic demands of the self-denying
asceticism of Kantian morality. But Hegel think this is merely the posturing of Romantic
individualism seeking praise for its own exceptionalism (PR §150R). Rectitude, rather, is
constancy in doing one’s duty, turning the supposed exceptionalism of virtue into the
banality of second nature.
Rectitude, as an “unreflected ethical disposition,”19 reaches it apex when it has
become habitual, a “second nature” expressing the ethos of a people. This is Hegel’s
final move against the Kantian separation of duty and inclination. Habituation into ethical
life, a habituation cultivated and educated into individuals, becomes a “second
nature…put in the place of the initial purely natural will” such that the previous
inclinations directed by drives and desires have now become habitual inclinations
directed by ethical duties (PR §151). Moral reflection intervening between duty and
inclination is unnecessary within a properly rational society because our rational duties
are experienced and expressed as habitual inclinations. The particular will of the
individual conforms to the universal will of the community as the unity of duty and
inclination.
When we look back at the Phenomenology, this fulfillment and highest
achievement of the particular and universal will was only partially experienced by the
Unhappy Consciousness when it received absolution for its sin (of existence), and only
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partially expressed as the mutual forgiveness between the doer and the judge. But as a
movement beyond the Phenomenology, the practice of mutual forgiveness is wholly
absorbed into the structures of ethical life and its attending duties (within the family, civil
society, and the state). This habituation occurs though a pedagogical process. In a proper
educative program, what is first thought to be natural is made spiritual in a process of
being “born again” (wiederzugebären), such that one’s “first nature can be transformed
into a second, spiritual one so that what is spiritual within them becomes habitual” (PR
§151A). This unreflective or prereflective habituation, based on the rational cultivation
established in ethical life, is the manner in which Hegel conceives of the unity of ethical
substance and ethical subjects.
Objections
But before raising more substantial concerns about the limits of Hegel’s ethical life
I first want to answer criticisms concerning the unreflective nature of ethical life offered
above. Allen Wood speaks the concerns of many when he comments that “the
subjectively ethical…seems to be essentially unreflective. It is the attitude that follows
ethical custom habitually and unquestioningly. Thus it might appear that the subjectively
ethical, the ethical attitude or disposition, is essentially premodern, since it excludes the
subjectivity found in the moral standpoint.”20 This concern stems from the need to
safeguard modern moral subjectivity from its submersion within ethical substance,
whether it been premodern or Hegelian. In order to guard Hegel against criticisms of
creeping totalitarianism, interpreters seek to emphasize the possibility of moral criticism
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within and/or against ethical life. Two examples are Frederick Neuhouser and Thomas
A. Lewis.
Frederick Neuhouser seeks to find a substantial place for moral subjectivity within
ethical life by opening up a gap between real and ideal societies and between reform and
radically oriented social criticism. As Neuhouser reasons, because we live in a less than
ideal (Hegelian) society there is always a need for morally based criticism if a society’s
customs and habits reinforce oppressive practices. But this social criticism is always
reform oriented for Hegel (and Neuhouser approves of this) because radical criticism
would call into question the very basis of modern freedom: that freedom as selfdetermination is the goal of modern social theories rather than freedom through rational
harmony with nature. Neuhouser effectively seeks to harmonize Hegel’s political theory
with the most favorable aspects of the social contract tradition (from Rouseau to Rawls)
by accentuating the place of moral subjectivity within the gap between real and ideal
societies.21 He does this by separating the normative aspect of Hegel’s social theory from
his speculative logic, allowing him to justify the elevation of moral subjectivity within
ethical life.22 One can certainly understand why Neuhouser would want to elevate moral
subjectivity within a situation of oppressive social practices. But this elevation of moral
subjectivity is not sustainable within Hegel’s system without radical revision. The
separation of Hegel’s logic from his social theory leads Neuhouser to misunderstand how
Hegel’s transitions work, such that what comes latest, ethical life in this case, is always
superior to and the grounding of what comes earlier, moral subjectivity. I will expand on
this in a moment.
21
22

Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 225-280.
Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 270.

147
Thomas A. Lewis also attempts to read Hegel against Hegel by turning to the
anthropology of “subjective spirit” where Hegel gives an extended discussion of habits as
pre-reflective actions that separate and overcome natural impulses. These habits are
themselves in need of reflection if they are to be a means of freedom rather than
instruments of bondage. As Lewis says, “Through its further development, spirit can
abstract from and reflect upon any of its particular habits. And, if spirit is fully free, it
can change these habits as well—in order to will in accord with reason, not just to choose
out of habit.”23 This reading of habits from Hegel’s anthropology suggest that habits are
a lower level of freedom, themselves needing the purifying action of reason. And
because Hegel’s account of habits comes early in his account of subjective spirit, before
the accounts of consciousness and self-consciousness, Lewis reasons that Hegel’s
conception of ethical life must be pried apart, revealing a prereflective habitual side and a
self-consciously reflective side, the latter of which is more developed and more fully
rational.24 The distance between prereflective habituation and reflective moral
deliberation open a space for transformative social criticism.
But the introduction of these gaps, either between prereflective and reflective
aspects (Lewis) or between the reality and ideality of ethical life (Neuhouser) reveals a
lack of trust or faith in modern institutions that Hegel did not share. Indeed, Hegel
thought that ethical life was so intimate, so immediate for individual subjects that the
“relationless identity” (verhältnislose Identität) (PR §147R) between the substance and
subject of ethical life is exactly more intimate than trust or faith because the stance of
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trust and faith must first introduce a distance that is then traversed by trust or faith.25
Hegel’s theory of habituation within ethical life is meant to close any such gaps. Hegel
in no way disallows critical distance from habituated practices. Critical distance belongs
to the sphere of philosophy rather than as necessary for each citizen. Just as everyone
does not engage in the struggle to the death to secure self-recognition, so also everyone
need not reflectively endorse the rationality of habituated practices. Indeed, Hegel
assume most do not have the desire or ability to do so. Therefore, interpretations that
seek to minimize the habitual nature of ethical life in order to secure a larger place for
moral subjectivity only indicate that they have less confidence in modernity and the
rationality of its institutions than Hegel does, and are more concerned with the questions
of transiting from a less free into a more free society, a concern which Hegel also does
not share.
Rather than showing the promise of Hegel for contemporary political theory, do not
these revisions of Hegel begin to show the very limits of Hegel? But, as should at least
be clear, the limits of Hegel do not consist in him being a proto-fascist requiring blind
submission to state authorities because Hegel’s account always presupposes the
rationality of ethical life as he explains it. But if such rational institutions do not yet exist
then one is rightfully abandoned to the interior life of moral subjectivity (PR §138R),
which, like Socrates, is often abandoned (to death) in return by such societies.
2. The Institutions of Ethical Life: Family, Civil Society, and State
But before continuing the line of questioning centered on our confidence in
25
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modernity or the possibility of social transformation with Hegel’s system, we must look
more closely at the social institutions in which subjectivity finds its home. These are the
inter-locking institutions that make up ethical life: the family, civil society, and the state.
Roughly, the family is the immediate unity of ethical life, or “the immediate
substantiality of spirit” in which each member fulfills thier duties according to the bonds
of love (PR §158). Here one’s personhood and individuality is submerged within the
immediate unity of the family. The goal, however, of the family is to raise children who
desire to move beyond this natural immediacy into the realm of self-sufficient freedom
(PR §175). When this occurs, the immediacy of family life breaks apart and individuals
enter civil society as the sphere which satisfies particular needs through a system of
production and consumption. The immediate unity of the family passes beyond itself into
the contradictory state where individuals are opposed to each other and to civil society as
a whole (PR §182). Civil society is an initial self-relation through others in that while
each person seeks its particular ends, this very pursuit is also the universal end or goal of
all (PR §182A). Through seeking the immediate satisfaction of one’s needs comes the
mediated satisfaction of the needs of all, distributed through systems of goods and
services. This explanation of civil society represents Hegel’s appropriation of English
political economy.26
Hegel claims, however, the state as the true ground from which the family and civil
society grow, and the goal toward which they aim (PR §256R). The state is different than
and superior to civil society. It must not be confused with civil society for this would
reduce the state to the merely negative aspect of protecting rights and property. If this
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were the case then the state would be merely function as the protector of individual
willfulness rather than securing substantial freedom. The state is the unity of subjective
and objective freedom in a way that civil society cannot be because civil society
functions within the opposition of particular and universal interests (PR §258R). But as
the unity of particular and universal interest, the state “is the ethical whole—the
actualization of freedom” (PR §258A). That the state is the ethical whole, the totality and
apex of ethical life, means “the state is the actuality of the ethical idea” and “has its
immediate worldly being in ethos, and its mediate worldly being in the individual’s selfconsciousness” (PR §257). It is important to notice that the state’s ethos (its habituated
second naturedness) is the state’s immediate existence while self-consciousness
constitutes its mediated existence. Classical liberalism would reverse the placement of
immediacy and mediation by emphasizing individuals as the immediate basis of the state
and all the acquired habits and practices as merely its mediation. But true to form, Hegel
prioritizes ethical life in its objectivity within which subjective freedom is expressed.
In light of unity subjective and objective freedom, “self-consciousness has its
substantial freedom through its disposition within the state” (PR §257) practiced as a
political disposition of trust (broadly thought of as patriotism). This political disposition
is expressed as a “willing that has become habitual” (PR §268). This disposition is the
consciousness that my interest, both substantial and particular, is contained and
preserved in the interest and aim of an other (i.e., of the state), i.e., in the other’s
relation to me as an individual. In this way, the other is immediately not an other
for me, and in being conscious of this, I am free.” (PR §268)
This is what Hegel means by freedom in one’s other, in which the otherness of other
people is mediated through the otherness of the state. In this habitual disposition within
the state (not toward the state for this would indicate reflective distance) one is
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substantially free. True freedom is achieved through the state as a “being at home with
oneself in one’s other” (E §24A2), or as expressed earlier in the Phenomenology, the state
fully expresses the “unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in
their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that
is ‘I’” (PS ¶177/PG 145). This unity of objective and subjective freedom is system of
rational determination allowing for a truly self-determining will.
Hegel’s practical philosophy, then, builds seamlessly upon his speculative
foundation seeking to reveal the actuality of freedom through otherness. This otherness
is the otherness of ethical life, principally the state, which is not really other to
consciousness but that in which consciousness finds its home. On the socio-political
level, ethical life establishes the self-transcending immanence of self-consciousness,
mirroring Hegel’s logical and phenomenological project. The individual subject
transcends its own natural willfulness within the transcendence of the state through a
cultivation and habituation into particular duties. But the state is nothing other than the
immanent freedom of self-consciousness as Geist, floating above natural existence and
yet not supernaturally constituted. Ethical life contains the self-transcending nature of
consciousness within its immanent horizon as the state. Neither comprised by nature nor
finding itself situated within a cosmic hierarchy, ethical life is the immanent plane on
which self-consciousness transcends itself and returns to itself as that which “goes
beyond itself.”
3. The Limits of Self-Transcending Immanence
What happens, then, when self-consciousness does not pursue “its substantial
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freedom through its disposition within the state” (§257), pursuing it elsewhere or rejects
such pursuits altogether? What happens when one does not find oneself “at home with
oneself in one’s other” but finds oneself systematically excluded from such a home?
What happens when the dependencies on which one finds oneself are not those which
flourish freedom but hinder and destroy it? These questions of alienation or exclusion
from a truly rational and free ethical life are, however, still not the heart of my concerns
of Hegel’s system.
The questions before Hegel, the questions that came crashing down around his
followers immediately after his death, concern the ability for Hegelianism to think
societal change and transformation. At first it might seem strange to question Hegel about
the lack of change within his speculative and political philosophy when the concept of
becoming (the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be) plays such a central role in the Logic, and
when Hegel constantly discusses the contingent changes necessary for the development
of Geist in its historical formation. Certainly Hegel conceptualizes the
cultivation/purification of thought in its transformation from common sense Verstand to
speculative Vernunft. Was this not the entire purpose of the Phenomenology? The
central question must be, however, Can Hegel conceptualize the actual transformation
from an irrational society of unfreedom into his conception of ethical life with its robust
interlocking aspects of institutional rationality and subjective habituation? Does Hegel
actually conceptualize this change itself or just posit its occurrence as having happened?
And if he cannot conceptualize this change, what does this mean for Hegel’s speculative
project and its political aspects?
Many interpreters have spent so much time distancing Hegel from the image of a

153
reactionary guardian of the Prussian state that they think it a great achievement that Hegel
distinguished true rational actuality from merely contingent existence (this often centers
around an interpretation of the notoriously difficult Doppelsatz in the preface to the
Philosophy of Right: “what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.”).27 These
interpretations often entail claims that Hegel is neither a theorist of the contingently
present (a protector of the status quo), nor a theorist of some idealistic future (an
irrelevant theorist). The interpretive horns of the dilemma is that either Hegel has
nothing to say to concrete realities because he is only building the ideal ethical state and
therefore has nothing to offer those seeking to reform or radically transform existing
political reality, or Hegel is so closely identified with his own socio-historical present that
he is either merely justifying the political status quo of modernity as he sees it or enters
into a perniciously relativizing historicism.
The real problem is that you can find justification for both positions in Hegel. On
the one hand Hegel says he does not desire to offer any advice for those attempting to
construct a rational state because his treatise only deals with how the rational state is
known (PR preface/Grund. 7:26). While defects can always be found in particular
existing states, Hegel only seeks to show what is affirmative in the rational state
expressing the concept of freedom (PR §258A). On the other hand, by Hegel’s own
definition of philosophy, if his explication of the actuality of freedom within ethical life
merely remains as a regulative ideal then it has fallen into the Kantian ‘ought’ which
never becomes an ‘is,’ a dichotomy Hegel’s entire philosophy is meant to overcome.
27
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But the desire to balance these positions (over-identification with status quo vs.
over-idealized theorist) attributes to Hegel a problem he refuses to recognize. Hegel does
not need to balance between over-identifying with historical existence and overidealizing rational thought. As Hegel had already argued in the Phenomenology, he
believed that historical existence had caught up to rational thought such that practice and
theory had attained their highest freedom (all of which was definitively articulated by
Hegel’s own philosophy). This was the process of Geist becoming self-conscious of
itself in time as substance and subject. This supposed unity of historical existence and
rational thought mind helps us understand Hegel’s statement that “it is as foolish to
imagine that any philosophy could be beyond its present time as that an individual could
leap out of his time” (PR preface/Grund. 7:26). On the one hand Hegel understands this
according to his retrospective account of the development of Geist in its various forms
such that he can both appreciate earlier developments (i.e. Greek ethical life) while still
criticizing them for their lack of maturity (in the case of Greek ethical life, that it did not
affirm subjective freedom). And when applied to himself, Hegel of course realizes that
he also is a prisoner of his own time just as much as any other. But the difference is that
Hegel thinks Geist had, in a definitive manner, entered not only its latest, but also its last,
shape. Certainly minor adjustment could be made here or there regarding his own
speculative logic or the details of the rational state. But these modifications would never
entail a wholesale transformation in the magnitude of overcoming the inherent
contradictions of Greek ethical life between Antigone and Creon, nor would current
historical contingencies require the moral vigilance of a Socrates because of its irrational
unfreedom.
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It is exactly for these reasons that Hegel does not, indeed, cannot posit transitional
forms and practices that would lead society toward more rational forms. Such transitions
are no longer necessary. And if they were, philosophy could not think them because
these historical shapes only contingently arrive on the scene and philosophy can only
comprehend their necessity after the fact. This is all in line with Hegel’s rejection of a
moral or political ‘ought’, compelling him to articulate his philosophy as a selftranscending immanence. It is self-transcending in that it moves beyond mere natural or
historical determinacy into the spiritual realm of freedom as self-determination. But it is
immanent because it rejects any otherworldly beyond to anchor its claims for selfdetermination. This self-transcending immanence is the unity of substance and subject, a
logical and political unity that Hegel believed was unfolding in the modern world and
best articulated in his speculative philosophy.
The Breakdown of Substance and Subject
This unity of subject and substance, within the rising revolutionary atmosphere of
Germany in the 1830s and 1840s, which resulted from a combination of political and
industrial factors, began to tear apart due to its own internal tensions (or rather, due to its
own internal optimism which seemed more and more out of place). With Hegel’s death
in 1831 came the slow breakdown of the systematic unity of substance and subject. The
‘new-left’ Hegelians took the immanence of Hegel’s thought in a strictly anthropological
manner and read Hegel as a humanist.28 This humanist reading was most dramatically
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accomplished in Feuerbach’s inversion of Hegel’s system by reading Geist as a strictly
naturalistic social theory and understanding God as merely a human social projection.
This inversion was farther radicalized by Marx who understood self-consciousness less as
a matter of the self-realization of freedom and more as a material process of production.
Marx argued that “human consciousness itself is completely socially mediated by these
material facts having to do with the ‘forces of production’ (what productive potential is
available in a particular economic and social order) and the ‘relations of production’(who
owns what).”29 Marx articulated a ‘material substance’ of economic forces and
productions that determine the ‘false consciousness’ of the subject. This is the reduction
of the unity of Hegel’s substance and subject toward a strictly materialist substance.
Inversely, Kierkegaard sided with the subject, especially the faithful subject,
against the substance of modern ethical life. For Kierkegaard, one can never overcome
the Kantian problem that we are stuck between the infinitude of consciousness seeking to
live its own life (according to its reason) and the finitude of existence exposing our lives
as not really our own. All such Hegelian reconciliations between the “system” and the
world are illusions hiding the fact that the Kantian problem remains. For Kierkegaard, as
Pinkard says, “the infinite value of self-determination is both impossible to achieve and
impossible to abandon,” meaning that life is a paradox without resolution.30 Or more
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precisely, it is a paradox without resolution by reason, requiring something more.
Because one cannot think oneself out of this paradox one must leap out of it through a
“leap of faith” which “must simply acknowledge that we are dependent on a power
outside of ourselves.”31 In this way, by emphasizing the faithful subject, Kierkegaard
moves in the opposite direction than Feuerbach and Marx, abandoning the implicit
humanism of Hegel and opting for a more thoroughgoing transcendence beyond selftranscending immanence. This is the breakdown of the Hegelian unity of substance and
subject in the direction of the subject, now reconnected to transcendence.
These breakdowns of the Hegelian substance and subject into either a materialist
substance of historical modes of production or the existentialist subject and its leap of
faith, and their later intermingling, have set the broad contours of continental philosophy
ever since. Each in their own way attempted to think change and transformation beyond
Hegel: Marx in theorizing the coming proletariat revolution and Kierkegaard through the
moment of radical faith in taking up one’s life amid its paradoxes.
The Limits of Self-Transcending Immanence
This breakdown of the unity of substance and subject continues to be the destiny of
Hegel as articulated by the two prominent interpreters we looked at in chapter one:
Robert Pippin and Slavoj Žižek. In a sense, these are the only current options within left
Hegelianism. Pippin represents an emphasis on the substance of normative practices
enabling self-legislating freedom and Žižek represents a commitment to the subject of
radical action. Each signifies the limits of Hegel’s self-transcending immanence.
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Beginning with Pippin, we noted that he attempts to navigate between a Kantian
individual moral self-legislation and a communitarian social ontology governed by
something other than liberal freedom. For Pippin, Hegel advocates for an ever-evolving
practice of social normativity promoting a rational freedom such that authentic autonomy
is achieved only through social inter-dependence. The evolution of these social practices
constitutes the life of Geist, the self-transcending achievement beyond, yet within, the
immanence of nature. This is Pippin’s version of Hegel’s self-transcending immanence.
Unlike Marx who sided with the materialist substance of economic production in
order to theorize movements of societal change, Pippin bites the bullet of social
transformation by focusing on the substance of normative practices. Pippin is explicitly
against finding a more significant place for moral subjectivity as a means toward
transitioning from an unfree to a more free society. This is the case because as
mentioned above, this would betray the very foundations of Hegel’s ethical life as
critique of Kantian morality.32 Certainly Pippin often emphasizes that Hegel offers us a
compelling understanding of past changes in normative practices (the breakdown of
Greek ethical life for instance), but he is also emphatic that these are only retrospective
reconstructions of historical events. Pippin concludes the substantive part of his
reflections on Hegel’s practical philosophy by claiming that
the account and justification of…moral progress can be given, but only ‘at dusk,’
never in a way that legislates ‘what ought to be done,’…Marx was right about
Hegel, in other word. The point of philosophy for Hegel is to comprehend the
world, not to change it; and this for a simple reason that Marx never properly
understood: it can’t.33
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Pippin can maintain such a position because he maintains a confidence in modernity and
its institutions that many of Hegel’s supporter do not. Because of this Pippin does not
need to dwell on the conceptualization of societal change, just as Hegel did not.34
But in seeking to comprehend the world, does not Hegel fail to account for those
who do change the world? As we asked earlier, from where does an Antigone come who
challenges Creon? From where does a Socrates come who becomes a gadfly? Or,
because these could be merely the exceptionally virtuous within a premodern ethical life
(although this should not blunt the questions), from where comes the judge who would
renounce his hard heart and forgive the one who acts? Why would one allow the
“wounds of the Spirit” in the first place, even if they were healed later? How does one
come to learn how to forgive the sins of existence? In Hegel’s account, one would do
this in order to be reconciled to oneself and one’s other in a process of successful mutual
recognition. This, however, is only a retrospective justification of the process which does
not take into account the motivations and understandings of the actors involved (actor
and judge). Of course, in the Phenomenology it is religion that teaches us why and how
to forgive ourselves. And yet Pippin does not avail himself of the religious aspects of
Hegel.
But Žižek most certainly does appropriate the religious dimensions of Hegel’s
thought, but not as a means toward buttressing a substantive ethical life of normative
practices, but toward creating a radical subjectivity beyond such normativity. As noted in
chapter one, Žižek understands the significance of Christianity as revealing the death of
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the God-man as that through which we come to be reconciled to ourselves as we assume
the same process of subjective death. This daily dying is not a process of resurrection
into new substantial unity but rather the persistent “tarrying with the negative” which is
subjectivity itself. The death of God, for Žižek, is not the unmasking of a human
projection such that once we are rid of it we will become reconciled with ourselves (as
was the case for Feuerbach). Rather, the death of God and our participation in it allows
for one to break free of normative and symbolic constructs. The subject, as that which is
nothing but its own failure to become a subject, is the end and beginning of Žižek’s
Hegel, focused on establishing the possibility of a radical political act intended to trigger
a revolutionary change in existing socio-political formations.
Žižek also supports modernity, but it is a counter-modernity that lives into the gaps
and lacks of contemporary society by understanding the movements of German Idealism
exactly as the thoughtful articulation of active negation. Žižek places great emphasis on
this subjective negativity and thereby redeems Hegel’s idea of world historical
individuals through whom the development of Geist occurs.35 Žižek calls these
individuals “vanishing mediators” who dwell within the passage between normative
orders, misunderstood and rejected by both sides (the old passing order and the newly
established replacement).36 These vanishing mediators are the heroes within the gaps of
Žižek’s counter-modernity that, instead of being “the wounds that heal without a mark”,
are much closer to an orthodox reading of Christianity where the wounds of the crucified
35
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one always remain. This emphasis on the radical subjective act is Žižek’s version of
Hegel’s self-transcending immanence, an immanence of subjectivity able to transcend the
status quo of normative constructs, persisting as a divided subject centered on
nothingness.
However, as noted at the end of chapter one, Žižek does not give an account of this
radical subjectivity in its motivation toward radical political acts. In fact, Žižek’s alleged
valorization of radical political action as the eruption of subjectivity is always
conditioned by a literary counter-normativity (Antigone, Oedipus, Jesus, King Lear) that
threatens Žižek’s assertion that subjectivity at its base is always its own support within
nothingness.37 This is the reverse of the problem for Pippin for whom the substance of
normative practices could not think the subjectivity of those who would change the
practices. For Žižek it is now the case that the subjectivity of radical change both
disallows but necessarily presupposes a certain normativity if it is to pass into an actual
act rather than persist in radical, indeterminate negation. It seems, therefore, that Žižek
can only think change without such change ever having any substance and Pippin can
thinks substance without ever having any substantial change.
Conclusion
It seems, then, the breakdown of Hegel’s substance and subject itself cannot be
maintained without either forgoing the thinking of political change or abandoning
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political change within a solipsistic act of subjectivity. On the one hand is the normative
Hegel of Pippin that can only admit that change happens, but always comes to late to
participate in it. However, according to Hegel’s own dialectic, this abstract
indeterminacy of Pippin that stands above or behind change must become determinate as
change in some manner. On the other hand, is the radical Hegel of Žižek that thinks the
unthinkable nothing as the core of subjectivity. But these moments, as we have seen, are
incomplete in themselves, mutually vanishing into its reverse. This oscillation between
Pippin and Žižek suggests the need for a higher conceptuality through which to unify
these two disparate interpretations of Hegel. Here it would be tempting to return Hegel’s
self-transcending immanence to its ‘traditional’ onto-theological interpretation as the
reconciliation between the normative and the radical Hegel.38 By way of this dialectical
twist, instead of the traditional Hegel being the naïvely metaphysical interpretation that
does not understand Hegel’s critical commitments, the traditional reading could be seen
as the only means of holding together his political theory. But as tempting as this might
be it would only delay the above problems by transposing them as questions of causality
within a panentheism framework.
Instead of resolving the dilemma between these three interpretations of Hegel, we
should take leave of the entire project of a self-transcending immanence and its
understanding of freedom. In its place, as a plausible alternative for thinking political
change in its structures and subjects, is the intervention of transcendence within
subjectivity and society.
38
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CHAPTER 4: AUGUSTINE IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEOLOGY
My weight is my love. Wherever I am carried, my love is carrying me.1
Introduction
To see how Augustine offers a political and theological orientation beyond
Hegel’s self-transcending immanence, an orientation able to integrate the social practices
and subjective positions capable of criticism and change, we must clear the air a bit about
Augustine’s recent political reception. This chapter will explore the recent interpretations
of Augustine and his significance for politics offered by John Milbank and Eric Gregory.
Exploring these two interpretations will simultaneously reveal the relevance of
Augustine’s political theology as well as the diversity of opinion concerning his
relevance. John Milbank turns to Augustine to overcome modern liberalism and its
postmodern variants. Essentially Milbank garners Augustine as an anti-liberal in which
theology always outstrips the possibilities of secular politics. Gregory, on the other hand,
turns to Augustine to revitalize liberalism by reintroducing civic virtues ordered by love,
and for this end solicits Augustinian themes neglected by contemporary political theory.
Both Milbank and Gregory stand against the Kantian framework dominating the political
landscape, whether it be continental philosophies for Milbank or Rawlsian liberalism for
Gregory.
This second part on Augustine will not follow the same pattern as the first on
Hegel. The first part on Hegel began with Pippin and Žižek as dual interpretations of
Hegel, passed through the Hegelian corpus, and then circled back to Pippin and Žižek,
1
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showing that these two really did represent the only two viable appropriations of
Hegelian thought, each articulating their own version of Hegel’s self-transcending
immanence. In this second part it will be argued that Milbank and Gregory do not
represent the only two viable appropriations of Augustine’s thought. The reasons for
this, however, will not be entirely clear until we reach chapters five and six. Indeed, the
goal of those chapters will be to enlarge the political interpretations of Augustine offered
by Milbank and Gregory, while also showing how an Augustinian orientation to
transcendence and immanence is more productive of a political subject capable of
criticism and change than that available through Hegel. A critique and enlargement of
Milbank and Gregory is always in service of the larger contrast between Augustine and
Hegel.
1. Ontological Peace: Transcendence against Liberalism
John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory is a landmark text, dealing with
much more than Augustine and his ontology of peace. While Theology and Social
Theory does polemicizes against social theory, the ‘and’ in the title should be taken
seriously. It is not so much that Milbank is against social theory as such, but argues that
theology is its own social theory without needing to out-source these matters to the
secular sciences. The true polemic of Milbank’s work concerns secular reason in its
various forms of political liberalism, scientific positivism, radical dialectics, and
philosophical difference (corresponding to the four parts of the book).
It is this last form of secular reason that most concerns us because the
philosophers of difference examined there all emerge out of the breakdown of the
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Hegelian unity of substance and subject, particularly as it is filtered through works of
Nietzsche. It is against this post- and anti-Hegelian trajectory in 20th century continental
philosophy that Milbank turns to Augustine’s counter-ontology of peace as a resource for
theology. Because of this relation to post- and anti-Hegelianism Milbank’s analysis both
works as a bridge between the breakdown of the Hegelian system by investigating the
philosophers of difference, and his analysis reveals the promise of Augustine’s political
theology as a movement beyond such failed attempts. We will, therefore, briefly
examine Milbank’s criticism of postmodern philosophies of difference and then look at
his deployment of Augustine as an alternative to secular reason. In this we will see how
Milbank understands the relationship between transcendence and liberalism, a liberalism
broadly equated with the autonomy of secular reason.
The Postmodern Problematic
After Enlightenment optimism concerning universal reason and the progress of
history toward liberation and freedom comes the critique of Nietzsche and his
philosophical progeny. This critique of Enlightenments takes three forms. The first is an
absolute historicism undertaken through a genealogical critique of ahistorical reason.
The second is an ontology of difference offered against a metaphysics of presence. The
third is an ethical nihilism standing against all moral foundationalisms. Most postmodern
philosophers, according to Milbank, are not nearly as clear-sighted as Nietzsche
concerning the ethical implications of the first two critiques revealing a failure of
consistency, if not of nerve.
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As Milbank sees it, the entire postmodern problematic comes down to this failure
of ethical consistency. The Kantian freedom of self-determination is precariously
balanced between nature and history. But once it is granted, after Hegel, that the freedom
of the will is not ahistorical but historically situated, then the freedom of the will
promoting equality quickly degenerates into the inequality of arbitrary power. This is the
turn in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche concerning the freedom of the will as the will to
power. And if this is the case, “then how can one ever talk of there being more or less
freedom in one society rather than another?”2 But postmodern celebrations of absolute
historicism long to keep the emancipatory potential of social criticism as a counter
against consumer liberalism. As Milbank states it, “All recent French neo-Nietzscheans,
if not Nietzsche and Heidegger, are loath to renounce the emancipatory claim, and are
therefore doomed to smuggle back into their philosophies an ahistorical Kantian subject
who is the bearer of freedom.”3 This is the perennial problem of those replacing Kantian
humanism with postmodern anti-humanism. If one follows Nietzsche down the hole of
thorough-going nihilism then the ability to critique the status quo is vacated for the mere
management of regimes of power. Within the coordinates of secular reason the only
place for securing a criticism of these regimes is a return to a Kantian subject of selfdetermination. But this return to a Kantian subject is always susceptible to Nietzsche’s
critique. Milbank claims that postmodern philosophers of difference cannot escape this
problematic within the horizon of the secular. For Milbank, this failure necessitates a
return to theology as the place of emancipatory potential. To see why we will briefly
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examine Milbank’s discussion of three interlocking themes (the critique of history,
metaphysics, and ethics) and how these seek to reposition theological discourse, followed
by his theological alternative to secular liberalism.
Historicism as Genealogy
The genealogical method inaugurated by Nietzsche, and extended by Foucault
and others, begins with two ambiguously related claims. The first is the claim that all
cultural formations are contingent and therefore arbitrary expressions of power
masquerading as reason. No culture has any more inherent right to exist or more intrinsic
goodness to claim in the face of other cultures. All that can be known is the endless
procession of power formations in history. Second is the claim that this procession of
power strategies can nevertheless be objectively narrated. The objectivity of this
narrative, that it indeed reveals how ‘power’ governs the course of history, is what
supplies the genealogical method its critical edge. Through its various interpretations
genealogy gives us more than an interpretation of human history. It offers a positive tool
for evaluating cultural formation as either more or less honest about its own strategies of
power. But, Milbank asks, does this not make the identification of power with reason an
ahistorical presupposition that transcends context that is then used to unmask power
strategies?4
Of course the genealogical method cannot make a foundationalist claim for itself
and must therefore prove its own plausibility by reading its most potent rival according to
this narrative of power. For Milbank, the reason why Nietzsche’s polemic is directed so
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strongly toward Christianity is because Christianity has an opposed reading of power
within history. If Nietzsche can show that Christianity is merely the most sophisticated
version of power masquerading as reason then he will have overcome all opposition to
his genealogical perspective. From Nietzsche’s perspective, “if every denial of power is
a ruse of power, then the absolute denial of power must be the final ruse of absolute
power.”5 This is the case because the natural human state is the ceaselessly creative
power of will, a will to power contrasted with the reactionary refusal of such strength.
For Nietzsche , this reactive stance to power is equated with Christianity and its
celebration of weakness.
As a provisional response to Nietzsche, Milbank asks if the creative power of will
might just as easily be equated with charity rather than dominion.6 Of course the
genealogist would answer that all acts of charity place the recipient into a position of
dependence and therefore can be one of the subtlest instruments of coercion. In the end,
this counter-interpretation offered by the genealogist that every act of charity is an act of
coercion only presupposes its geneological narrative of power rather than proving it. Of
course Milbank has not proven the possibility of Christian charity, only suggested its
plausibility. It is for these reasons that the absolute historicism of genealogy must be
supplemented with an ontology of difference as a means toward proving its legitimacy as
a tool for social criticism.
The Critique of Metaphysics
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For those like Nietzsche generally, and Heidegger specifically, Western
philosophy and its metaphysics is “the attempt to give a ‘total’ classification of being,
and to ground the temporal and shifting in ‘truth’.”7 Heidegger claims that metaphysics
is really a strategy for forgetting historical existence and the existential circumstances of
life itself. For Heidegger, in Milbank’s words, this forgetting of “mortality and
temporality is at one with our forgetting of ‘the ontological difference’, the difference
between beings on the one hand…and Being itself on the other.”8 Rather than affirming
the ontological difference, Heidegger sees metaphysics and onto-theology as obscuring
and escaping this difference through speculative discourse. To overcome metaphysics
means to enter the questioning of Being only through our own mortality, temporality, and
finitude. Of course Heidegger knows that Being can never be directly encountered or
experienced. He takes account of this not through the mystery of Being opening toward a
theological discourse, but by claiming that Being is always both a concealing and
unconcealing, indicating a primordial ontological rupture between and within beings and
Being.
Here again Milbank questions the plausibility of this reading of both the
ontological situation and the history of philosophy. Milbank does not so much dispute
the claims of ontological difference or the importance of finitude, but rather the negative
slant given to this difference. For “to give this concealment the overtones of
dissimulation, of violence, of a necessary suppression” is a questionable matter for “one
might want rather to say that as much as a being is a particular existence and not Being
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itself, it yet exhibits in its sheer contingency the inescapable mystery of Being.”9 Only if
one has excluded the possibility of an analogical relationship of beings to Being is
ontological violence necessary to explain the difference between beings and Being.
Milbank’s claim is that no strong philosophical reason is given to support this necessary
ontological violence beyond the preference for a non-theological reading of the
ontological situation. But if this preference is as ungrounded as the one give by a
theological description then theology should feel no need to adjust itself to postmodern
philosophies of difference.
The Critique of Ethics
Beyond the preferential option of ontological violence being as ungrounded as an
ontology of peace, Milbank concludes his discussion of the postmodern problematic by
turning to ethics. It is his claim that postmodern philosophies of difference follow
Nietzsche’s absolute historicism even while attempting “to claim for itself a continuing
critical reserve” of Kantian freedom.10 As Nietzsche saw clearly, “the rigorous
implication of post-humanism is this: freedom is only a reality as arbitrary power,”
meaning that “the Rousseauian-Kantian egalitarian extension of freedom has been
transformed into the asymmetrical extension of power.”11 If this is the case then the
critical reserve through which postmodern philosophers denounce exploitative systems
evaporates into another strategy power. For
how is one to decide when to abide in illusion, and when to dismantle it? Either
course is in a sense hopeless, and nothing can really guide our decision as to when
9
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is the appropriate moment for one or the other. The decision must itself be
arbitrary, and persuasion to either course a strategy of deception. In which case, it
would appear, only a fascistic politics remains viable.12
Milbank claims this fascistic politics necessarily flows out of an ontology of difference.13
This is the dilemma of postmodern philosophy caught between its commitment to
historicism and freedom. Milbank’s articulation of this dilemma exactly explains the
renaissance of Hegel in political theory (a renaissance beginning around the same time as
the publication of Theology and Social Theory).14 If postmodern continental philosophy
could not integrate Kant and Nietzsche then why not split the difference and return to
Hegel as an alternative to both?
Of course Milbank’s trajectory is different than, but analogous to, a return to
Hegel. For him, if there can be no return to a Kantian humanism of universal freedom
nor a dwelling in a Nietzschean anti-humanism of power, then one must return to a
theology which can offer, in a non-foundationalist manner, a counter-history and a
counter-ontology able to affirm both difference and peace rather than difference as
violence. Milbank thinks that Augustine offers us such a theology.
Augustine and the Two Cities
To say that theology is its own social theory means that it is an explication of the
socio-linguistic practices of the church as the true interpretation of human history. This
approach “refuses to treat reason and morality as ahistorical universals, but instead asks,
like Hegel, how has Christianity affected human reason and human practice” from within
12
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the history of the world?15 The task, then, is to offer a counter-history and a counterethics able to rival the plausibility of a postmodern Nietzschean anti-humanism, all
grounded in a counter-ontology of peace.
Counter-History
Because a postmodern theology must acknowledge that all subjects and objects
are positioned by a particular set of cultural practices and narratives, it must attend both
to these narrative practices while not falling into anti-realism nor narratival
foundationalism.16 A postmodern theology needs to articulate itself as a metanarrative
which is also embedded in history and therefore open to development. According to
Milbank, the Church interprets itself as responding to the original story of Jesus, a story
that is nothing less than the founding of a new community. That this story is linked to the
Son and Spirit of God, who are fully divine, shows that this story belongs within the
“narrative manifestation of God” within history.17 This story, as a “narrative
manifestation of God,” is therefore equally a regulative metanarrative as historical
narrative. Because this narrative as metanarrative claims also to be a recounting of actual
history, not merely a founding myth, this narrative are best understood not according to a
Kantian narrative epistemology but as something more akin to a Hegelian philosophy of
history, now based in faith rather than reason.
The historical claim is that a new community has come into being through the
ministry of the Son and Spirit, a community that is the truth of all human community.
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This is a claim which the Church cannot surrender to other ‘social sciences’ because the
“logic of Christianity involves the claim that the ‘interruption’ of history by Christ and
his bride, the Church, is the most fundamental of events, interpreting all other events.”18
Christianity, therefore, is not merely different from other social formations, but is the
difference from all other cultural systems and communal narrative.19
This difference is historically narrated as the difference between two cities. By
re-reading Augustine’s City of God Milbank seeks to articulate the historical ground of
social critique arising from the Biblical tradition as Augustine understood it. Grounded in
history, this narrative protects against a false appeal to universal reason. Likewise, as
equally the story of God this historical embedded social critique cannot be reduced to
mere historicism. Rather than making power and suspicion fundamental to human
history, Augustine challenges the assumptions of universal antagonism by arguing from
the standpoint of fundamental peace.20
On the one hand is the earthly city, the city of war, of which Rome is the
archetype. Roman society is based on conquest and domination such that even its virtues
only find their truth in war. As Milbank states, for Rome there
can only be virtue where there is something to be defeated, and virtue therefore
consists for them, not only in the attainment and pursuit of a goal desirable in
itself, but also in a ‘conquest’ of less desirable forces.21
This is true not only of virtue but is true of the foundational myths of Rome and its gods.
Roman myths assume a prior order of violence that is only stopped or contained by a
leader or a god (Romulus or Jupiter) such that the legal and civil order of Rome is “traced
18
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back to the arbitrary limitation of violence by violence, to victory over rivals, and to the
usurpation of fathers by sons.”22 This foundational violence is perpetually repeated in the
form of foreign conquest, seeking to replace a perceived anarchy with dominion.
On the other hand is the heavenly city, the city of peace. In the city of peace the
cycle of violence warring against violence is broken and another beginning is made.
While it is true that finite reality has fallen from its original peace, this means that now
salvation from sin must mean ‘liberation’ from cosmic, political, economic and
psychic dominium, and therefore from all structures belonging to the saeculum, or
temporal interval between the Fall and the final return of Christ. This salvation
takes the form of a different inauguration of a different kind of community.
Whereas the civitas terrena inherits its power from the conqueror of a fraternal
rival, the ‘city of God on pilgrimage through this world’ founds itself not in a
succession of power, but upon the memory of the murdered brother Abel slain by
Cain.23
Unlike the founding of a city on the memory of the brother (Romulus) who murdered his
brother (Remus), the city of peace is founded on the memory of Abel, a foreshadowing of
Christ, the brother to all. This alternate community institutes a political society
inhabiting a trajectory of peace rather than a repetition of violence. Augustine’s
philosophy (or better, theology) of history is therefore very concerned with the
beginnings of political communities, in contrast to the more Hegelian perspective
focusing on the aporias and eventual dissolution of political systems.
Counter-Ethics
This counter-history activates a counter-ethic that is neither ancient nor liberal. In
Milbank’s mind, Christianity is the difference between cultural systems and therefore
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cannot be reduced to either ancient virtue or liberal detachment. The social practice of
Christianity is other than these options. In making this point Milbank desires to protect
Augustine (and theology) from a dominant interpretation. Milbank fears that too many
have read Augustine’s critique of ancient culture as the first steps toward Cartesian
inwardness and liberal detachment, a reduction that then under-values Augustine’s actual
critique and appreciation of ancient culture.
Milbank sees Augustine not as rejecting all aspects of ancient thought, but rather
as seeking to overcome its dualisms. The first dualism overcome in the Church is the
separation between oikos and polis. Rather than reducing the household around the needs
of the city, the Church unites the oikos and polis such that each family is itself a little
republic where cultivation of character should occur. Likewise, society as a whole is reimagined as a family bound by the strong bonds of love. In this way household and city
stand together rather than the city exercising dominion over all households.24 Similarly,
Augustine seeks to overcome the dichotomy between soul and city (and its derivative
distinctions of body/soul and passion/reason) such that the city no longer needs to control
or dominate its individual members (congruently the soul need not be thought to
dominate the body, nor reason the passions). Augustine seeks a deeper integration
between these dichotomies by introducing a third element above them. “Souls,
households and cities can only be ‘internally’ right insofar as this apparently ‘internal’
order is really part of an entirely ‘external’ sequence within which it must be correctly
placed,” an external sequence guided by a transcendence of peace.25 It is precisely
because this internal sequencing is accomplished through a social and transcendent
24
25

Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 407.
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 408.

176
ordering that Milbank warns against reading Augustine as an incipient liberal. Rather
than initiating the inward turn, Augustine emphasizes the turn to transcendence to
account for the peace of the city and the soul.
But none of this is a denial of the fall or of sin, the tragic disarray humanity finds
itself. Given the persistence of sin in others
there is only one way to respond to them which would not itself be sinful and
domineering, and that is to anticipate heaven, and act as if their sin was not there
(or rather acting with a ‘higher realism’ which releases what is positive and so
alone real in their actions from negative distortion) by offering reconciliation.26
Forgiveness is the true form of virtue in this life because it short-circuits the absence of
virtue in others by “not taking offence, assuming the guilt of others, doing what they
should have done, beyond the bounds of any given ‘responsibility’.”27 But even more
than this reversal of sin in forgiveness, love is that which opens up the space for others in
their differences. “If forgiveness alone, a gratuitous self-offering beyond the demands of
the law, reflects virtue, then this is because virtue itself as charity is originally the
gratuitous, creative positing of difference, and the offering to others of a space of
freedom, which is existence.”28 Christianity in the form of charity, a productive
fraternity of liberty and equality, is the practice of harmonious difference, knowing that
difference is not ontologically violent even if it is ontologically ultimate.
Counter-Ontology
The positive evaluation of difference is possible because Augustine views God
not as one who limits a primordial chaos, but is actually the Unlimited who nonetheless
26
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creates the difference of creation. God does this not in contradiction to God’s nature or
essence but because God is already both infinite being and internal difference in harmony
(as Trinity) such that God is simultaneously all being and all difference.29 Because of
this difference in harmony
creation is not an appearance, a mixture of truth and untruth, related to God by a
minus sign, but is rather the serial occurrence of differenetial reality in time, and
related to God by a mysterious plus sign which construes methexis as also
kenosis: God who is ‘all’ being nonetheless ‘gives’ a finite being which he is
not.30
Milbank draws on both Augustine and Dionysius to argue for understanding violence as
an unnecessary ontological intrusion (rather than the necessary conditions which must
then be stayed by a counter-violence) in the form of the privation. Evil is not a thing in
existence but a failure to properly relate to God (the source of existence) and other
created things (the community of existence). This occurs through a bending of desire
toward (self-) possession rather than openness to others in their differences. As the desire
for self-possession, evil is a violation of charity. This counter-ontology that sees evil as
privation and violence as contingent completes Milbank’s rebuttal to postmodern
nihilism. This theological orientation, based in Augustine, begins from a selfimmanenting transcendence (the God who creates and re-creates) rather than the selftranscending immanence of Hegel.
Evaluation
Milbank, then, seeks to give a compelling theological response to modernity and
its postmodern variants by internalizing the postmodern critique of foundationalism
29
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without allowing this critique to become determinative for theology. He does this by
accepting the necessity that theology is itself a social theory embedded in narratives and
practices, but refuses to import the necessity of an agonistic struggle within society or an
ontological violence as difference. Milbank instead reads difference through the peaceful
formation of true human community grounded in an ontological vision of peace.
Through this ontological orientations Milbank seeks to affirm the place of transcendence
within the immanence of secular reason.
The grand scope of Milbank’s endeavor, however, often entails a rather
impressionistic reading of Augustine. The rhetorical fervor of Milbank’s theological
project makes one wonder if Augustine is being fitted into a theological project that
might not be true to the specific trajectories of Augustine’s own thought. In this sense,
while Milbank’s interpretation might be broadly congruent with Augustine it often
glosses over the details of how Christ relates to the Church, of how this metanarrative
becomes the narrative of one’s life. Milbank often gestures toward the unity of ecclesial
practices and individual freedom against modern liberalism and its postmodern variants,
but he never concretely explores the interweaving of these objective practices, the
subjects engaged in them, and how God is working in and through both. As a movement
‘beyond secular reason’, Milbank’s use of Augustine tends to remain focused on
theological reason as a theoretical project, neglecting the practice formation of subjects.
In other words, the theological correction to secular reasons seems to come at the
cost of over-emphasizing the ontological aspects of Augustine’s theology to the detriment
of the more soteriological parts of Augustine’s thought. Milbank scarcely discusses the
manner in which this counter-narrative becomes the specific narrative of an individual.
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He hardly speaks of the manner in which Christ is the way back into this ontological
peace, preferring to focus on the interruptive nature of the Christ event. Milbank
certainly makes clear that Christianity is not merely different from other social formation
but is the difference between all social formations. Milbank, however, does not make
clear how Christianity draws people into this difference in and through Christ. The how
is as fundamental to Augustine’s ontology as it is to his soteriology (a point argued in the
chapter five). In Milbank’s presentation, the soteriological how is overwhelmed by the
ontological that because he emphasizes the ‘counter-’ aspects of Augustine’s theology as
it stands in opposition to modern liberalism. This lack of focus on the soteriological how
leads to a rather thin account of how political subjects are formed. Because of this thin
account it is not clear how, on his account, one would move beyond merely offering
social critique into practices of constructive change. Milbank seems so focused on the
ontological status of Christian practices (theology in particular) that the question of the
subjects capable to engage in such practices does not arise.31
Because of these concerns, political theologians like Eric Gregory have turned
from Milbank’s rhetorically charged appropriation of Augustine as an anti-liberal and
begun offering an account of Augustine focused on the subjective motivational structure
of properly ordered love, all much more amenable to modern liberalism. This, however,
is not a turn away from transcendence or ontology, but merely a different way of reading
Augustine, turning him toward liberalism rather than away from it.
2. Ordered Love: Transcendence for Liberalism
31
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Rather than an outright critique and rejection of liberalism, Eric Gregory longs to
rejuvenate a civic liberalism by turning to Augustine’s understanding of love for God and
others. To do this Gregory must clear the air concerning rival versions of an Augustinian
liberalism. The first he notes is Augustinian Realism as promoted by Reinhold Niebuhr
and Robert Markus.32 Their political use of Augustine focuses on the sinfulness of
humanity and the fallibility of politics. Against political optimism and utopianism,
Augustinian political realism is constantly aware of human self-aggrandizement and
domination. But this realism is also grounded in the virtue of hope as it looks toward the
eschatological fulfillment of human society. Gregory fears this hope is often lost as
Augustine is read as focusing on the limited aspiration of the earthly city because of sin, a
limitation thought to make Augustine a precursor to Hobbesian liberalism. The second
political interpretation of Augustine joins him to Rawls by focusing on the epistemic
constraints of a liberal society (connected to the likes of Paul Weithman and Edmond
Santurri).33 Wary of the use of political power to coerce belief, this interpretation reduces
the realm of politics to the publically rational in order to protect against epistemic hubris.
The virtue of justice is put forward as the guiding light in political deliberation. For
Gregory, while both of these interpretations have merit they tend to avoid the essentially
Augustinian topic of love and its place in human sociality. Gregory’s third, and
preferred, interpretation sees Augustinian politics as a form of civic liberalism attempting
to overcome the thin subjects of modern liberalism according to a thicker account of
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human sociality and the necessity of virtues within liberal discourse and practice.34
Gregory joins the ranks of Jean Bethke Elshtain and Oliver O’Donovan in linking
Augustine’s social ontology of moral motivation to a robust liberalism focused on more
than just sin. Indeed, this version of Augustinian politics emphasizes the virtue of love
within politics as a means toward expressing a more holistic account of human nature.
These interpretations, however, are not the only forms of political Augustinianism
with which Gregory must deal. A fourth Augustinian interpretation deploys Augustine
against liberalism. Gregory’s main target here is the work of John Milbank.35 Gregory
agrees with Milbank about placing love at the center of Augustine’s political thought, and
he agrees with Milbank that Augustine’s theological anthropology is essentially a social
ontology opening toward transcendence. But he disagrees that this entails a focus on
ecclesiology to the exclusion of a broader political theory. Gregory worries that Milbank
conflates Christology into ecclesiology rather than highlighting the “interruptive
character of the Augustinian Christ.”36 Gregory’s contention is that an Augustinian
defense of civic liberalism does not entail a theological capitulation to secular reason.
There is no capitulation because an Augustinian Christology of love bridges the divide
between a liberal love of others and a theological love of God. The constructive part of
his project is positioned around Hannah Arendt’s criticisms of Augustine’s political
thought. To this criticism we will turn before examining Gregory’s interpretation of
Augustine.
Augustine’s Political Vice: Against Love
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Gregory focuses on Arendt because she both questions the appropriateness of love
as a political category, and specifically investigates Augustine on this account. For her,
love is a political vice best kept away from social deliberations. Arendt “challenges the
political implications of both divine love and the goodness of love itself—finding in
neither the capacity for action nor mutual respect.”37 In many respects Arendt is carrying
forward the project of Kantian disinterestedness in regard to political motivation.
Gregory sees Arendt offering a two-pronged criticism of love as a political category in
regard to others and God, presenting a major objection to Gregory’s overall project.
In the first place, Arendt worries that solidarity and mutual respect are lost when
love enters into the calculus of political deliberation. Love is too intimate, too
passionate, and too partial to produce a politics of equality. Love is too often the hidden
font of human cruelty.38 She is indebted to a Kantian liberalism that contrasts the
dispassionate reason needed for public politics from the private passions of individuals.
In this scheme love is pushed into the realm of private ethics while reason can reign in
the sphere of public politics. It is Arendt’s contention that this is exactly the problem
with Christian love in that it abandons politics of reason for an ethics of love that easily
slides into a self-love through others. For Arendt, “love becomes self-consuming of
politics, legitimates violence, and therefore cannot ground an ethics of liberal citizenship
that respects the separateness of person.”39 Love, therefore, fails to secure solidarity and
equality in the political realm.
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Matters become even worse, however, when love is connected to a divine source.
If love was faulty as a political category in general, it becomes downright dangerous
when related to God. Arendt sees the Christian pursuit of God as making a desert out of
the world generally, and, specifically, reducing neighbor-love to an instrument of Godlove. The monolithic love for God overwhelms and devalues all that is not-God.40
Arendt worries that rather than grounding neighbor love within divine love as its
transcendent source, divine love only makes neighbor-love a form of self-love in one’s
ascent to God. The ultimate exemplification of this is the Incarnation. Rather than the
perfect expression of love for neighbor, the Incarnation is a betrayal of neighbor-love in
that God-as-neighbor (Jesus, the Incarnate God-man) evacuates the inherent significance
of neighbor qua neighbor and makes the neighbor an instrumental step toward God-love.
Gregory contends, however, that Arendt too quickly dismisses love as a political
category instead of entering into the hard work of discriminating between well ordered
and poorly ordered loves. Rather than abandoning love all together, Gregory turns to
Augustine as offering an account of properly ordered love that actually elevates the
neighbor and properly motivates civic liberalism. This account turns on the possibility of
connecting neighbor-love and God-love. For Gregory, this connection is accomplished in
the Christological union of the love commands to love God and love our neighbors.
Augustine’s Political Virtue: Ordered Love
Much like Milbank was guided in his confrontation with Nietzsche, Gregory
directs his Augustinian inquiry according to Arendt’s criticisms hoping to show
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specifically that Augustine overcomes such problems en route to a general
recommendation of Augustine’s account of love as a neglected resource in contemporary
approaches to Augustine’s politics. Gregory first tackles the problem of love as a source
for political theory. He then explores how love relates to God in such a way as to
enhance rather than thwart neighbor-love.
Love for Others
For Gregory, civic liberalism needs to reclaim the place of the emotions and
passions within moral motivation and political practice. Gregory argues that Augustine’s
“intersubjective ontology” of creaturely dependence and other-relatedness requires a
robust account of love as the affirmation of and openness toward others.41 For
Augustine, “love is not a blind drive but a complex disposition that informs a way of
being in the world.”42 But this focus on love must not slide into a romantic or
paternalistic politics that either sentimentalizes or coerces others in the name of love.
Humans are apt to sin through wrongly ordered loves directed toward self-love without
relation to or in domination over others.43 This need to organize love and to form the
character of the lover is Gregory’s primary interest.44
This need for an organized love beyond sentimentalism compels Gregory to admit
that the best form of an Augustinian liberalism is one where “love and sin constrain each
other.”45 The necessity of love and sin mutually constraining each other gives rise to
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some Augustinian advice for loving one’s neighbors. Concern for one’s neighbor should
be emblazoned by love yet chastened by sin. This chastening should be exhibited as
compassion fused with prudence.46 Compassion for one’s neighbor is a healthy
emotional motivation for assisting them in their time of need. But this compassion is
only truly expressed if it upholds the dignity of those in need, not reducing the neighbor
to the status of a helpless victim. Prudence is vigilant against such sinful reduction of the
other into a mere object of compassion rather a subject of respect. Through this
combination of compassion and prudence love is properly ordered as a political virtue.
Likewise, a properly ordered love is able to love all equally even while expressing this
love as non-identical treatment.47 While Augustine claims love is universal he is also
committed to proximity in the exercise of this love. For Augustine, friends and local
community are providential gifts of God through which we express the natural constraints
of our embodied existence. Lastly, Gregory’s Augustinian advice for loving one’s
neighbor is a constant counsel against harm. Augustine is ever aware of the social
pathologies that can spring up when one’s neighbor becomes subject to “the false
autonomy of the self’s egoism.”48 It is not because he devalues the neighbor (as Arendt
fears), but exactly because he value neighbor love so much that Augustine refuses the
neighbor qua neighbor as an object before the self. The autonomous self cannot be trust
with such an object without good turning into harm, inadvertently or not. It is exactly
this reason that requires the coupling of neighbor love to God love in Augustine, not as
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an other-worldly escape but as a way to affirm the neighbor within the “conceptual role
of love for God.”49
Love for God
Gregory desires to show that love of God protects the neighbor from the
instrumentalization of sin. This is accomplished by understanding the love of others
within a love for God. Against the much maligned distinction between use (uti) and
enjoyment (frui) which seems to place neighbors within the sphere of objects to be used
on the way to enjoying God, Gregory seeks to rehabilitate this distinction as the only way
to properly respect the neighbor. To love one’s neighbor for oneself is a perversion of
love. But to love one’s neighbor in God is to properly love the neighbor as a created
being ordered toward the source of all being. This is essentially a social vision of
neighbor love connected to an all-encompassing vision of God.50
The connection, for Gregory, between neighbor love and God love (between uti
and frui) is Christological. Through the Incarnation there is an ethical and ontological
relation between God and the world opening up the possibility of enjoying God’s gifts in
creation. This possibility is only maintained if this enjoyment is properly ordered toward
God. For Augustine, “to love God is to love the whole of creation existing in God. The
love for God is expressed in an ordered love that loves God in loving God’s world.”51
Though loving God by loving the world we see that love for God is always world
affirming through an “immanent teleology” of ordered love based in the Christological
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reality that God has become “the neighbor of humanity.”52 Because of the Incarnation
“true love of self is now itself taken into the intersubjective triune love of God. It is this
participatory love that frees the self from its own needy self-enclosure.”53 Because of
this participatory love the “Incarnation issues a challenge to any form of deistic or
Neoplatonic ontology that perpetuates a competitive tournament of loves between God
and the world.”54 Neighbor-love and God-love are Christologically non-competitively.
This Christological non-competitive relation creates the unity of the two love
commands. That Christ has become the neighbor of humanity is not the ultimate
reduction of the neighbor, as Arendt thought. Rather, Christology is the manner in which
the command to love God and to love one’s neighbor are united without reduction of
either. Christology, for Gregory, is the theological ground allowing for a politically
useful appropriation of love in Augustine. This Christological ground allows for the
tension (mutual constraint) between love and sin that affirms creation generally and
neighbor love specifically, even while seeking to order this love toward God as a check
against sinful domination. Within this tension is a space for “vulnerable encounters with
others that is characteristic of liberal politics.”55 As Gregory says, “Christology shapes a
way of seeing the world that offers insights for political citizenship” because
Christology is both the form and substance of Augustinian theology. To put it
bluntly, Book 10 of the City of God is the basic text for Augustinian politics: the
heart of Augustine’s account of the true worship of the crucified God and the
charitable service of neighbor in collective caritas.56
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This “collective caritas” issuing beyond ecclesial walls into the world, ordered around
love of God, is the basis of an Augustinian civil liberalism that opens onto a fuller
account of humanity in the world, with others, and before God. The self-immanenting
transcendence of God exhibited Christologically is the basis of an Augustinian account of
a politics of love offering conceptual resources to civil liberalism.
Evaluation
The depth and breath of Gregory’s engagement with criticisms and
misunderstanding of Augustine’s political theory is stunning and appreciated. Drawing
widely from the work of others, Gregory rejects the notion that Neoplatonism tilted
Augustine toward an other-worldly escape and skillfully shows that Stoicism did not
render Augustine’s anthropology void of emotional connection, all without abandoning
Augustine’s essentially eudaimonistic vision.57 Overcoming these objections Gregory
weaves together an anthropology of love through the Christological union of divine and
human love. And yet he keeps in mind the deleterious effects of sin as corrupted desire,
leading to an understanding of the necessity of mutual constraint of love and sin. In these
ways Gregory has offered a compelling interpretation and application of Augustine’s
account of love for the rehabilitation of civic liberalism, recovering love as a potent
motivational aspect within political theory.
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The of recovering of love as a political category by emphasizing properly
‘ordered love’ leaves one question hanging, which Gregory never answers. How exactly
is love properly ordered? Much space is spent arguing that love can and should be a
political virtue because when it is properly ordered it creates space for mutual respect and
compassion. Much space is devoted to showing how a properly ordered love is
conceptually possible given the Christological union of the love commands. But scarcely
any time is given to explaining how disordered loves can become ordered loves. Gregory
makes vague reference to the need for moral and spiritual formation, a “kind of askesis”
through which “the self must learn to love rightly.”58 But the manner in which the self
undergoes such formation is left to the side.
Of course Gregory could object that the book he intended to write did not contain
such questions within its scope because he was writing to recommend Augustine before a
skeptical audience. This could be true. But the centrality that Gregory places on
Christology makes this a fair question. For Augustine, it is exactly through
Christological mediation that humanity is re-ordered in its loves. In his concern to show
how Christology unites divine and human love Gregory downplays the actual mediator of
Christ in securing justice and love within the city of God. Gregory is explicit that he
wants to move the center of gravity for political Augustinians from book 19 of City of
God to book 10. His focus on book 10, however, is merely another instance of uniting
divine (worship) and human (works of mercy) love. Gregory omits the specifically
soteriological work of Christ’s mediation between God and humanity within the
sacramental practice of the Eucharist. As we will see in chapter six, it is precisely these
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soteriological aspects of Augustine that allow for the proper ordering of love such that
works of mercy might be accomplished in the world.
The focus for Gregory is on the ontological guarantee of Christ’s two natures as
the means by which the political virtue of love can be directed both toward God and
humanity. Gregory persistently emphasizes the ontological order between love of God
and neighbor without adequately investigating the soteriological ordering of such love.
In other words, Gregory neglects the soteriological how of such ordering in his emphasis
on the ontological what of such an order (the soteriological how of a converted will and
the how of justice and love are the topics of chapters five and six, respectively).
Conclusion
As we have seen, Milbank offers an Augustinian theology that overcomes a
secular reason that seeks to subordinate the Church. Milbank shows how true critique
and change only come through a counter-ontology of peace. The focus on a counterontology and its counter-narrative are applauded as a means of reintroducing God’s
transcendence with the immanence of secular reason. However, as noted above, arguing
that Christianity makes possible an alternative social formation is not the same as
showing how such a formation comes to be. This oversight reduces Augustine to more of
a philosophical theologian focused on ontology. This lack of focus on the soteriological
how leads to a rather thin account of how political subjects actually are formed through
the mediation of Christ.
Similarly, Gregory also focuses on the ontological aspects of Augustine, but now
not antagonistically related to liberalism. Instead, Gregory focuses on the ontology of
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properly ordered love and sees Christology as the key to integrating love for God and
love for neighbor. As mentioned above, as laudable as this is, it altogether neglects the
process of re-ordering love away from self-love to love of God and love of neighbor. By
only focusing on ‘ordered love’ to the neglect of the process of ‘ordering love’, Gregory
again leads toward a thin account of political subjectivity because he has failed to account
for the transformation of subjects from self-love to God- and neighbor-love. The
possibility of such a transformation animates so much of Augustine’s theology that its
neglect is glaring (again these points will be substantiated in the following two chapters).
Moving through Milbank and Gregory’s interpretations of Augustine has helped
us begin to see the differences in orientation between Augustine and Hegel. Both
Milbank and Gregory rely on a fundamental distinction between Creator and creation, a
distinction Hegel refuses. For Milbank, God interrupts the immanent realm of secular
reason. This Christological interruption within history allows for both critique and
change, even if Milbank focuses more on the ontological aspects allowing for critique of
ontological violence according to an ontology of peace, rather than focusing on the actual
subjects of change (how they are changed and how they effect change). For Gregory, in
Christ God unifies neighbor-love and God-love such that transcendence and immanence
are non-competitively related without reduction of one into the other. This unification
breaks apart a pernicious self-love and its immanent orientation. Milbank and Gregory,
each in their own way, begin outlining an Augustinian theological orientation beyond
Hegel’s self-transcending immanence. The purpose of the next two chapters is to fill out
this theological orientation that takes God’s self-immanenting transcendence seriously.
Against humanity’s self-transcending immanence articulated by Hegel, it will be shown
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that God’s self-immanenting transcendence offers more coherent resources for
conceptualizing a political subject capable of critique and change.
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CHAPTER 5: CONVERSION AND FREEDOM: CONFESSIONS
That is the sum of it: not to will what I willed and to will what you willed.1
Introduction
The previous chapter revealed an Augustine deployed to either bolster or disrupt
certain forms of liberalism, each with its own theological agenda. Milbank and Gregory
agree in emphasizing the importance of transcendence for understanding Augustine’s
political thought, a transcendence offering resources to either overcome the nihilism of
modernity or the lack of neighbor-love in liberalism. But in their affirmation of
transcendence Milbank and Gregory seemed to emphasize the ontological aspects to the
detriment of the soteriological aspects of Augustine’s thought.
The next two chapters seek to show that because Augustine integrates ontology
and soteriology he is able to provide a basis for both social criticism and substantial
change (something Hegel was unable to achieve). Indeed, when looked at with less of a
concern to critique or consolidate liberalism, Augustine proves sufficiently capable of
resisting the dichotomies of subject and society, offering an integrated moral psychology
and social theory. He is capable of doing so because of his openness to a transcendence
not assimilated to the self-transcending immanence of human thought. Rather, because
of God’s self-immanenting transcendence Augustine can conceive of the subject opening
(or being opened) beyond itself to others and God, breaking the weight of habits and the

1

conf. 9.1.1.

194
customs of prideful domination.2 The intervention of transcendences within the
immanence of subjectivity and the immanence of societal practices is the means by which
each is integrated together and while also being drawn out of its own self-absorption.
This chapter, then, will investigate how Augustine integrates the self and the
social practices through a reading of his Confessions, while the next chapter examines the
City of God and its concerns with society. As we will see, while there are certain
congruencies between Hegel and Augustine regarding the subject and society, Augustine
is keen to show not only how a subject expresses its freedom within a given society, but
rather how a subject transitions between societies, one society given over to an enslaved
will and an alternative society where the will is free. In the City of God these two
societies are the earthly and heavenly cities. But within the Confessions the primary
focus is the division within the will itself.
By emphasizing the process of transition we will see how Augustine complexifies
Hegel’s account of subject and society by adding the issue of change from one society to
another. This raises the questions of how someone moves from a subjective formation
established within one set of social practices to an alternative subjective formation and its
social practices. Does the subject first change her mind and then enter an alternative
society? Or is one introduced into this alternative society before the accompanying
subjectivity is formed by it? Can the subject merely decide to change her subjective
formation? And, if the alternative society comes first, and if this alternative is so different
then how can we account for the subject being drawn to this alternative in the first place?

2

As when I introduced ‘self-transcending immanence to describe Hegel’s philosophy, at
this point ‘self-immanenting transcendence’ is used as a heuristic devise receiving
justification only at the end of my exposition of Augustine.
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These are the types of questions Hegel (via Pippin and Žižek) could not answers, if they
even bothered to raise them. Of course all these questions are far from the regular idiom
of Augustine and the conceptual constellations by which he navigates. However, in
examining his understanding of the bondage and then freedom of the will, the importance
of this Augustinian orientation will become clear in offering answers to questions such as
these.
The first section of this chapter will focus on the conversion of the will and God’s
providential intervention. This section will cover this terrain by discussing the nature and
causes of the divided will, concluding with the famous garden scene of Augustine’s
conversion. The second section will deepen this seemingly solitary account of subjective
conversion by elucidating how Augustine skillfully reveals the social aspects of his
conversion. Here it will be shown that his conversion is better thought as equally
Augustine’s entrance into an alternative society as it is God’s miraculous intervention. It
is the coordination between this alternative society and God’s providence that converts
Augustine’s will. The last section will explore the cosmological and Christological
foundation from which Augustine builds his account of conversion, making explicit the
importance of God’s self-immanenting transcendence in integrating an account of
subjective and social conversion.
Augustine and the Subject
But to finish the introduction of this chapter I have to return to a question raised in
the general introduction. Namely, is there really an Augustinian subject comparable to
Hegel’s subject? Investigating Augustine’s theory of the subject often seems like the
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most natural thing to do. Did he not create the autobiographical genre? Was he not
obsessed with the inner life, retreating from the world? Did he not grant the centrality of
subjectivity to Western philosophy? These questions are commonly answered in the
affirmative. But as with Hegel, we must problematize the received tradition and ask
whether or not Augustine should indeed be thought to have set Western philosophy and
theology on its solitary journey inward.
The Inward Turn
Those who see Augustine as a central figure in developing the concept of the self
or subjectivity are legion. Charles Taylor, in his influential Sources of the Self, suggests
“on the way from Plato to Descartes stands Augustine.”3 For Taylor, Augustine is the
turning point between the ancient and modern understanding of the subject. Augustine
continues the Platonic oppositions between spirit and matter, higher and lower, eternal
and temporal, and immutable and changeable. But these are now re-described
“essentially in terms of inner/outer” such that rather than looking up for Plato, Augustine
looks in.4 This inward turn, according to Taylor, shifts from the objects known to the
activity of knowing such that “to look towards this activity is to look at the self, to take
up a reflexive stance.”5 Inaugurating this reflexive stance vaults Augustine into the
milieu of Descartes and modern subjectivity. As Taylor says, “It is hardly an
exaggeration to say that it was Augustine who introduced the inwardness of radical
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reflexivity and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of thought.”6 Especially in
philosophical contexts, but even in theology, scholars often assume that Augustine is as
concerned with the ‘self’ and ‘subjectivity’ as modern philosophy.
From within this reflexive stance Augustine can doubt everything but his own
existence on his way to proving the existence of God. This reflexive stance offers a
process of seeking the certainty of God within the certainty of self-presence.7 Cutting
memory from its Platonic roots in a prenatal vision of the Ideas, Augustine lays the
groundwork for the development of innate ideas. And severing volition from reason and
desire, Augustine is the first to develop the notion of the will.8 Because Augustine’s
notion of the will cannot be reduced to reason or intellectual vision the will itself
becomes the center of moral responsibility.9 Both as intellectual self-presence and as the
center of moral responsibly, the inward self of the Western tradition springs from
Augustine’s genius.10
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The Inward Enigma
But is this really the case? Does Augustine talk about the ‘self and ‘subjectivity’
as a proto-modern, or has a modern fixation been projected onto Augustine? For John
Cavadini, too often “the claim that Augustine thinks of, talks about, has theories of, or
discovers something called ‘the self’ seems so self-evident that it recedes from view
precisely as a claim in need of argument.”11 He finds fault for this common assumption in
the English translations of Augustine that emphasize the “inner self” rather than the more
literal “inner man” or “inner human being” when translating Augustine’s interior homo
or interirois hominis mei.12 Another translation issue occurs with the overuse of reflexive
pronoun “such as ‘myself,’ ‘yourself,’ and ‘oneself’ that sound like possessive pronouns
plus the noun ‘self.’”13 This overuse of reflexive pronouns creates the illusion that
Augustine is examining some stable, interior reality beyond the shifting external world.
This purported inner self as a stable interior reality glimpsed by the inward gaze is readily
consumed by modern philosophy.
Cavadini also sees these problems compounded by a cursory reading of
Augustine’s use of the ‘interior human’ in opposition to the ‘external human’, such that
the former is thought to be the stable, immaterial soul which gazes about its inner space
and the later is the unstable, material body caught up in the lesser things of the world.
But this dichotomy overlooks the intended similarity between the two where the inner
human is given full sensuality (it looks, tastes, feels) such that the “‘interior homo’ is just
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as incomplete as the ‘exterior homo,’ and just as needy—its senses in need of just as
much correction and re-orientation as that of the exterior human.”14 Cavadini also notes
that while Augustine certainly does speak of an inner self-awareness, this self-awareness
is not a stable possession, but a constant
struggle, a brokenness, a gift, a process of healing, a resistance to healing, an
emptiness, a reference that impels one not to concentrate on oneself, in the end,
but on that to which one’s self-awareness propels one, to God.15
As we will see below, Augustine does not so much offer a stable conscious entity, but a
self-awareness constantly in need of re-creation. In this sense, whatever might be called
subjectivity for Augustine is more like the impossibility of closure and stability.16
If there is a self to be found in the writings of Augustine, it would be better
identified with the prideful self of the philosophers who seem to know the homeland (of
God) without knowing the way (Christ).17 The reified structure of philosophical pride
thinks itself inwardly stable and self-identical even while in reality it is incoherent and
self-contradictory.18 But beyond this pride of the philosophers is the plight of everyone
possessing a ‘divided self’ and seeking re-integration. This re-integration, however, is
precisely not through the power or stability of one’s own ‘self’ but by coming into a
proper relation with God the Creator. Through this relation to God Augustine effectively
“inverts the subject” by “developing a notion of interiority which is circumscribed by
exteriority,” a transcendent exteriority condescending to the human situation.19
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With all this in mind I will use ‘self’ and ‘subject’ in as non-committal a manner
as Augustine uses ‘heart,’ ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ and ‘will’ as he search to find rest in God, not
investing in them too much inherent ontological weight, but instead measuring them by
their proximity or distance from God. As we will see, just as much as Hegel, Augustine
longs to be at-home-with-oneself, but finds this to mean something drastically different
than that offered by a self-legislating freedom (be it through social practices or subjective
acts). We will trace such a conception of the self through a reading of Augustine’s
Confessions by looking, first, at the conversion of the will in book 8, a locus classicus for
discussing Augustine’s moral psychology. Then we will deepen this account of
conversion by examining the oft forgotten social elements in Augustine’s account of his
conversion. We will conclude by looking at how Augustine integrates the subjective and
the social within a cosmological, and thus Christological, orientation. All throughout
reference will be made to Augustine’s understanding of God’s self-immanenting
transcendence.
1. Conversion of the Will: Conflict and Intervention
We have already encountered paradoxical understandings of freedom. Rousseau
declared that people must be “forced to be free” and Hegel claimed that freedom comes
through state institutions. Both run counter to the dominant theory of freedom as noninterference. Augustine likewise offers an understanding of freedom that is equally
paradoxical for modern readers. For Augustine, as Charles Mathewes says, the “self is
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most free when it is determined by God” exactly because “grace is freedom.”20
Contemporary philosophers may think Augustine lacks the basic (modern) intuition that
freedom of the will consists in the power of choice between alternatives and that such
determination by God is a lack of freedom. But Augustine could just as well counter that
contemporary philosophers lack the basic (ancient) intuition that freedom of the will
consists in willing the good.21 Because Augustine has such a different understanding of
freedom the significance of his notion of the will is often lost, being reduced to the
dubious status of precursor to or progenitor of the modern conception of the will.
This loss of a true appreciation of Augustine’s moral psychology occurs because,
just as with the concept of the ‘self,’ interpreters come to Augustine with a presupposed
theory of the will as that which can choose between alternatives. As Albreht Dihle
claims, it is “generally accepted in the study of the history of philosophy that the notion
of will…was invented by St. Augustine.”22 According to Dihle Augustine did not derive
his theory of the will from any earlier philosophical doctrines, but broke with classical
intellectualist understandings by making the human will “prior to and independent of the
act of intellectual cognition.”23 More recent scholarship has toned down the strong claim
to originality, finding that Augustine cobbles together his theory of the will from multiple
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sources.24 But for many philosophical engagements with Augustine, Dihle’s conclusion
still holds:
St. Augustine’s essential contribution to the development of the medieval and
modern notion of will has to be seen in the wider context of the change from the
ontological to a psychological approach to religion and ethics which he initiated.25
And Augustine appears to confirm this in his earlier writings on the will (from his early
dialogues up to De libero arbitrio) where he seems to pursue a more strictly
psychological approach.
But many have begun to question this typical account of Augustine’s theory of the
will as merely the ability to choose between alternatives against reason or desire.26 The
real question for Augustine is not whether one has a will but what it might be to say that
the will is free. To have a will is to possess the ability of free choice between
alternatives. But the free choice of the will is not necessarily freedom. To have a free
will is to love and delight in doing the good. Mary Clark makes this point succinctly:
“Without the distinction that Augustine made between human choice and human freedom
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(arbitium voluntatis and libertas), his doctrine of freedom [is] incomprehensible.”27 Free
choice is a good faculty of humanity used either for good or evil. But human freedom
entails the use of this faculty directed toward and delighting in the good, for true freedom
(libertas) is merely the good use of free choice (liberum arbitrium).28 Anticipating the
argument below, it could be said that “the wrong use of free will is only an apparent
freedom; it is actually a descent into slavery.”29 While descending into this slavery, free
choice is retained even while freedom is lost (the freedom to choice the good). And
when grace is applied to the will, it is not the case that free choice is overturned or
cancelled. Rather, through grace free choice is retained while true freedom regained.30
For Augustine, then, to talk of a free will is not merely to speak about the good human
faculty of free choice between alternatives but also the good use of this faculty to choose
the good.
Because of this necessary distinction I will generally refrain from speaking of
‘free will’ because it obscures the difference between the free choice of the will and
freedom of the will, the latter of which is Augustine’s true concern even if he generally
equates will (voluntas) with free choice (liberum arbitrium). The difficulty of speaking
about the Augustinian will comes from the fact that the will is not as it should be. Every
human will is always in process, moving between a bondage to sin and a longing for
freedom. It is exactly within this movement that interpreters often lose the thread of
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Augustine’s argument. The movement from bondage to sin (and its attending society) to
the freedom of grace (and its alternative society) is not a movement from free choice
(having a will) to determination by God (losing one’s will). Free choice is assumed on
both ends of the movement from slavery to freedom.
But untangling these issues is a difficult and demanding process. As Clark notes,
“The only just way of representing Augustine’s doctrine on freedom is the simultaneous
confrontation of what he said about free choice in the De Libero Arbitrio with what he
said about freedom in the writings against the Pelagians and with what he experienced of
free choice and freedom as related in the Confessions.”31 Along with Mary Clark, James
Wetzel and T. D. J Chappell have attempted such a detailed reading.32 But for the
purposes of this chapter we will focus on the Confessions and its depiction of the
movement from the bondage to the freedom of the will through a reading of Augustine’s
moral struggle as it is depicted in book 8 of his Confessions. In our first pass through
Augustine’s conversion account we will focus on the nature of Augustine’s divided will
through a close reading of the last sentence of Confessions 8.5.10. This reading will give
opportunity to see the development of Augustine’s conception of the will, the causes of
the divided will, and the movement of God in resolving this conflict.
The Two Wills
After hearing the story of Victorinus’ conversion, told by Simplicianus, Augustine
declares, “Thus did my two wills, the one old, the other new, the first carnal, and the
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second spiritual, contend with one another, and by their conflict they laid waste my soul”
(conf. 8.5.10).33 This cry of despair, setting up the problem of book 8, is only finally
resolved as Augustine reads a passage from Romans and at once “it was as if a light of
relief from all anxiety flooded into my heart” (conf. 8.12.30). Between these two
exclamations is a wasteland of conflicts, a war of wills within a solitary soul.
Before writing his Confessions, when considering the will, Augustine seemed
solely concerned with a psychology of ‘free choice.’ In his early polemics against
Manichean dualism Augustine advanced an understanding of the will that seem to
function sui generis. Along with their cosmology, the moral dilemma of akrasia
prompted the Manicheans to posit two warring souls (one evil/dark, one good/light)
within each human being. Whether intended or not, the positing of two warring souls
tended to naturalize evil as a part of the world and therefore neutralize moral culpability.
Against this dualism Augustine argues for the unity of the soul by granting the will the
ability to either pursue evil or do good. In De duabus animabus Augustine defines the
will as the uncompelled, or uncoerced movement of the mind to either obtain or retain
some thing or some action. Within this definition sin is an exercise of the will to obtain
or retain what is forbidden.34 The problem is that when Augustine tries “to ‘denaturalize
sin’ and virtue in De duabus animabus, he adds to our nature the sui generis power of
volition and threatens to sever our actions from their motivations,” ending with a
definition of the will as free choice between alternatives.35
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Augustine could not quit resolve the problem this sui generis conception of the
will created within his generally ‘intellectualist’ framework of cognition.36 This problem
is seen in his more extended treatment of the will in De libero arbitrio.37 In this work
Augustine seeks to link a Stoic conception of willing (more spontaneous in nature) to a
Platonic order of immaterial objects of delight, producing an uneasy synthesis between
the two that seems to crumble later in the text. At the end we see Augustine claiming
both that (1) “nothing is so much within our power as the will itself…and since it is in
our power, we are free with respect to it” and (2) that “only something that is seen can
incite the will to act.”38 Here Augustine is caught between the will as either independent
of a motivating framework or the will drawn along by the beatific vision.
These aporias compel Augustine to abandon beginning with a psychology of sin
when discussing evil, freedom, and God. Rather than making ‘sheer volition’ the key for
unlocking Augustine’s view of the will and then reading it forward into later works like
the Confessions, we must take the question of the will as problematically posed as only
free choice in his early works. By the time we get to the Confessions (with hints already
in De duabus animabus and De libero arbitrio) Augustine is not asking about the free
choice of the will but the fact of two warring wills within one soul. This is the contrast
between free choice and freedom itself. For Augustine, we can not ask about the
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psychology of the will (voluntas) without also asking about the two wills (duae
voluntates) because the will is always divided against itself causing Augustine to cry out
in anguish at 8.5.10. But what are these two will and where did they come from?
The Old and New Will
Augustine calls these two wills (duae voluntates) the old (vetus) and new (nova).
Here Augustine is alluding to Ephesians 4:22-24 and Colossians 3:9-10 which speak of
putting off the old self with its desires and putting on the new self.39 The old will of
which Augustine refers is the will to sin, or more precisely, the will to desire sin. This is
exemplified in the pear theft in book 2, alluding to the sin of Adam and Eve. As
Augustine says,
I wanted to carry out an act of theft and did so, driven by no kind of need…My desire
was to enjoy not what I sought by stealing but merely the excitement of thieving and
the doing of what was wrong…I became evil for no reason. I had no motive for my
wickedness except wickedness itself…I loved the self-destruction, I loved my fall,
not the object for which I had fallen but my fall itself (conf. 2.4.9)
Augustine willed to be evil without purpose and without cause, without intention or aim.
This old will is both unhinged from material desire and reason, desiring only its own
privation. Rather than offering an explanation for the willing or the desire for sin,
Augustine examines the mystery of it all. Elsewhere he has characterized sin as the
pursuit of lesser good (immediately in Conf. 2.5.10-11 and earlier in De libero arbitrio
1.16), which, although misguided, still seeks a certain good as its reason and motive. But
here Augustine narrates a desire without utility or purpose.
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This mystery of sin, however, is not the end of the story of the old will. The
origin of sin may be a mystery but its effects are well known. The old will is old
precisely because it endures from the past into the present as the accumulation of past
decisions. The old will is the accumulation of past evil willing, producing ignorance and
difficulty in presently willing the good. Before Confessions, Augustine claimed that this
accumulation becomes the “resistance of carnal habit, which develops almost naturally
because of the unruliness of our mortal inheritance,”40 a “habit formed by connection
with the flesh and our sins” which “begin to militate against us and to put obstacles in our
way.”41 In these earlier works it seems as though reason and will could cause one to “let
go of the deadly charm of destructive habits” through a discipline of virtue.42 But in
Confessions this hope is forsaken because habit is now seen as binding the will in strong
chains. As Augustine says in the same paragraph before our text:
I sighed after such freedom, but was bound not by an iron imposed by anyone else
but by the iron of my own choice. The enemy had a grip on my will and so made
a chain for me to hold me a prisoner. The consequence of a distorted will
(voluntate peruersa) is passion (libido). By servitude to passion, habit
(consuetudo) is formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes
necessity. By these links as it were, connected one to another (hence my term a
chain), a harsh bondage held me under restraint. (conf. 8.5.10)43
This bondage comes not from an external source for this would violate the principle that
the will cannot be held responsible if it is coerced. Rather, through one’s own freely
chosen past actions one is bound to the old will as sinful habit. Because of this self40
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binding of free choice, Augustine held himself responsible for the current condition of
being unfree to will the good (conf. 8.5.11). The old will then, which is the bondage of
the will to sinful habits, is the result of the actions of a single will extended in time. The
warring of wills, then, is not between different wills (good and evil), nor between
different objects of delight (temporal/sensible or eternal/intelligible), but according to the
diverse willing of a single will accumulated through time. As James Wetzel notes, in this
situation
our present state of will…includes its past states in the form of habit, and
therefore the discrepancy between our past practices of willing and our present
willingness for change can be expressed as volitional paralysis.44
Sinful habit blocks present action based in knowledge of or desire for the good because
“the force of habit seems to spring from desire that has lost it ratio.”45 This lost reason
(lost to the past) is still presently binding the will. By placing the division between the
past and the present Augustine is able to keeps the link between willing, reason, and
desire. The divided will is divided between past reasons and desires in conflict with
present reasons and desires.46
Now, the new (nova) will is the “will which had begun within me, to wish freely
to worship you and find joy in you, O God, the sole sure delight” (conf. 8.5.10). This new
will consists of willing the eternal law rather than the temporal law of one’s members
(alluding to Romans 7:22-23) (conf. 8.5.12). Augustine makes clear in Ad Simplicianum
that this will is given to us by God, unlike the earlier works where Augustine seemed to
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suggest that one could will the good will.47 In expositing Romans 9, Augustine grapples
with the claim that “many are called but few are chosen.”48 He claims that God must call
people to salvation in different ways: those not chosen are called ineffectually and those
chosen are called effectually. As he say,
Many, that is to say, are called in one way, but all are not affected in the same
way; and those only follow the calling who are found fit to receive it…For God
calls in the way that is suited to those who follow his calling. The call comes also
to others; but because it is such that they cannot be moved by it and are not fitted
to receive it, they can be said to be called but not chosen…Those are chosen who
are effectually called…He calls the man on whom he has mercy in the way he
knows will suit him, so that he will not refuse the call.49
This calling is such that “having suited situation to person, God enables those called to
acknowledge their own desire for beatitude.”50 Because of this Augustine notes, “there
are two different things that God gives us, the power to will and the thing that we actually
will.”51 Therefore, as he makes clear in Ad Simplicianum, while he may have earlier
given the will the power to choose the new or good will, after answering Simplicianus’
questions (and here expressed in the Confessions) the new will is only given to us by
God. As we will see shortly, this gifted nova will is masterfully recounted in the Garden
scene where all talk of Augustine’s will vanishes and we see him transformed in his
reading of Romans 13:13-14 (conf. 8.12.29). Indeed, at the beginning of book nine
Augustine comments that through all his long years his own free will (i.e. free choice)
could not turn his neck to bear the light yoke of Christ, but rather this was the work of
Christ himself (conf. 9.1.1).
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In a farther clarification, Augustine speaks of his old will as carnal. This is the
carnal corruption of his soul (carnales corruptions animae meae) that he brings to mind
and ponders in book two (conf. 2.1.1). Instead of staying on the path of the love of the
mind he followed his passions and the desires of the flesh (concupiscentia carnis) (conf.
2.12). The corruption of his will in book 2 and the conflict expressed in book 8 lead him
to say, quoting Galatians 5:17: “Thus I understood from my own experience what I had
read, how ‘the flesh lusts (caro consupisceret) against the spirit, and the spirit against the
flesh’” (conf. 8.5.11). This concupiscentia carnis, however, is not a merely moment-bymoment lustfulness, but also the carnal habit (consuetude carnalis) that weighs down the
will and keeps it from turning to God (conf. 7.17.23).
They Laid Waste My Soul
Returning to our passage from 8.5.10, Augustine concludes that the two wills
“contend (confligebant ) with one another, and by their conflict they laid waste
(discordando dissipabant) my soul.” This contending and conflict alludes to Romans
7:16-17 and 7:22-25 as the conflict between what dwells within Augustine through the
past habits of sin, and what he desires in the Law of God. As he declares in 8.5.12,
In vain I ‘delighted in your law in respect of the inward man; but another law in
my members fought against the law of my mind and led me captive in the law of
sin which was in my members’. The law of sin is the violence of habit
(consuetudinis) by which even the unwilling mind is dragged down and held, as it
deserves to be since by its own choice it slipped into the habit.
This conflict lays waste (dissipabant) Augustine’s soul. This dissipabant is not due to
some outside force bearing upon Augustine’s soul, nor the ontological state of a created
being, but is rather the consequences of past sinful willing. For,
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I was at war within myself, and I was laid waste (dissipabar) by myself. This
devastation (dissipatio) was made against my will indeed, and yet it revealed not
the nature of a different mind within me, but rather the punishment of my own
nature. (conf. 8.10.22)52
Augustine uses dissipabant here not only to describe the withering conflict of wills
within himself, but to invoke the image of the Prodigal Son who takes the good gifts of
his father and wastes them. In connection to the pear theft, Augustine states he was far
from the face of God in the darkness of his own passions. But this ‘far’ from God was
not a distance in space but a darkness of affections such that like the Prodigal Son “he
could waste (dissiparet) the substance that you had given him as he started out” (conf.
1.18.28).53 Therefore, by using dissipabant here, Augustine understands his own struggle
of voluntas and the laying waste of his soul as an exemplification of the narrative of the
Prodigal Son which itself illustrates the destiny of all people.
Augustine, then, is bound to an evil will through sinful habit and barred from a
good will according to his own power of will (free choice). Through the free choice of
the will Augustine has become unfree and is no longer free to will the good, which is the
true freedom that he desires. His present reason and desire cannot unbind him from an
evil will cultivated according to sinful habit, a habit forged through the use of his own
free choice. For Augustine, the turning away from God and the good begins an
irreversible process of sinful habits becoming immune to the redirection of reason or
desire.
In this state of impotence, Augustine recounts his own struggles in a garden, in
which he received a divine command through the voice of a child. He hears the voice
52
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call out “pick up and read,” leading to a chance reading from Paul’s letter to the Roman.
There he is commanded to “put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the
flesh in its lusts.” And “at once, with the last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of
relief from all anxiety flooded into my heart” (conf. 8.12.29). While the mechanics of
conversion are not so much explained as expressed, in the putting on of Christ the will of
Augustine is relinquished for the will of God, which though thought to be contrary to
freedom itself, is for Augustine the only means by which freedom is regained, the
freedom to will the good. According to a divine intervention staged through the chance
song of a child, the random reading of a text, and the sudden illumination of the heart,
Augustine declares that “you [God] have converted me to yourself” (convertisti emin me
ad te) (conf. 8.12.30).54 This is the conversion of Augustine’s will.
At this point we must pause and face a possible objection. This account might
easily seem the inverse of the radical act posited by Žižek. For Žižek, the radical act of
the subject breaks free of all previous subjective and social formations. It is a sovereign
act of subjective assertion. With Augustine, is he not merely transferring this radical
subjective act to God’s side who not only interrupts the social and subjective formation of
Augustine, but altogether overcomes Augustine, the subject? Instead of the radical act of
the human subject below, it is the radical act of God above. If this is the case, is it still
possible to meaningfully speak of a subject (of the subject’s will)? Does this not exactly
suggest a voluntarism on God’s side as a replacement for humanity’s sinful voluntarism?
If this were the whole story, as many investigations of Augustine’s theory of the
will claim, then these questions would certainly stand against Augustine. But his
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narrative is much richer and more expansive than mere divine intervensionism,
encompassing the communal nature of human willing and, indeed, the conversion of all
creation. In this next section, then, we will examine how Augustine’s conversion is more
properly understood as including a robust social aspect. In the section after this we will
see how this subjective conversion within an alternative society moves within an
Augustinian metaphysics of creation, which is thoroughly Christological.
2. Conversion of the Will: Community and Intervention
A strictly philosophical or psychological approach to Augustine’s texts, especially
one like the Confessions, threatens to separate the truth of the matter from the beauty of
its form, something Augustine was keen not to do. Such an approach also threatens to
miss the more pragmatic reasons for Augustine to have written his Confession, such as
explaining his thorough conversion from Manichaeism to Christianity in the hopes that
others might follow his example, concluded by a reading of Scriptures consonant with
such a conversion.55 Indeed, contrary to modern assumptions, it is entirely possible the
autobiographical material is all prelude to the more philosophical and theological treatise
that concludes the work. The question of modern readers has been something like “Why
is an autobiography concluded by a theoretical discourse?” However, it is conceivable
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that for ancient readers the question would have been “Why is the autobiographical
introduction so long?”56 The main question here, however, is not strictly the literary
antecedents of the Confessions, but the construction and components of his conversion
narrative and what light these might shed on his thoughts concerning the social aspects of
such a conversion.
The Myth of Suddenness
As noted in the previous section, Augustine’s conversion can be read as a divine
intervention overriding Augustine’s sinful willing with a willing of the good. This divine
intervention can sound like a dreadful determinism erasing all freedom. One way around
this criticism is to critique the modern ‘myth of suddenness’ through an investigation of
God’s providential ordering of events leading toward conversion.57 Rather than a sudden
conversion from the prolonged habit of sin, Augustine comes to conclude that the call of
grace is equally prolonged and persistent.
James Wetzel has drawn attention to the harmony between God’s suitable calling
and human willing known only in retrospect. The efficacy of God’s suitable calling
comes through God’s providential ordering of object of delight drawing the will away
from carnal habits. Formerly, the will delighted in carnal things. But through God’s
calling new object begin to delight the will and raise it to higher things. The will
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consents (through its free choice) to what delights it and therefore is free (for a will
without consent is not will at all for Augustine), even if it is not in control of what object
actually come before it. Because God both knows what delights us in our innermost
being and has control over the outward objects of delight, God is able to perfectly arrange
situations that elicit our voluntary consent to this divine calling. As Wetzel says,
The central different between ordinary instances of consent and divinely inspired
ones is that in the latter the fit between disposition and environment is so good
that no margin remains for hesitation or irresolution. We do not need to make a
choice. Our choice is, as it were, built into God’s offer.58
According to Wetzel, it is for this reason that the garden scene all but eliminates the
moments of willing and choosing. Augustine is simply reacting to the divine calling
through the voice of a child and the verse of scripture.59 In this way God coordinates a
suitable calling with human willing that does not violate the structure of free choice.
This account gives us an understanding of divine action in conversion without
supplying the inside story of the will’s transformation. What we get from Augustine,
after pages and pages describing his inner conflict, is not a dramatic telling of God’s
intervention and transformation, but only a short statement of inner relief. Why? Why so
little theological bang for so much autobiographical build up? Wetzel speculates that the
moment of Augustine’s conversion remains relatively opaque exactly because his
conversion “contained his recognition that the divine presence had been with him all
along. It did not have to enter from outside to resolve his crisis from within.”60 In
Wetzel’s understanding, what seems like the climatic moment is merely the recognition
of accumulated past moments in which God had always been present and divinely
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coordinating Augustine’s life. The ‘myth of suddenness’ and its interventionist
complement is overturned with the recognition that God had always been bringing about
a suitable calling in Augustine, not from outside but always within and through
Augustine’s life.
The Stories of Providence
But is this all that can be said of God’s coordinating of objects of desire into a
suitable calling and conversion? Does not the replacement of a sudden intervention with
gradual conversion merely displace the concern of divine determinism from a synchronic
to a diachronic paradigm? Is there not a place for humanity, for human society, within
this story of conversion? A closer look reveals just such a place within the story of
providence, the place of an emerging alternative society.61 To see this we will look at the
structure of book eight and then relate this to the larger structure at work in books one
through nine.
Book eight consists of three episodes, of which the first two are conversions and
the third is Augustine’s conversion. Each of the first two conversations has embedded
within it the story of a conversion. The first conversation is between Augustine and
Simplicianus in which Simplicianus tells the story of Marius Victorinus’ conversion.
Simplicianus takes up this telling of Victorinus’ conversion in order to exhort Augustine
to “the humility of Christ hidden from the wise and revealed to babes” (conf. 8.1.3). As a
well-known teacher of rhetoric, Victorinus had attained the level of renown to which
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Augustine aspired. But Victorinus eventually learned the humility of the Word and was
baptized publicly to the joy of all who witnessed it. Hearing this story prompts
Augustine to wonder why people are “more delighted by the salvation of a soul who is
despaired of but is then liberated from great danger than if there has always been hope or
if the danger has only been minor?” (conf. 8.3.6). Augustine alludes to the Prodigal Son
as an example of such a story.
The delight caused by Simplicianus’ story begins drawing Augustine toward
conversion. As he notes, when Simplicianus finished his story Augustine “was on fire to
imitate [Victorianus]” (exarsi ad imitandum) (conf. 8.5.10).62 This delight is the
proximate cause of the inner conflict of wills at the end of conf. 8.5.10, examined above.
As Lewis Ayres notes, turning to book 9, the exampla of the saints is intended to produce
such an effect.63 There Augustine says that “the examples given by your servants…set
me on fire (accendebant)” (conf. 9.2.3). Simplicianus’ story, then, prompts the inner
turmoil and defines the issues facing Augustine.64 But this prompting is not
accomplished through some divine intervention beyond history and humanity or within
the inner recesses of the self. Rather, it is produced through the telling of the life and
conversion of a flesh and blood person (Victorinus) by another person (Simplicianus) to a
third (Augustine).
In book 8 this first conversation leads to a second between Augustine and
Ponticianus. While the conversation with Simplicianus references the Platonic books,
when Ponticianus surprises Augustine with a visit, it is by chance that Ponticianus notices
62
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the writings of Paul on a table (conf. 8.6.14). The Platonic books enabled Augustine to
think through the immaterial nature of the will leading him beyond Manichaeism and its
dualism, a reflection prompted by Simplicianus’ story. These books, however, had no
answer for overcoming such a divided will. It is only through the Scriptures that such a
solution presents itself, a solution for which Platonism could never have prepared
Augustine.65 These subtle movements of providence (a surprise visit and a chance
noticing) set up the next story so that it might also act as an example for Augustine.
Ponticianus tells of how he and three friends were walking in a garden and separated into
pairs. The other couple wandered in a different direction than Ponticianus and they
happened upon a house in which lived some of God’s servant. In this house they by
chance found a copy of the Life of Antony. Upon reading it one was “amazed and set on
fire” (et mirari et accendi) and converted (conf. 8.6.15). In this story of Ponticianus
Augustine hears again of one ‘set on fire’. But in this case Augustine hears of one being
converted to God as the proper response to such a story. This time not only is Augustine
told a conversion story, but he is also given an example of people responding to a
conversion story, the conversion of Antony and the response of those who read it.66
After the first story (by Simplicianus) Augustine develops a series of reflections
on the divided will and how he was perpetually delaying a decision (conf. 8.5.12). The
second story produces an entirely different result, forcing the issue of decision for
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Augustine. He tells us that at the time Ponticianus was telling his story God was turning
Augustine around to be able to see himself as he really was. As Augustine says, “You
took me up from behind my own back where I had placed myself because I did not wish
to obverse myself, and you set me before my face so that I should see how vile I was”
(conf. 8.7.16). Ayres warns against reading this as if Augustine were having an inner
dialogue with God as Ponticianus prattles on. Rather Ayres notes it is “the on-going
telling of the story that Augustine wishes to identify as the means through which God
focuses Augustine’s gaze upon himself.”67 Augustine is clear that “if I tried to avert my
gaze from myself, his [Ponticianus’] story continued relentlessly, and you [God] once
again placed me in front of myself.” Through the story itself and through the one telling
it, God’s providential action is working to coordinate suitable objects of desire and the
desire itself.
Exampla in the Garden
This, however, is not the end. Not only is divine providence noted in bringing
together these lives and stories, linking history and humanity as the means of Augustine’s
conversion. But also, in returning to the garden scene we find again the exempla of a
saint as a means of Augustine’s conversion. While Augustine has mentioned Antony and
the effect reading about his conversion had on others, Augustine did not speak of the
actual conversion of Antony. He holds it back until he is in the throws of agony in the
garden and hears the voice of a child chanting. In that moment he searches his memory
but could not remember a game or chant that included “Pick up and read.” His memory,
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the repository of the past, a past now chaining him to sinful habit, fails Augustine. The
past has doubly failed him by binding him to past sinful habit and by failing to provide a
sufficient memory able to interpret the voice.
Within of this interpretive deadlock Augustine says that he “interpreted it solely
as a divine command to me to open the book and read the first chapter I might find”
(conf. 8.12.29). Between a mysterious voice and a chance verse comes divine command.
Does this not seem to perfectly fit the model of divine intervention? But this is not where
Augustine leaves the narrative. He immediately states that the reason he interpreted this
voice as a divine command is because “I had heard how Antony happened to be present
at the gospel reading, and took it as an admonition addressed to himself.” Lodged within
Augustine’s memory was the story, the example, of another who had interpreted a voice
as a divine command. This memory, from a past which was not properly his, from a
story which had delighted him and had enflamed others, was the pivotal piece that
allowed Augustine to move forward. Between voice and verse is a providentially ordered
memory of the example of person (Antony) given by still another (Ponticianus). These
stories and the society out of which they flowed, coupled with the Scriptures, were the
means by which Augustine’s will is converted. As Ayres notes, divine providence
must not only present new and desirable objects, it must also enable a synthesis
between memory and desire strong enough to overcome habit…Augustine has
finally been drawn to conversion because he has been drawn to a point where,
with the help of grace, the movement of memory, understanding and will brings
to light and moves toward the correct exempla. His will is not so much finally
forced out of old habit; it has been drawn to a point at which new memories and
desires triumph over old.68
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It is in all these ways that Augustine can declare to God, “You have converted me to
yourself” (convertisti emin me ad te) (conf. 8.12.30)69 without such a conversion being an
alienation of his own humanity. Indeed, Augustine is showing us that all along he was
slowly being converted from one society to an alternative one. To these contrasting
societies we will now turn, knowing that a full elaboration will have to wait until the next
chapter when we turn to City of God.
The Society of Providence
The contours of this alternative society is best noticed when we step back and
look at the placement of book 8 within the scope and movement of books 1-9. As
William A. Stephany has pointed out, books 1-9 of the Confessions form a chiasm
centering on book 5, with pairs of books on either side: books 4 and 6, book 3 and 7,
books 2 and 8, and books 1 and 9. Book five begins with Augustine meeting what could
be called a Manichean bishop in Faustus and ends with him meeting a Christian bishop in
Ambrose. This decisive shift of allegiances, this subtle movement from one society to
another, marks the center of the transition from one society to another. Books 4 and 6
trace the arc of friendships, love, and the material world. In books 3 and 7 we hear of
Augustine’s two great discoveries and intellectual conversions. In book 3 he reads
Cicero and dedicates himself to the love of wisdom, and in book 7 he reads the Platonists.
The pursuit of wisdom beginning with Cicero in book 3, runs afoul in Manicheaism, but
is overcome with the discovery of Platonism in book 7. Books 2 and 8 are dominated by
stories occurring in gardens involving fruit trees. In book 2 Augustine does the evil he
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does not desire and in book 8 he cannot do the good he desire. The former reveals the
way of the divided will and the latter the way out of it. And finally, books 1 and 9 speak
of physical birth and spiritual rebirth.70 It is these last two pairings that I want to explore
more closely.
We have already discussed the manner in which Augustine mines his motives for
the pear theft and finds reason and desire lacking. The will to sin, the falling for its own
sake, is mysterious. But later in book 2 he backs from the utter mystery of it all and
confesses multiple times that had he been alone he would not have stolen the pears (conf.
2.8.16-9.17). Therefore, he concludes, “my love (amavi) in that act was to be associated
with the gang in whose company I did it” (conf. 2.8.16). Augustine claims that if he had
been alone his cupidity (cupiditatis) would not have been inflamed (accenderem). But
because of the example of the group he was moved toward sin. Augustine notes
“friendship can be a dangerous enemy, a seduction of the mind lying beyond the reach of
investigation” (conf. 2.9.17).
This danger of friendship, however, is overturned in the fellowship Augustine
finds in book 8. Through the physical presence of Simplicianus, Ponticianus, and
especially Alypius in the garden, and through the presence of others in the stories shared,
Augustine was surrounded by friendships that were enflaming him toward the love of
God rather than love of self. This alternative society was shaping Augustine’s desires
toward good and away from evil. The examples of the saints in book 8 were overcoming
the examples set by Augustine’s fellow sinners in book 2.

70

William A. Stephany, “Thematic Structure in Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian
Studies 20 (1989): 129-142.

224
The parallels between books 1 and 9 further strength this contrast between two
societies, moving beyond the agonies of a particular will to the destinies of all people. In
book 1 Augustine speaks of his birth, his infancy, and his introduction into human society
through the learning of language, an introduction that brought Augustine “more deeply
into the stormy society of human life” (conf. 1.8.13). The acquisition of language quickly
outstrips its menial use in gaining the necessities of life and begins deforming his desires
as Augustine commences his education. It is here, in his education, that Augustine
claims that he learned to love what is vile and despise what is good. The “stormy society
of human life” has now becomes a tumultuous ocean, to which Augustine cries:
Woe to you, torrent of human custom! “Who can stand against you?” When will
you run dry? How long will your flowing current carry the sons of Eve into the
great and fearful ocean which can be crossed, with difficulty, only by those who
have embarked on the Wood of the cross? (conf. 1.16.25)
This watery torrent symbolizing fallen human society is briefly interrupted by the story of
a baptism deferred when, as a child, Augustine fell deathly ill (conf. 1.11.17-18). At the
offer of baptism Augustine is given a chance to bathe in the cleansing waters of the
Church instead of drowning in the waters of human confusion. This baptism, hinted at in
book 1, is only final accomplished in book 9, marking the entry of Augustine into an
alternative human society of those not tossed by the waves of desire but instead are those
who thirst for God and are quenched by the fountain of life (conf. 13.17.20-21). Book 1,
then, speaks of a physical birth that is really an entry into social and spiritual death, and
book 9 speaks of a sacramental death (and the physical deaths of multiple saints, most
prominently Augustine’s mother) as the entry into spiritual life.71
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Subject and Society
Throughout books 1-9 of his Confessions Augustine has been showing us the
contrasting influences of human society and its alternative. Through these contrasts
Augustine has lead us into an understanding of how the will becomes enslaved to sinful
habit through its own free choice under the direction of external examples. The subject is
converted when it first begins to understand that the root of its division is not beyond
itself but is the accumulation of its own past actions, actions given over to lesser loves.
Although the bondage of the will is not imposed from beyond itself, the solution (or
freedom) must come from beyond its own free choice and the sinful society that has
shaped its exercise of free choice. The will can will its own fall from freedom, but not its
return to freedom. It is for this reason that divine providence must orchestrate a return of
the will through the provision of alternative objects of delight and examples of the proper
response to such objects. This process occurs not through a divine intervention from
beyond history and humanity, but through a suitable calling that properly exposes the
subject to examples which delight and enflame.
The establishment and nature of such a society of examples, or city as Augustine
will call it, will be the focus of the next chapter. But for now I would like to briefly note
the similarities of the above to Hegel’s understanding of the unity of the subject and
society discussed in chapter 3. Both Hegel and Augustine give priority to a non-material
figure guiding the chance ordering of events in the formation of the subject, divine
providence for Augustine and Geist for Hegel. Both view this guiding figure as working
through a society configured around institutions and practices out of which the subject is
formed. And both see freedom as more than the negative freedom of choice between
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alternatives (liberum arbitrium for Augustine and willkür for Hegel). Rather freedom is
being positively ordered toward the good.
But as noted in chapter 3, when it comes to the questions of establishing or
transitioning into a more free society Hegel was not able to hold together subject and
society within his framework of self-transcending immanence. On the one hand, some
Hegelians emphasize the institutional role of society to such a degree that it is impossible
to promote the formation of a radical subjectivity capable of criticizing injustice and
initiating change. This is the position of those like Robert Pippin who focus on normative
social practices. On the other hand, other Hegelians promote a radical subjectivity in
such contrast to all social formations that while critical of one social formation it makes
little sense to speak of a new, more just or free social formation because this would
exactly limit and circumscribe the subject again. This is the position of those like Slavoj
Žižek who focus on radical subjective acts. Does Augustine do any better in both
integrating subject and society while also holding open the means for a subjectivity
capable of both criticism and change?72
It must be remembered that the main difference between the two is that Augustine
explicitly presents his moral psychology in the Confessions as a transition between two
societies, from the deformation of his will by sinful habit to the reformation of will by
grace within an alternative society. It is this change that is central, not the unity between
subject and society. While Augustine’s moral and social theory is guided by the
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necessity of change through a slow process of breaking open the stable subject, Hegel’s
faith in modernity does not have and does not need such a change. These differences are
based in a more fundamental difference between Augustine and Hegel concerning the
nature of creation itself, to which we turn in the next section. Augustine is fundamentally
committed to the difference between Creator and creation, a difference that Hegel was at
pains to abolish. The difference between affirming or denying a distinction between
Creator and creation is exactly the difference between a self-transcending immanence
(Hegel) and a self-immanenting transcendence (Augustine). It is because Augustine
affirms that subject and society are created by a self-immanenting transcendence that he
can hold the two together (subject and society) as a means for change rather than a
perpetuation of the status quo (the previous sinful subject and society). What
Augustine’s self-immanenting transcendence might mean will now be examined by
looking at the explicitly Christological aspects of conversion as they are linked to
creation.
3. Conversion of Creation: Christ as Intervention
In outlining Augustine’s commitment to think God as self-immanenting
transcendence we finally arrive where many begin, Augustine’s great confession of the
restless soul journeying toward God: “You stir man to take pleasure in praising you,
because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you”
(conf. 1.1.1).73 That humanity is restless apart from God, somehow far from the One to
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whom all things are near (conf. 1.18.28), certainly speaks to the odyssey of the soul
narrated in books 1-9. Certainly these themes are justly emphasized and explored.
Equally for Augustine, however, especially when we pass beyond book 10, is that
humanity is made by God, “a little piece of your creation (creaturae tuae)” (conf. 1.1.1).
The issue of creation is an essential key for understanding the unity of the work. As Jon
Mackenzie notes regarding the overall structure of the work,
The first section [books 1-10] can be read as an attempt to conceive the human
subject without recourse to the form of the subject imparted at creation, an
attempt which will finally fail. By comparison, the second portion [books11-13]
of the Confessions could be interpreted as a re-reading of the first section in light
of the understanding of the impartation of form to the subject through creation.74
This impartation of form to the subject, as Mackenzie notes, is not something peculiar to
humanity but is a characteristic of all creation. For Augustine, creation is a two-step
process in which formless matter is first created and then latter given form.75 This is
Augustine’s synthesis of a Neoplatonic ontology and the claim in Genesis 1:2 that the
earth was formless and void.76 All created things begin in and move toward this
formlessness, “toward the chaos where there is no control, and to a far off dissimilarity
(longinquam dissimilitudinem)” to God (conf. 13.2.2). Concerning the sheer contingency
of creation in relation to the God who does not need such a creation, Augustine asks,
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“What merit had these things before you even to receive a formless existence when, but
for you, they would not exist at all?” (conf. 13.2.2). But just as the formless creation
depended on the Word of God for its creation, so too it is by that Word that they receive
their form (conf. 13.2.2). Or closer to the point, created things are “converted”
(converteretur) from formless to formed by the Word who made them (conf. 13.2.3).
Augustine wants us to understand that the “‘converting’ that is at the heart of the original
creative act is now mirrored and brought to fulfillment in the redemptive act,” unifying
the orders of creation and redemption.77 Therefore, when Augustine claims that God had
converted him (conf. 8.12.30) he was not speaking of some anomalous event within the
history of the cosmos. Rather, he is speaking of how he is now again properly aligned
with the cosmos, converted to his proper form and directed toward his proper end.
Augustine’s autobiographical conversion served as an illustration, or typology, of the
conversion of the cosmos. This theme, announced in book 1 as the problem confronting
humanity, is proclaimed to be the process of all creation. All things must be converted to
God.78
Absorbing all Immanence?
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The question to be asked, however, given this “metaphysics of conversion”79 is
whether a reliance on a Neoplatonic ontology conflates creation and the fall as the
prerequisite for the following conversion? If the first stage of creation is formless matter
that seems necessarily to be falling away from God, and if humanity is caught in such a
downward fall, is not this fall synonymous with creation? As Emilie Brunn comments,
“Augustine insists on the close, if not fatal, connection that ties the first stage of spiritual
creation…to the fact of the fall.”80 O’Connell worries this connection inevitably
compromises the integrity of humanity, leading to the eventual absorption of human
particularity when God becomes ‘all in all’ after the completion of redemption.81
And if this is true, then the contrast between Hegel and Augustine argued for
throughout is revealed as an utter failure. If Augustine is overly dependent on
Neoplatonism such that he conflates creation and fall then he is guilty of perpetuating a
theology repulsive to bodily reality, tending toward an other-worldly escapism, all
terminating in the re-absorption of humanity in God. Augustine would not, then, present
a clear alternative to the Hegelian problematic that explicitly conflates creation and the
fall as the ‘sinfulness of existence’. He would merely be offering its reverse. Instead of a
self-transcending immanence that excludes any true transcendence we would now have a
self-immanenting transcendence that eventually re-absorbs all immanence back into
itself.
Does, then, Augustine conflate creation and fall? Does he end up basically
reducing humanity to a moment of divinity? We will answer the former questions next,
79
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waiting to answer the second after discussing the mediation of Christ between God and
humanity.
Dissimilarity and Dissipation
Certainly Augustine draws a close connection between ontology and morality,
closer than many interpreters recognize when they read Augustine as a precursor to the
modern subject, claiming that he has replaced ontology with psychology. But within this
deep connection between ontology and psychology Augustine carefully distinguishes
between the ontological and moral orders. Augustine notes that the first moment of
creation institutes beings that dwell in a “far off dissimilarity” (longinquam
dissimilitudinem) from God (conf. 13.2.2). This naturally suggests a comparison to the
far country (longinqua regione) to which the Prodigal Son travelled (conf. 1.18.25). And
because of this parallel it is tempting to read Augustine’s entrance into a “the region of
dissimilarity” (regione dissimilitudinis) and his fall from the vision of God in book 7 as
corroborating the link between sinfulness and material existence. The “region of
dissimilarity” of book 7 and the “far off dissimilarity” of book 13, when read through the
far country of humanity’s wandering, all seem to add up to a conflation between creation
and fall.
This however blurs the lines between the ontological region of dissimilarity
(dissimilitudinis) from God (in which all created entities share) and the prodigal
dissipation (dissiparet) of God’s gifts (in which only humanity shares). As we noted in
the first section, the war waged between Augustine’s two will “laid waste” (dissiparet)
his soul (conf. 8.5.10; 8.10.22). And it is exactly this moral situation to which Augustine
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refers when speaking of the Prodigal Son, that in the far country (longinqua regione) “he
could waste (dissiparet) the substance that [God] had given him” (conf. 1.18.28), a
situation Augustine directly applies to himself in conf 4.16.30.82 Creaturely dissimilarity
from God does not necessarily entail a prodigal dissipation. Augustine is careful not to
conflate these two regions of dissimilarity and dissipation, even if it is the Word who
remedies both through a process of conversion. The ontological creation of the world
does not necessitate its moral fall.83
Downward Participation and Mediation
How is humanity, then, to be re-formed once it has fallen away from its first
conversion, entering not only an ontological dissimilarity but also a prodigal dissipation?
In explaining this re-formation Augustine outlines his difference from the Platonists who
glimpse the homeland but do not know the way to it.84 Platonists and Christians could
agree on the ontological doctrine that creation participates in God. But what Augustine
began to realize is that for humanity to be re-formed it was necessary that God participate
in the human plight. God’s entrance within humanity would entail a ‘downward
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participation’ through which humanity would be re-formed. And this ‘downward
participation’ marks Augustine’s distance from Neoplatonism.85
Within the much-commented intellectual conversion to Platonism recounted in
book 7 is an oft-overlooked conversion of Platonism for an explicitly Christian purpose.
Within the Confessions the term participatio occurs only three times, each in book 7,
although the idea is prevalent throughout (especially in book 11-13). In book 7
Augustine recounts what the “books of the Platonists” taught him concerning the Word of
God, although he does so by quoting Scripture (specifically John 1), rather than referring
to the Platonists directly. Augustine, however, notes that he did not find the humility of
the Incarnation in those books. The Platonic books could only affirm an upward
participation of created realities in God. The first and third use of participatio confirms
this, each referencing the Word, the Son of God. Augustine readily admits to the eternal
and immutable nature of the Son in which all temporal and mutable natures participate.
This is his meaning of his first use in conf. 7.9.14 where he says that all are wise “by
participation (participatione) in wisdom abiding in them.” Wise humans are wise
because they participate in Wisdom itself, the Son. As David Meconi comments,
This participation is always ‘upward,’ in the sense that it is always the lower, less
perfect existent’s taking part in the superior and more perfect reality. Hence
central to the platonic understanding of participation is the fact that the underived,
immutable Form is always partaken of and participated in, never vise versa.86
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The third use of participation affirms this philosophical doctrine, but now as a proof for
the superiority of Christ above all other humans. Augustine comments that while he was
still grappling with how to understand the Incarnation he nevertheless counted Christ as
superior to all others “because of the great excellence of his human character and the
more perfect participation (participantione) in wisdom” (conf. 7.19.25). Christ, the
human, is thought to be the perfect exemplification of one participating in uncreated
Wisdom, showing again the upward movement of participation. Just like the rest of
creation, Christ the contingent and mutable human, upwardly participates in Wisdom, and
it is to this perfection that Augustine is drawn.
But it is the second use of participatio that transforms the entire Platonic
ontology. Between the immutable Word in which all participate (conf. 7.9.14) and the
superiority of Christ in his participating in Wisdom (conf. 7.19.25) stands the Word that
“by his sharing (participatione) in our ‘coat of skin’” comes to down to humanity in
order to raise humanity up (conf. 7.18.24). The Word, who is superior, comes down to
that which is inferior and builds for himself a dwelling even though everything already
dwells him. The ‘coat of skin’, alluding to the garments God make for Adam and Eve, is
the mortality in which humanity finds itself when expelled from the Garden. It is through
this Word that takes on human flesh that humanity is raised up and healed. As Meconi
notes, “through the humbled flesh of the Word God’s downward participation in
imperfection is now thought possible” such that “Plato is thus supplemented.”87 Book 7,
therefore, certainly recounts Augustine’s conversion to Platonism. But it also subtly
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indicates the conversion of Platonist participation through the downward movement of
the Incarnation.
The possibility of downward participation opens space for Christ to be the
mediator between God and humanity in book 10. It should be remember that in book 8,
just as Augustine was realizing the depths of his bondage to sin, he cried out with the
words of Romans 7:24-25, “Wretched man that I was who would deliver me from this
body of death other than your grace through Jesus Christ our Lord?” (conf. 8.5.12).
Likewise, in book 10, after having examined his conscience according to the three sins of
1 John 2:16, he calls out again to God, “Who could be found to reconcile me to you?”
(conf. 10.42.67). The answer is the Son of God, the mediator between God and
humanity. Because Augustine (and humanity in general) does not have the power to
convert himself back to God, a mediator was necessary who has “something in common
with God and something in common with humanity” (conf. 10.42.67). This “mediator
between God and men” is the “man Christ Jesus” (conf. 10.43.68), who participates
downwardly with humanity so that humanity might again participate upwardly in God.
Through the mediation of the Incarnation, the Word who was already in the form of God
takes on the form of a servant so that humanity might be re-formed toward God. In this
way, that which was fallen from its original creation (a creation made through the Word
as God) is converted back to God (through the Word as human). The formless subject is,
therefore, converted back to its original form through this downward participation of God
in humanity, creating the possibility of a mediator between God and humanity.
Willing the Divine (and Human) Will
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Here we must return to the objection raised above concerning whether or not
Augustine ends up absorbing all humanity particularity within God. It could be asked,
Even if God’s work is not strictly interventionist but a work of providence in history, and
even if the subject is introduced into an alternative human society within history, is not
the ultimate price of this re-formation, this ‘freedom’, the replacement of human will
with divine will? This kind of objection concerns whether freedom for Augustine is the
preservation or loss of one’s own humanity. And if this is a loss of human will within
God’s, then Augustine is not a resource for thinking a truly radical political subjectivity
because human subjectivity is ultimately overcome by God’s sovereignty. And these
fears seem to be confirmed, when, after his conversion Augustine declares to Christ,
“This was the sum of it: not to will what I willed and to will what you willed.” (conf.
9.1.1).88
But this willing the will of Christ is not an alien intervention precisely because
Christ is the mediator between God and humanity. We must first remember the
downward participation in which the Word takes on the human ‘coat of skin’. This
reference to taking on human mutability and morality is intimately connected to
Augustine’s conversion. In reading Romans he hears that he should no longer make
provision for the sinful flesh, but should put on Christ (conf. 8.12.29). Given the
decisiveness of God’s own ‘putting on’ of human flesh in Christ, and the evident
stumbling block that this was for Augustine initially, it would be incorrect to think that
putting on Christ would mean for Augustine a denial of or escape from the human
88
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condition, a fleeing from material flesh to some immaterial life. Why would the
humanity of Christ be of such significance if it were then used as the means to escape the
human condition itself? Instead, putting on Christ must refer to the humanity of Christ,
the Word’s own ‘coat of skin’ unblemished by sin, through which Augustine learns how,
in Wetzel’s words, “to live in the flesh as God would and did.”89 The redemption of
Augustine’s own humanity is through the humanity of God, a downward participation
that reconnects humanity to the flow of upward participation in God, a conversion to its
true form.
With this affirmation of humanity before us we can return to the above objection
that divine will seems to overcome human will. If willing God’s will comes only from
the side of the fully divine then Augustine would be flirting with the loss of his human
individuality within divine being. Those protesting such a situation would be correct in
criticizing the loss of human subjectivity within divine sovereignty. But Augustine, in
his conversion, learns to put on Christ in Christ’s humanity. This humanity of Christ is
not in opposition to Augustine’s humanity but the fulfillment of it. Only in putting on
Christ can Augustine’s humanity be reformed or converted to its true purpose. And
through this conversion true freedom of the will is regained. On the other hand, if this
willing of Christ’s will came solely from the human side of the Incarnation then
Augustine would certainly be surrendering his will to an exterior source, substituting the
will of one material being for the will of another material being. But again, because of
the Incarnation, Christ’s humanity ought not be conceived in a strictly materialist fashion
as a competition between two material beings. Rather, the materiality of humanity is
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affirmed even while its sinful willing is denied. The conflict of will (between human
beings) or the loss of will (within divine being) only makes sense within a strictly
materialist ontology or a strictly immaterialist Platonic ontology.90 But within the
downward participation of the Word, of which all things upwardly participate, Augustine
finds his will freed. This free will remains a human will even while regaining its
freedom. The divine Word, therefore, converts humanity back to its true form by entering
into the fallen form of humanity and its history.
Conclusion
The previous section focused on the subject and its re-formation through
conversion and Christ’s role in this recreation. Admittedly, this constituted a more
theoretical discussion leaving to the side questions of society and the subject’s place
within it. More will be said in the next chapter regarding the mediation of the Son and
the type of society he institutes. But for now it will be useful to gather together the
threads concerning the Incarnation and God’s self-immanenting transcendence.
The downward participation of God in the Incarnation lends credence to
designating Augustine’s articulation of God as self-immanenting transcendence in
contrast to Hegel’s self-transcending immanence. All throughout Augustine emphasizes
the impossibility of (self-) transcending the milieu of fallen humanity, presently bound by
its past choices, forged as sinful habits. Attempts to think the subject according to its
own immanence, its own psychological resources, fails. Even the lofty heights of
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Platonism only glimpse the homeland for which humanity longs, ultimately failing to
understand the way there. For Augustine, Platonism marks the very limits of human selftranscendence, and therefore fully expresses the failure of such self-transcendence to
overcome the limitations of sinful habit and sinful humanity. Only when God
condescends to the human situation does a way open for change.
It is exactly this possibility for creating change that separates Augustine from
Hegel. Hegel could only acknowledge change in history but no longer thought it
necessary for true change to occur in modern society. Hegel’s self-transcending
immanence was meant to be the self-surpassing of human limitations through conflating
creation and fall, such that existence is ‘sinful’ in its ontological alienation from itself, all
without reference to any actual transcendence. Because there is no distinction between
creation and fall (i.e. there was no change for the worse) Hegel is unable to think change
(for the better) once he has articulated his own philosophical system. But Augustine, in
holding apart creation and fall, conceptualizes both the change to worse (bondage of the
will) and its consequent change for the better (true freedom). While the former (the fall)
was an act of sinful self-immanenting through free choice, the latter (redemption) is not
an act of self-transcending through an alternative free choice. Rather, the selfimmanenting act of humanity is only reversed through the self-immanenting act of God
in the Incarnation. Only because of God’s self-immanenting transcendence it is possible
for humanity to transcend its own sinful limitations, opening the possibility for an
alternative kind of human society.
The exact contours of this alternative society, and that to which it is a contrast,
still need to be examined. The workings of this society were alluded to above while
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discussing alternative exemplum through which Augustine’s conversion came. These
examples helped integrate the subjective and social within the process of conversion. But
as will be shown in the next chapter, it is really Christ who founds and established this
alternative society, and therefore it is Christ who is the true example of freedom. And yet
Christ is not merely an example of freedom and justice, but is also the one who gives to
humanity the ability to follow this example. The next chapter, then, will examine more
closely how God’ self-immanenting transcendence establishes an alternative society
through the mediation of Christ.
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CHAPTER 6: SOCIETY AND FREEDOM: CITY OF GOD
The just live by faith, which works by love: by that love with which a man loves God as
God ought to be loved, and his neighbor as himself.1
Introduction
Chapter five focused on the conversion of the subject as a transition from one
society to another society, held together through the self-immanenting transcendence of
the Incarnation. The Incarnation of the Word provided the means through which God reforms humanity toward freedom. Beyond the bondage of the will within fallen human
society, the converted will is a uniting of graced subject and society through the
mediation of Christ, who is both God and human. This chapter will broaden the
discussion of human society only briefly touch upon in the previous chapter. For this we
will focus on Augustine City of God.
On a superficial level the argument of City of God can be laid out rather quickly.
The antithetical relationship between the heavenly and the earthly cities stem from either
an orderly love directed toward God or a disordered love directed toward self. And yet,
within this present age (saeculum), these two cities are entangled such that one cannot
clearly distinguish the two until the final judgment. Within this entanglement each city
makes use of temporal goods creating a shared common peace. This common peace,
within this present age, secures a semi-autonomous realm for political deliberation
regarding the common good among those who hold different comprehensive doctrines.
The Rawlsian idiom ending the previous sentence signals the purpose and direction of
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such an interpretation. This type of interpretation is meant to make Augustine palatable
for contemporary political theory, allowing it to interact with modern concepts.
Although the above description is useful and concise, this chapter argues that such
a view offers an incomplete understanding of Augustine’s political thought. But more
importantly, this type of reading mutes the more pertinent aspects of Augustine’s political
theology relating to political criticism and change. By moving beyond individual
subjectivity and its conversion examined in the previous chapter, this chapter will look at
Augustine’s understanding of human society as a whole. The overall goal of this chapter
is to deepen the previous account of God’s self-immanenting transcendence, but now
focusing on society rather than subjectivity. This attention on society will focus on the
mediating activity of Christ, now centered on the factors of justice and love rather than
issues of the freedom of the will. As we will see, justice and love can only come through
the mediation of Christ who both founds and exemplifies a truly just and loving society.
Through this mediation a critical distance is created out of which a constructive social
change is possible. This chapter, then, shows the significance of God’s self-immanenting
transcendence in producing an alternative society capable of both social criticism and
constructive change, a criticism and change working toward justice and love. Through
this chapter Augustine’s understanding of God’s self-immanenting transcendence will be
shown to offer better resources for understanding social critique and change than Hegel’s
self-transcending immanence.
Reading City of God through book 19
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As with previous Augustinian themes (as with Hegel earlier), we must clear the
ground a bit concerning dominant interpretations. To this end I will fill out the above
sketch with reference to R. A. Markus’s understanding of the saeculum and Oliver
O’Donovan’s emphasis on love as the linchpin of Augustine’s political thought.
Markus sees Augustine’s mature political thought as striking a balance between a
Eusebian celebration and a Hippolytan judgment of Rome. For Eusebius, a Christian
Emperor sitting in Rome represents the unification of what was held separate during the
life of Christ and the rule of Augustus. With Constantine comes a “single harmonious
order, one Empire devoted to the worship of the one true God.”2 But to this messianic
rendering of Constantine is a Hippolytan alternative of judgment and condemnation,
fueled by past persecutions. Hippolytus poured out apocalyptic pronouncements against
Rome in the tradition of the writers of Daniel and Revelation, denouncing it as a “satanic
imitation of the kingdom of Christ.”3 Augustine, however, was wary of either total
acceptance or total rejection of these traditions. For Augustine, according to Markus,
“the Empire is not to be seen in terms either of the messianic image of the Eusebian
tradition or of the apocalyptic image of the Antichrist of the Hippolytan
tradition…[Rome] is theologically neutral.”4 For Markus, Augustine suspends Rome
between the earthly and heavenly cities, radically indeterminate in this present age (the
saeculum).5
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This is, of course, not to collapse the distinction between the earthly and heavenly
cities. They are radially dichotomous in terms of justice and love. But the polarity of
‘formal’ definition is always mixed within the ‘empirical’ situation of temporal existence.
As Augustine says, “In this world (saeculo), the two cities are indeed entangled and
mingled with one another; and they will remain so until the last judgment shall separate
them” (ciu. 1.35).6 This temporal mixture ultimately renders invisible both the earthly
and heavenly cities until the final judgment separates them, rending indeterminate any
current identification of either the earthly city with Rome and the heavenly city with the
church.7
This dual invisibility allows for an overlapping use of temporal goods even if
each ultimately orders them differently (i.e. only the heavenly city properly orders the
love of temporal things toward the eternal).8 For Augustine, the earthly city has
wrongfully restricted its concern only to “temporal peace,” the sphere of material needs
and their satisfaction through orderly social interactions. The heavenly city, on the other
hand, properly uses temporal goods as ordered toward the eternal. Regardless of their
differences, as Markus notes, “the earthly peace is of common concern to all, whether
citizens of the heavenly or the earthly cities; it is valued and ‘loved’ by both.” Markus
continues,
Augustine’s ‘positivistic’ definition of the res publica appears to have been very
carefully devised to make room for this overlap. The people constituting a res
publica are agreed in valuing certain things; they need not be agreed in valuing
them on identical scales of value, still less do they need to be agreed on the
objects upon which they set supreme value.9
6
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The bulk of Markus’ argument centers on book 19 of City of God and its replacement of
justice by love as the definition of a commonwealth, an argument introduced but not
extensively pursued in book 2. He argues that this redefinition of a res public according
to love allows for different ultimate allegiances to engage each other within a restricted
sphere of temporal goods and its earthly peace. This restricted sphere allows for the
autonomy of an inherently pluralistic state in which different motivating structures can
form coincident decisions.10 For Markus, these conceptualization all flows from
Augustine’s “understanding of the saeculum, not as a no-man’s land between the two
cities, but as their temporal life in their interwoven, perplexed, and only eschatologically
separable realities.”11 This, in nuce, is Markus’ reading of Augustine.
Oliver O’Donovan criticizes Markus for his agnosticism concerning historical
identifications of the either the earthly city (with Babylon and Rome) and the heavenly
city (Israel and the church), he questions Markus’ supposed neutrality of actual historical
communities, and complains of Markus’ over-hasty assimilation of Augustine to modern
liberalism.12 Nonetheless, O’Donovan also sees book 19 as the center of Augustine’s
political theology, with 19.24 constituting a critical turning point in Augustine’s
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thought.13 In O’Donovan’s mind, Augustine’s redefinition of a res publica around love
rather than justice allows for the possibility of understanding earthly peace without
Augustine compromising his principle that a res publica is only just when God is given
his due through right worship.14 While offering a corrective to Markus, O’Donovan
likewise perpetuates the practice of centering Augustine’s political thought on book 19
and its concerns with temporal peace and love. Both Markus and O’Donovan continue
the modern interpretation of Augustine that emphasizes eschatological ends over a
supposed natural order.15
And certainly, in agreement with Markus and O’Donovan, it is right to make love
central to Augustine’s political thought. Certainly Augustine uses love as an essential
definition of the two cities: “Two cities, then, have been created by two loves: that is, the
earthly by love of self extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly city by love
of God extending to contempt of self” (ciu. 14.28). And earlier, “In the one city, love of
God has been given pride of place, and, in the other, love of self” (ciu. 14.13). Echoing
his claim from Confessions (conf. 13.9.10), love is central to human existence because as
“the body is carried by its weight” so too “the soul is carried by its love” (ciu. 11.28),
directing the will appropriately or perversely. This emphasis on love allows Augustine to
place evil within the will rather than the objects perversely used by the will such that, for
13
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example, avarice is the effect of a disordered will rather than caused by a golden object
itself, which remains good though loved poorly (ciu. 12.8). A properly ordered love,
therefore, is ordered according to the order of being found in all created things (ciu.
15.22). With these distinctions in mind Augustine can claim that the earthly city loves
lower things (the self and the goods secured by an earthly peace) while the heavenly city
loves the higher goods (God and eternal security) (ciu. 15.4). Augustine grafts the
absolute dichotomy of loves between the two cities onto a common order of being and its
hierarchy of goods and concludes that the heavenly city uses earthly and temporal goods
as pilgrims on a journey while the earthly city uses temporal good as if they were
permanent residents (ciu. 19.17).16
These texts can be gathered and directed in such a way as to explain Augustine’s
replacement of love for justice in his definition of a res publica, with the added result of
justifying the centrality of an overlapping concern for earthly peace (temporal goods)
amid wildly divergent loves (love of self and love of God). This emphasis softens the
dichotomy between the two loves by finding a realm of overlapping interests within an
earthly peace. Marcus and O’Donovan play up the trajectory of such a reading, and as
we have seen, Eric Gregory follows by emphasizing the political virtue of properly
ordered love of God and love of neighbor.
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But these types of readings have begun to be contested as self-serving and
selective. If offering a redefinition of a res publica were the center of Augustine’s
political thought, why introduce the concept in book 2 (the definition of a res publica)
only to wait until book 19 to resolve it? And if there is a good reason for the delay, what
is missed in jumping from book 2 to 19 with hardly a comment on what lay between
(besides touching on the texts mentioned above)? And why, when Augustine is so
persistent in his critique of the earthly city, is this, one of the only concessions made
between the earthly and heavenly city (a shared earthly peace), developed into the center
of Augustine’s political thought?17 These questions raise the possibility that something is
amiss in the above approaches. In order to correct these partial readings of City of God it
is necessary not only to search Augustine’s texts for themes and topics interesting and
accessible to modern political theorists, but also to follow the threads of Augustine’s own
argument.
With the goal in mind of following Augustine’s own argument this chapter will
open with book 1 of City of God and its depiction of Rome and its lust for domination
(libido dominandi). This lust for domination expresses the essence of the earthly city and
is therefore the baseline against which the heavenly city is a contrast. With this
emphasis on the lust for domination in mind we will then turn to Augustine’s discussion
of justice in book 2. Following this will be the linking of justice and love in book 10 and
17
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17, and it mediation through Christ, the just founder of the heavenly city. Only then will
we turn to book 19 and examine how it weaves together justice and love. Throughout I
will show that Augustine has an overwhelming concern with justice, such that any
supposed forsaking of justice for love misunderstands Augustine’s intention, rendering
his political theology incomplete.
Standing on its own this chapter will attempt to correct incomplete interpretations
of Augustine’s political theology by holding together justice and love as 1) the means of
critiquing the lust for domination of the earthly city and 2) as that which directs the
change offered by the heavenly city through its earthly pilgrimage. Within part two of
this study the interpretation offered here will deepen the previous chapter’s account of
God’s self-immanenting transcendence, but now adding the factor of justice and love to
the previous transformation of will. The mediation between God and humanity in the
Son will be shown to be the key through which Augustine articulates an alternative
society capable of criticism (against the lust for domination) and change (around true
justice and love). This alternative society is the correlate of the previous chapter’s
emphasis on subjectivity, both of which are connected to the mediation of Christ. Within
the general evaluation between Augustine and Hegel, this chapter reveals the superiority
of Augustine’s understanding of God’s self-immanenting transcendence in supplying a
framework for social criticism and change when compared to Hegel’s understanding of
humanity’s self-transcending immanence.
1. The Earthly City and the Lust for Domination
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In the preface to book 1 Augustine lays out the essential themes of City of God,
even if he did not know at the time how long the work would grow.18 Augustine first
introduces the glorious city of God, referring to both its pilgrim (peregrinator) status and
as it will be in its eternal home. Augustine seeks to “defend her against those who favour
their own gods above her Founder.” Augustine then introduces his first antithesis
through the pairing of pride and humility. He says that the King and Founder of the city
of God has proclaimed a divine law that “God resisteth the proud but giveth grace unto
the humble.” This is contrasted with the words of Virgil in reference to Rome, that the
proud love to hear themselves praised with the motto: “To spare the [conquered] and
subdue the proud.”19 While God gives grace to the humble (humilibus), Rome is praised
for sparing the conquered (subiectis). And while God resists the proud (superbi), Rome
takes it upon itself to subdue the proud. In these subtle contrasts Augustine is showing
how human pride is always a perverse imitation of God (ciu. 19.12), supplanting the
grace given to the humble by God for a mere sparring of the conquered by Rome, and
18
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Rome sees itself as doing God’s work in subduing the proud.20 Only after the initial
pairing of pride and humility does Augustine finally complete his most famous antithesis
by raising the figure of the earthly city. The defining attribute of this city is that “when it
seeks [domination]” over others it “is itself [dominated] by the lust for [domination] (ipsa
ei dominandi libido dominatur).”21 As we will see, this libido dominandi is the principle
means by which Augustine critiques Roman virtue, showing that its civic virtues always
served a will to dominate others. But, as he states here and throughout, one is always
dominated by this lust for domination, always leading away from freedom and justice
toward slavery and domination.
Temporal Goods, Virtue, and Death
In book 1, instead of tracing any of these themes directly Augustine first notes
that critics of the heavenly city should praise rather than blame God because only in the
Christian churches did these critics find safety from the attaching hordes. Through a
quick survey of Greek and Roman history Augustine finds that never before have the
vanquished been spared in the halls of their own temples, but in Rome the pagans found
shelter in the churches (ciu. 1.1-7). Augustine further steals the wind from the critics’
sails when he reminds them of what every true philosopher knows, that loss of temporal
goods is no true loss for the virtuous (ciu. 1.8-14). By this Augustine places these critics
on the horns of a dilemma. Either these critics are virtuous and therefore ought not to
fear death. Or they are not virtuous because they worship false gods, but were saved by
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the true God anyway. Augustine wants to force them to choice between the failure of
their own virtue or the failure of their gods.
Augustine deepens this dilemma in 1.15 by raising before their eyes the noble
example (nobilissimum exemplum) of Marcus Regulus. Regulus, captured by the
Carthaginians, is sent back to Rome in hope of exchanging prisoners. Regulus is bound
by oath to return to Carthage if he fails in releasing the captive Carthaginians from Rome.
Regulus, however, advises the Senate not to release the prisoners, and, because of his
oath, returns to Carthage to face a miserable death. Augustine praises Regulus for his
virtue (both in advising Rome on the wisest course of action and in keeping his oath), but
draws a dual conclusion from this example. On the one hand, if Regulus thought worship
of the gods brought temporal benefit then he was sorely mistaken. The gods neither
protected him from defeat or death. On the other hand, if Regulus thought worship of the
gods brought benefit only in the next life, then Regulus would not find any fault in the
gods for his death. In either case the critics bewailing the present woes of Rome have no
argument to make. If Regulus, such a revered hero of Rome could come to such a death,
then these critics ought not complain if Rome itself dies. And if Regulus can die with his
virtue while worshipping the gods, then the same ought to be true for Rome itself.
These opening chapters, then, raise the issues of worshipping the gods for either
temporal or eternal benefit, themes that will dominate the first part of City of God, books
1-5 and 6-10 respectively. But Augustine has also introduced the issue of virtue and the
place of exemplum in moral discourse. Deepening these themes Augustine next turns to
the issue of volitional death as a mark of Roman virtue, exemplified by Lucretia and
Cato.
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Lucretia and Cato as Exempla
Augustine initially takes up the issue of honorable suicide because during the sack
of Rome women—especially certain Christian virgins—were sexually violated. Critics
mocked that God was not able to save those most dedicate to him, and added that these
women were not even virtuous enough to kill themselves in order to prove their honor, as
the great Lucretia had.22 Augustine first argues that chastity is maintained even if the
body is violated by the lust of another. Therefore a woman “has done nothing for which
she ought to punish herself with voluntary death” (ciu. 1.18) because she is innocent of
any crime. Indeed, if one of these women were to commit suicide she would be guilty of
killing an innocent person (ciu. 1.17). Augustine, seeking to put to rest the concerns of
Christian women who felt for the sake of honor they should kill themselves, sets justice
as the criteria by which he will discuss Lucretia’s death.
In 1.19 Augustine turns to Lucretia, “that noble woman of Rome,” and seeks to
draw out the inconsistencies of Roman conceptions of virtue. By the time of Augustine
the rape and suicide of Lucretia was an ancient tale told by Livy as an example of Rome
virtue. Because the story was so well known to his readers, Augustine glosses the details.
After being raped by king Tarquin, Lucretia reveals to her husband and father what
happened to her. Then, “sick with the shame of what had been done to her, and unable
to bear it, she slew herself.” Why did she kill herself? Augustine asks. It was not
because of personal guilt or sadness. Rather she killed herself as a public witness in light
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of her public shame. In Rome, suicide is a means of public honor and glory, or rather, it
is a practice of civic virtue. For example, old men, rather than becoming a burden on
society, would choose to die by closing their mouths to food as a way of maintaining
their virtue.23 Suicide was also a public act used to prove a point.24 This occurs in the
case of Lucretia. Augustine asks the question that Lucretia knew everyone would ask,
“Should she be judged an adulteress or a chaste woman?” Lucretia killed herself in order
to prove beyond all doubt her innocence and chastity, and therefore maintain her virtue.
These were the traditional terms by which Lucretia’s suicide was understood. But
Augustine shifts the question from the issue of adultery and chastity, to that of guilt and
punishment. Why, if innocent, is Lucretia punished with death? “If it was not through
any impurity on her part that she was taken against her will, then it was no justice by
which, being innocent, she was punished.” Augustine raises the issue of justice in light
of the violence suffered. If Lucretia had suffered violence, how is it an act of justice that
she would now be punished when she is innocent? If she punishes the innocent (herself)
unjustly then she is a murderer. But if she is not unjustly punished then she must have
been an adulteress. The situation reduces to a simple dilemma:
If she is acquitted of murder, she is convicted of adultery; and if she is acquitted
of adultery, then she is convicted of murder. It is not possible to find a way out of
this dilemma. One can only ask: If she was an adulteress, why is she praised? If
she was pure, why was she slain.
Augustine, moving from a classical understanding of Lucretia death based in issues of
chastity and honor, redefines the issue according to justice. In setting up this dilemma
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Augustine seeks to show the inconsistencies of Roman virtue in which the pursuit of
honor is at odds with the practice of justice.
Augustine, however, does not end by noting inconsistencies. He instead seeks to
move below the symptoms to the underlying disease. Below the issues of adultery or
chastity, of guilt or innocence, Augustine suggests that Lucretia’s true motivation was not
based in the strength of purity but the weakness of shame, a weakness springing from the
love of praise.
Being a Roman lady excessively eager for praise, she feared that if she remained
alive, she would be thought to have enjoyed suffering the violence that she had
suffered when she lived. Hence, she judged that she must use self-punishment to
exhibit the state of her mind to the eyes of men to whom she could not show her
conscience. She blushed, indeed, to think that, if she were to bear patiently the
infamy that another had inflicted upon her, she would be believed to have been an
accomplice to it. (ciu. 1.19)
Rather than seek approval from the eyes of God who sees the purity of conscience and
chastity (as Christian women are commended to do), Lucretia loved the praise of others
and force them to see the contents of her mind through the corpse of her body. Augustine
claims this is a weakness based in shame rather than a principled commitment to purity, a
weakness that cannot bear the foolish opinions of others but would rather dominate their
praise (ciu. 1.22).
For Augustine this weakness of shame growing from the love of praise is rooted
in a more sinister soil. In book 5 he examines this more closely. There Augustine claims
that Rome expanded because they loved praise and glory and died for it, deeming it best
to either die in glorious battle or live in freedom. He explains that
they suppressed all other desires in their boundless desire for this one thing. In
short, because they deemed it ignoble for their fatherland to serve and glorious for
it to rule and command (dominari), the first object of all their desire was freedom
(liberam), and the second mastery (dominam). (ciu. 5.12)
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Rome thought it inglorious to serve and desired freedom instead. Overcoming its more
base desires because of its thirst for praise and glory, Rome became a great empire. But
Augustine contends that this desire for glory and freedom merely masked Rome’s deepest
desire. For “once they had achieved freedom (libertas), however, so great a desire for
glory then arose that liberty (libertas) seemed to them too little by itself, unless they also
sought domination (dominatio) over others” (ciu. 5.12). Roman moralists like Livy claim
that this desire for glory overcomes a lust for mastery and represents the moral progress
of the Romans. But Augustine shows that desire for glory only masks the dark soil of
domination.25 As Brian Harding says, the difference between the love of glory and the
lust for domination “is not one of goals, but of methods and appearances.”26 According
to the lights of the earthly city, love of praise and glory produce a certain level of virtue,
keeping in check outright wickedness. But for Augustine both are vices rooted in and
expressing the will to dominate inaugurated by Romulus’ murder of Remus (ciu. 3.6).
For Augustine, a truly virtuous person would not need love of praise to curb a lust for
domination. Indeed, a virtuous person despises the glory of others and instead rests in the
judgment of God (ciu. 5.14, 19).
With this critique in mind we can return to the example of Lucretia, of which the
Romans held as a matron of virtue and Augustine handed over as a mistress of vice.
Rather than exhibiting the virtue of chastity and honor, by explaining her suicide as an act
of weakness compelled by love of praise, Augustine is insinuating that rather than be a
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slave to the opinions of others Lucretia desired to master their opinions by dominating
her own body. As Harding suggests, “This desire turns the blade against Lucretia, her
libido dominandi dominates her causing her for the sake of honour to slay herself.”27 By
exchanging interpretive frameworks, Augustine has transformed Lucretia from an
example of Roman virtue into an example of what Augustine had noted in the preface of
book 1, that those given over to the lust for domination are in turn dominated by it.
To similar effect, in 1.23, Augustine raises the death of Cato as an example not of
the virtue of conscience but the vice of domination. Cato kills himself at Utica after
Caesar effectively ends the Republic. Cato’s suicide is held up as a valiant example of
individual liberty and patriotic commitment to the Republic against Caesar’ domination.
But Augustine finds in Cato another example of the contradictions of Roman virtue
masking its libido dominandi. Augustine wonders why, if death is preferable to life
under Caesar’s rule, Cato would not also compel his son to die with him. Would not a
father’s sword have redeemed his son from such a disgrace? Instead of being rooted in
the love of liberty or the glory of Rome, Augustine suggests that “although Cato greatly
loved his son, who he hoped and wished would be spared by Caesar, still more greatly
did he hate…to give Caesar the glory of pardoning himself.” As with all of Rome before
him, Cato hated the idea of serving another rather than ruling, and could not live under
the mercy of Caesar. Again concurring with Harding, Cato
dominates himself because he can no longer dominate anything else; in this
suicide the repressed brutality of Romulus again returns to the surface pushing
aside its mask of glory…[Cato] makes himself into a Roman hero like Romulus
by treating his body as Remus.”28
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Cato, in his pride, is dominated by the lust for domination, leading toward death rather
than life.
In typical rhetorical fashion, Augustine has mined ancient exempla for a
contemporary purpose. Augustine has twisted these examples to make a polemical point
against his critics and their own perceived virtue. As Augustine noted in the preface, it is
the nature of the earthly city to attempt to subdue the proud and in the process end by
being dominated by this very lust for domination. Lucretia and Cato perfectly exemplify
the perverse virtue of Rome causing it to celebrate those people whose pride compels
them to subdue themselves. The suicides of Lucretia and Cato reveal the self-subjection
of the proud, motivated by a love of praise and glory, of which Augustine reveals to be
merely a mask for a libido dominandi. It is for these reasons that Augustine claims that
Rome has developed the libido dominandi in its purest form (ciu. 1.30), cleverly veiled as
a desire for glory.29 Lucretia and Cato, therefore, are not examples mobilizing a
commitment to virtue, offering resources for positive change from a less virtuous to a
more virtuous society. Rather they capitulate to and therefore continue the oppressive
Roman practice of dominating the subjected.
Depths Of Domination
This purest form of domination, praise of glory ending in self-destruction, is the
result of sin and its bondage. God “did not intend that His rational creature, made in His
own image, should have lordship (dominari) over any but the irrational creatures: not
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man over man, but man over the beasts…The first cause of servitude, therefore, is sin”
(ciu. 19.15). Seeking dominion over others, for Augustine, is the result and punishment
of sin. And in the process of seeking to rule over others each is ruled by sin. For this
reason Augustine argues that the harshest form of domination is not experiences from the
hands of others but comes from the lust for domination itself (libido ipsa dominandi)
(ciu. 19.15). By this Augustine repeats the preface to book 1, that when the earthly city
seeks to dominate over others it is itself dominated by this lust.
This lust for domination seeks not only the servitude of fellow humans but also
the gods as well. This is Cain’s sin, the founder of the first earthly city and the first
example (primo exemplo) or archetype of Rome (ciu. 15.5). Cain sought not to serve
God in his sacrifice but that through his sacrifice God would serve him. For “this is the
way of the earthly city: to worship a god or gods so that, with their aid, that city may
reign in victory and earthly peace, not by the counsel of charity, but with lust for
[domination] (dominandi cupiditate)” (ciu. 15.7). Here we should note that Augustine
connects “earthly peace” with “lust for domination” in a manner that should give pause to
over hasty celebrations of earthly peace and its common use by the earthly and heavenly
cities. After the irenic statements in 15.4 concerning the earthly city and it loving lesser
goods comes these darker consequences in 15.5 and 15.7. Earthly peace is still
compelled by domination, a domination not exhausted by the cessation of war (for it must
be remembered that Cain and Abel were not at war when Cain murdered his brother).
Indeed, even peace is not enough for the libido dominandi because it cannot bare
sharing the glory of such a peace. It is for this reason that Romulus killed Remus,
because as co-founders of Rome the glory of the accomplishment was shared between
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them. But “in order that one of them should wield entire mastery (totam dominationem),
his colleague was removed” (ciu. 15.5). As Augustine notes, unlike goodness that can be
shared without diminishment, glory is always lessened when divided among equals. It is
for this reason the earthly city is always divided against itself. While goodness is noncompetitive, glory always divides in seeking total dominion. In these ways, therefore, the
libido dominandi seeks dominion over humanity and the gods and it will suffer no rivals.
Lucretia and Cato are examples of such domination in turning against themselves in order
to master others. Rather than being virtuous examples meant to spur on just deeds they
are examples of vice perpetuating injustice. Throughout book 1, then, Augustine weaves
a polemic against a Roman pride that end in the death of the innocent.
2. Justice and Res Publica
Now, at first glance it might seem that the above analysis of book one only
strengthens those approaches that would place love at the center of Augustine’s political
theology. The libido dominandi of the earthly city is merely the negative correlate of the
properly ordered love of the heavenly city. And certainly this is true. But to move from
libido dominandi to properly ordered love moves too quickly and ignores the issues of
virtue and justice that Augustine weaves into his critique of Rome. In book 1 Augustine
does not directly connect love of self with the formation of the libido dominandi, but
rather connects it with the false virtues exemplified by Lucretia and Cato. Here
Augustine is practicing a theological critique located in concerns of justice rather than
that of love. When moving from the first to the second book of City of God we see this
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concerned for justice explicitly raised. And seeing this will help reveal the intimate link
between justice and love that Augustine forges throughout City of God.
The Justice of Gods and Romans
It is interesting to note that while Augustine’s stated purpose for book 2 is to
show that Rome suffered many calamities under their gods before Christ was born (2.3).
He begins by pointing out that the gods never provided Rome with just laws for upright
living (2.4, 2.6, 2.16). Rather than giving Rome laws directed toward justice the gods are
instead examples of indecency and perversion. Their public rites are more obscene than
what anyone would permit to be done in private. And the Romans tacitly knew it was
better not to emulate their gods because they passed laws forbidding performers of such
indecent rites from holding public office, and they forbid that the slanderous remarks
directed toward the gods should ever be made of fellow countrymen. In these ways they
showed more concern for themselves than their gods, an inconsistency Augustine is
careful to exploit (ciu. 2.8-16).
But, Augustine wonders, “perhaps the divine beings saw no need to appoint laws
for the Roman people because, as Sallust says, ‘justice and goodness prevailed among
them as much by nature as by law’” (ciu. 2.17). Against such a boastful claim, Augustine
mercilessly recites all the ‘just and good’ deeds of the Romans, beginning with the rape
of the Sabine women and the slaughter of their fathers and ending with the exile of the
celebrated Roman general Marcus Camillus, disparaged and disgraced because of the
envy of others. Between these Augustine gives faint praise to the Romans who, although
making Romulus a god, at least passed laws forbidding the emulation of his deeds.
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Augustine shows that Rome had fallen from the heights of such “justice and goodness”
well before the time of Christ (ciu. 2.18-20). If Rome has become corrupt, Augustine
shows that it had become so before Christianity began to have influence within the
empire. Throughout these chapters Augustine shows that the Roman gods neither
promoted nor exemplified justice, and the Romans themselves neither loved nor practiced
justice. Only after Augustine had dismissed the justice of the gods and the nature of the
people does he then turn to Cicero’s much discussed definition of a res publica.
A Res Publica of Justice
If justice is not secured through the gods by example or decree, or by the natural
propensity of the Romans, then perhaps it is constructed through common agreement. In
2.21 Augustine shifts from historical description to philosophical definition, drawing on
Cicero. Augustine cites the lines of Scipio through whom Cicero declares that like the
harmony established by musicians, common agreement within a city must be established
by justice, allowing for the ‘property of the people’, or commonwealth, to be secured. If
the common property of the people is violated by unjust rule (either by king, council, or
all the people itself), then the res publica is not merely flawed, but ceases to exist.
Within Cicero’s dialogue it is shown that this definition of a res publica is superior to
others because it applies to all modes of governance: monarchy, republic, and democracy.
From here commentators often skip to Augustine’s claim that not only had Rome
ceased to be a commonwealth because it had strayed from justice, but that it had never
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been a commonwealth because it never practiced true justice.30 But before we ask about
the nature of this ‘true justice’ mentioned at the end of 2.21 we must examine more
closely the long quote added from book 5 of De republica in which Cicero laments the
present state of Rome. More than just using Cicero to indict Rome’s moral degradation
in general, Augustine utilizes Cicero in accusing the ‘great men’ who were supposed to
uphold the traditions and mores of Rome. “And what shall I say of our men?” declares
Cicero,
For morals have perished from the want of great men; and we must not only be
held accountable for so great an evil; we must indeed, plead our cause as though
charged with a capital offense. For it is because of our vices, and not through any
mischance, that we now retain only the name of the commonwealth that we long
ago lost in fact.31
As Robert Dodaro has argued, this passage and the previous passage from Cicero
comparing the harmony of musicians to the common agreement of a res publica refer to
the function of the statesmen in promoting justice within the commonwealth.32 Cicero
laments not the failure of justice in general, but the specific failure of just statesmen to
promote justice within the res publica. It is against this failure that Augustine claims that
true justice only exists in the commonwealth founded and ruled by Christ (ciu. 2.21). In
book 2, then, neither the gods, nor the innate justice and goodness of the Romans, nor the
justice of the statesmen have secured Rome in its virtue or justice. Rome could not secure
this justice because true justice only comes through Christ as the founder of the just
society. This appeal to Christ is not one step on the way toward abandoning justice for a
broader conception of love as the definition of a res publica found in book 19. Rather
30
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Augustine is slowly laying the foundation for understanding the essential differences
between the heavenly and the earthly cities based in justice.
3. Justice, Love, and Sacrifice
Throughout the previous two sections we have first traced how Rome is
dominated by the libido dominandi, using the desire for praise and glory to mask its more
base desire to rule over others. Then we examined the question of justice and the Roman
res publica, seeing how Augustine claimed that only true justice resides in the city of
God founded and ruled by Christ. The persistence of the libido dominandi and its
consequent injustice is caused both by the worship of false gods and the sinfulness of
humanity, exemplified by Rome but applicable to all societies.33 And while we examined
how Augustine uses Cicero’s definition of a res publica according to justice, we have not
defined justice as Augustine sees it.
To understand the centrality of justice, and by way of introducing the related
themes of love and sacrifice, let us refer to a statement in 19.23. Here Augustine says,
Justice is found where the one supreme God rules an obedient City according to
His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him…In that City, both the individual
just man and the community and people of the just live by faith, which works by
love: by that love with which a man loves God as God ought to be loved, and his
neighbor as himself.
It is essential to understand this constellation of concepts here in 19.23 before moving on
to the more famous 19.24 and its “objects of love” definition of a res publica. The proper
questions to be asked are not, What is justice and what is this ordered love? Rather the
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proper questions is, How does justice comes about and how is love properly ordered?34
To do this we must inquire into the close connection between justice, love, and sacrifice.
We will first do this by examining love and sacrifice in book 10, followed by observing
how Christ is both “just and justifying” in book 17. Both will deepen the previous
chapter’s account of God’s self-immanenting transcendence as a means toward
conversion, but now adding the factor of justice and love to the previous transformation
of will, all mediated through Christ.
From Justice to Love
Augustine subscribes to the classical notion that justice is giving each his due
(ciu. 19.4).35 Connected to God this means to worship and serve God alone, for
justice is that virtue which gives to each his due. What kind of justice is it, then,
that takes a man away from the true God and subjects him to impure demons? Is
this giving to each his due?...What justice can we suppose there to be in a man
who does not serve God?” (ciu. 19.21)
But what does it mean to serve God and thereby give God God’s due? Book 10 gives us
an answer to this question in reference to worship, but in a way we might not expect.
Worship is how we give to God what is God’s due through service (latreia) (ciu.
10.1), a service “expressed through certain sacraments or performed within our own
selves” (ciu. 10.3).36 But in performing this service we learn to cling to God who is our
highest good, a clinging accomplished through love expressed as the fulfillment of the
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dual love commands: love God and love your neighbor. This practice of love “is worship
of God” for “this is true religion; this is right piety; this is the service which is due to God
alone” (ciu. 10.3). Through the service of love for God and others, Augustine transforms
the classical notions of justice by linking it to love, a transformation informed by Roman
13:8 in which we are commanded to fulfill the debt of love to each other.37
Augustine, however, does not leave the connection between love and worship
unexplored, instead asking more specifically about the service due to God. Augustine
centers on the practice of offering sacrifices because “it is certain, and no man would
venture to deny it, that sacrifice is due only to God,” a practice Augustine sees
established by Cain and Abel (ciu. 10.4). But it is around the concept of sacrifice that
Augustine’s doctrine of God begins to transform the categories of religious devotion. For
“who would be so foolish as to suppose that the things offered to God in sacrifice are
necessary to Him for some purposes of His own?” asks Augustine (ciu. 10.5). Instead of
being for God, sacrifices are required for our own benefit. God desires not our sacrifice
per se, but that in and through them we might draw near to God. For “we are to
understand these things simply as symbols of what we are to do now for the purpose of
drawing near to God and helping our neighbor to do the same” (ciu. 10.5). Illustrating
from the psalms and prophets, Augustine concludes that the true, invisible sacrifice God
requires is a contrite heart leading to acts of mercy. Because mercy borne from contrition
is the true sacrifice owed to God Augustine concludes that “all commandments, therefore,
which we read concerning the many kinds of sacrifice offered in the ministry of the
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tabernacle or the temple, are to be interpreted symbolically, as referring to love of God
and neighbour.”
Moving from here to Romans 12:1-6, Augustine discusses Paul’s exhortation that
everyone offer themselves as living sacrifices in true humility. But how is such a true
sacrifice possible for those dominated by self-love, unable to will the good will of God?
In an elegant passage bringing together several themes Augustine relates our sacrifice to
the true sacrifice of Christ:
Since, therefore, true sacrifices are works of mercy shown to ourselves and to our
neighbours, and done with reference to God; and since works of mercy have no
object other than to set us free from misery and thereby make us blessed; and
since this cannot be done other than through that good of which it is said, ‘It is
good for me to be very near to God’: it surely follows that the whole of the
redeemed City—that is, the congregation and fellowship of the saints—is offered
to God as a universal sacrifice for us through the great High Priest Who, in His
Passion, offered even Himself for us in the form of a servant, so that we might be
the body of so great a Head. For it was this form that He offered, and in it that He
was offered, because it is according to it that He is our Mediator. (ciu. 10.6)
Central to this passage is the fact that Christ is the mediator because of his being in the
form of a servant (recalling Philippians 2:6-11). In his human weakness, participating in
our “coat of skin” (conf. 7.18.24), Christ is our mediator. Augustine elaborates in 10.20,
saying,
The man Jesus Christ, became the Mediator between God and man by taking the
form of a servant. In the form of God, He receives sacrifice together with the
Father, with Whom He is one God. In the form of a servant, however, He chose
to be a sacrifice Himself…Thus, He is both priest who offers and the sacrifice
which is offered.
Here Augustine appeals to the dual nature of Christ, that in the form of God he receives
sacrifices while in the form of a servant, of humanity, he offers sacrifice to God. In his
humanity, in the proper humility expected of humanity but lost in the pride of the fall,
Christ offers the only true sacrifice due to God.
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Augustine is giving content to what he only alluded to in book 10 of his
Confessions. It is not just that God took on the form of humanity that humanity might be
re-formed, but Christ took on the form of a servant in order to render to God what is due
to God in true sacrifice. As he says in 10.6, in the Passion of Christ this true sacrifice is
offered and through this offering the redeemed city is also offered to God. The sacrifice
that the faithful make to God is in reality the sacrifice that Christ made to God on behalf
of humanity. The redeemed city participates in this sacrifice through the continual
celebration of the Eucharist “by which she demonstrates that she herself is offered in the
offering that she makes to God” (ciu. 10.6). Because it is Christ who offers the true
sacrifice to God Christians know that their ability for such an act (which is really the act
of love) does not come from themselves but from God. As Dodaro indicates, in
celebrating the Eucharist Christians “should recognize that the source of their virtue is
found not in themselves, but in Christ. By adopting this perspective, they too assume the
‘form of a servant’, and in imitation of Christ, do not grasp at equality with God.”38 The
Incarnation, then, is not merely an expression of the unity of God and humanity making
possible the unity of love of God and love of neighbor, a position Gregory stakes out.
Rather the Incarnation effects the mediation of Christ through who comes the ability to
properly love at all.
In taking up this form, Christ gives to God what is God’s due through love for
God and neighbor. This is possible because the “Son of God, remaining immutable in
himself, put on humanity and bestowed upon mankind the spirit of His love through the
mediation of a Man” (ciu. 10.29). This bestowing of the spirit of love through the
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incarnation, perfectly expressed in his sacrifice, is that grace by which one can love God
and love neighbor as one’s self. Ultimately this is a Trinitarian process of love in which
humanity is caught up, reordering our loves of self toward love of God and neighbor.39
But we need to note how in the mediation of Christ we again see God’s selfimmanenting transcendence. God in Christ enters the human situation to do for humanity
what it could not do for itself. Through the Incarnation, here specifically in death, Christ
fulfills the dual love commands thereby rendering to God what is due to God. God in
Christ does this because humanity on its own could not give God God’s due because of
the bondage of its own will to its libido dominandi. Of this self-immanenting
transcendence Augustine says that God
established and founded this faith, that man might find a way to man’s God
through God made man. For this is ‘the Mediator between God and man: the man
Christ Jesus’. For it is as man that He is the Mediator and the Way. (ciu. 11.2)40
Christ, as mediator between God and humanity because he is both God and human, offers
on behalf of humanity the perfect sacrifice due to God. According to this sacrifice justice
and love come to humanity and are returned to God, a justice and love not possible for
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humanity according to its own will or effort. Augustine, however, has more to say
concerning the salvific effects of Christ’s life and death. And for this we will turn to 17.4
and its account concerning Christ’s mediation of justice.
The Just and Justifier
The connection between love and sacrifice united in Christ is strengthened when
we return to the theme of justice. Why is Christ’s sacrifice effective for humanity?
Christ’s death is effective because Christ is the only truly just person who also justifies,
overcoming the ignorance and weakness of sin.
Augustine argues for the mediation of justice through Jesus by considering
Hannah’s song in 17.4. This song is not merely “the words of a little woman giving
thanks for the birth of her son,” but is rather “the Christian religion itself, the City of God
itself, whose King and Founder is Christ.” Referring to the city of God and Christ as its
founder and king (conditor et rex) echoes the expression from 2.21 that true justice is
only found in the city whose founder and rule (conditor rectorque) is Christ.41 It must be
remembered that in 2.21 the issue was not justice in general, but the example of justice
given by the statesmen. Continuing in 17.4 Augustine says, “Through her, indeed, there
speaks, by the spirit of prophecy, the grace of God itself, from which the proud are
estranged so that they fall, and by which the humble are filled so that they rise.” This
falling of the proud and rising of the humble echoes the essential dichotomy between the
two cities introduced in the preface to book 1. Fundamentally, the adversaries of the city
of God, here named as Babylon, “presume upon their own strength and glory in
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themselves and not in the Lord…In their pride, they believe that they can please God by
their own strength, and that they do not need the help of God.” They are “‘ignorant of
God’s righteousness’ (Dei iustitiam) (that is, of that which God, Who alone is just and
justifies us (iustus atque iustificans), gives to men).”42 Against pagan and Pelagian
accounts of virtue in which moral strength is found within ourselves, Augustine claims
that true virtue leading to true justice only comes from Christ who is just and also
justifies. Christ, the just one, is the true exemplum of justice lacking in a world
dominated by examples of pride and injustice (especially those masked as virtue like
Lucretia and Cato). Christ acts as the true example of justice because when he took on
human nature he remained righteous, not becoming sinful (sed iusta, non peccatrix erat),
so that by this Christ might show “that it is sin which is evil, and not the substance or
nature of flesh” (ciu. 10.24).
In addition to being an example of justice, Christ also justifies the sinner in his
death such that the weakness and penalty of sin is overcome (ciu. 20.6). Justifying the
sinner liberates the will from bondage caused by sin, overcoming not only ignorance but
also moral weakness (the weakness seen in Lucretia bound to her libido dominandi). In
Christ’s death humanity is able to see that death—as the penalty for sin, a penalty paid by
Christ—should not be avoided nor sought out sinfully. The penalty of sin is paid and the
weakness of will caused by bondage to sin is broken in Christ’s death. By breaking the
bondage of sin Christ is able to establish a truly just community: he enables its citizens to
act justly, free from the fear of death and the bonds of sinful habit. Dodaro states this
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concisely: “As a truly just man, Christ offers the only perfect example of justice that can
cure ignorance, while as the God-man he offers the grace by which the soul is enabled to
understand and imitate his example.”43 Augustine frames Christ as the true statesmen
who establishes and promotes justice by means of providing an adequate example (as
just) and by providing the ability for following such an example (as justifier).
Whereas in book 10 Augustine spoke of Christ’s mediation through his sacrifice,
connecting worship and love, here in book 17 we see that “Christ alone mediates justice
because he alone is truly just, while he also justifies human beings, thereby uniting them
with himself to form the only just society.”44 The creation of this just society is the goal
of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, who mediates the true sacrifice to God as the
just and justifying one. In offering himself as a sacrifice Christ gives to God what is
God’s due, the true act of justice. Only in acting justly toward God can one secure a just
society, for if one acts unjustly toward God then all else will fall into injustice and
disorder. It is for this reason that the true worship of God, secured only in the city of
God, is the basis for justice (ciu. 19.24). This justice, it should be remembered, is
reversible with love for God and others, such that giving God justice through Christ is the
only means by which love is secured for others.
Justice as giving to each person their due; worship as sacrificing to God what is
due to God; love as the truth of which sacrifices are the symbol: these are all wrapped
together and made possible by the priestly mediation of Christ who is the perfect
statesmen as both just and justifier. It is only within this configuration of concepts that
43
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we can understand Augustine’s summary statement in 19.23, noted at the opening of this
section:
Justice is found where the one supreme God rules an obedient City according to
His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him…In that City, both the individual
just man and the community and people of the just live by faith, which works by
love: by that love with which a man loves God as God ought to be loved, and his
neighbour as himself.45
In the city of God, the just person and the just community live by faith expressing itself
as love for God and neighbor. This love is a fulfillment of justice in giving God God’s
due, a giving that humanity is unable to give except as given through Christ, the mediator
between God and humanity. Christ, then, is the mediator of both love and justice in that
true justice is love and true love is just. This mediation springs from God’s selfimmanenting transcendence in the Incarnation in which the immutable partakes of the
mutable, the immortal the mortal, so as to exemplify and offer love and justice to
humanity (ciu. 9.17). This mediation of justice and love overcomes the libido dominandi
enslaving humanity, coming from beyond in humility to reverse the immanence of selfloving pride.
4. Love and the World
Having now outlined Augustine’s political theology according to the destructive
libido dominandi in general, and Rome’s perfection of masking it with glory, and by
45
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understanding Augustine’s continuing commitment to justice as love for God and
neighbor mediated through the Incarnation, we must answer an objection, or rather, the
fundamental objection, raised against adopting this exposition of God’s self-immanenting
transcendence.
This objection asks, does not such a strong linking of justice and love to the
worship of God exactly promote the problem of otherworldly detachment for which
Hegel offers an alternative? Does not anchoring justice and love in God precisely divert
adherents from the needs and concerns of justice and love in this world while passively
travelling beyond? If justice is not so easily separated from love, if Augustine’s
replacement of a love for justice as a definition of a res public in 19.24 is as much ironic
concession as positive proposal,46 then is not earthly peace lost as a possible platform on
which to build a Christian concern for the world? Without such a foundation is not
Augustinian political theory apt to drift into otherworldly escapism? And if so, then does
not the critical apparatus constructed by contrasting the libido dominandi with true justice
and love fail to change the world even if it can critique it? It is these types of objections
that prompt people like Markus and O’Donovan to read Augustine as replacing justice for
love so as to ensure a minimal discourse around worldly peace. And lastly, if these types
of objections are true then at best Augustine fails to promote freedom here and now, and
at the worst he positively inhibits freedom under the guise of a freedom to come in a
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world beyond. As Hegel would ask, is not such other-determined freedom exactly not
freedom?47
The lineaments of a response to such objections should already be well within
view. But answering such an objection will farther clarify the need for adopting the
theological orientation of God’s self-immanenting transcendence as the basis not only for
political criticism, but also constructive change. To answer this objection we will look at
the pilgrim distance and the pilgrim love of the city of God.
Pilgrim Distance
To answer the otherworldly objection we must return to a concept that will at first
seem only to exacerbate the problem. This is the idea that the city of God is a pilgrim
city, a city journeying through this world. This aspect of the city of God was announced
in the preface to book 1: The city of God both dwells “by faith as a pilgrim” and “in the
security of that eternal home which she now patiently awaits.” This is the eschatological
tension within the city of God in which a part of humanity sojourns toward the eternal
security already experienced by the unfallen angels.48 Citizens of the city of God are
those “awaiting a heavenly fatherland (supernam patriam) with true faith” and “know
that they are pilgrims (peregrinos) even in their own habitations” (ciu. 1.15).49 This
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world is not home for the citizens of the city of God. They travel toward their true
homeland beyond this mortal life.
Turning back to Cain and Able, the archetypes of the struggle between the two
cities, we can begin to see the political edge of such a distinction. In 15.1 Augustine
reminds us that the history of the two cities “extends throughout the whole of this time or
age (saeculum)” of mortal living and dying. It is within this time that “Cain founded a
city, whereas Abel, a pilgrim (peregrinus), did not found one.” The earthly city, “which
is not a pilgrim (non peregrinantem) in this world, but which finds its rest in its own
temporal peace and felicity (temporali pace ac felicitate)” (ciu. 15.17), makes its home in
this world and puts its trusts in it rather than hoping in God (ciu. 15.21). More
specifically, the city of God learns, as a pilgrim on earth (peregrinator in terris), that
it should not trust the freedom of its own will (libertate arbitrii), but should ‘hope
to call upon the name of the Lord God.’ For the will which is present in man’s
nature can fall away from good to do evil; and it does this through its own free
choice (libero arbitrio)…It can also turn away from evil to do good; but it cannot
do this without divine aid. (ciu. 15.21)
This passage links the distinction between the earthly and heavenly cities to the previous
discussion of the divided will that fell into bondage by its own free choice and is unable
to liberate itself by the same free choice. The earthly city, through its own free choice, is
bound in the unfreedom of the libido dominandi. These comments on the will return to
the argument from the previous chapter.
But Augustine’s main concern here lies not with the ability of the will to enslave
itself, but the nature of this enslavement and its effects on earthly societies. Earlier we
looked at book 15 concerning the depths of the libido dominandi. In 15.5 Augustine
reminds us that not only is Cain the founder of the first earthly city, but this city was
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founded on a fratricide in the slaying of Abel. This fratricide is repeated by Romulus in
the slaying of Remus because the glory of Rome could not be shared. This founding
event (inaugurated by Cain and repeated by Romulus) exemplifies the libido dominandi
seeking domination over others. The founding of the earthly city and its competition of
goods (the praise of others as a means toward self-love) destines the earthly city to be
always “divided against itself,” while the citizens of the heavenly city “cannot strive
among themselves” (ciu. 15.5) in seeking the good. The earthly city is always divided
against itself, even in times of peace, because the glory sought is always unsharable and
therefore competitive. The goodness that is loved among the citizens of the heavenly
city, however, “is a possession which is enjoyed more fully in proportion to the concord
that exists between partners united in charity” (ciu. 15.5).
That the heavenly city is based in non-competitive goodness and love should not,
however, lead to a triumphant perfectionism. Augustine stipulates later in 15.5 that while
on their pilgrim way towards perfection, mortal citizens of the heavenly city have not yet
attained this perfection of goodness and love. This lack of attainment causes strife within
each citizen and between citizens of the heavenly city (ciu. 15.5). For this reason
Augustine claims that righteousness or justice “is in this life such that it consists only in
the remission of sin rather than the perfection of virtue,” such that pilgrims on the way to
their homeland are always begging for forgiveness rather than demanding perfection (ciu.
19.27). This “contrite heart, humble in penitence” (ciu. 10.5) leads us precisely back to
book 10 and its discussion of sacrifice, love, and justice. The way of justice in this world
always begins with a penitent heart for its lack of love, and always ends with love of God
and love of neighbor. In a sense, each makes up the two-step process of walking forward
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on the pilgrim journey, first repenting and then loving. But neither step is possible, the
penance for self-love and the action of God- and neighbor-love, outside the mediation of
Christ who founds the true city in justice and love.
This love creates the distance necessary to criticize the libido dominandi
dominating the earthly city. It is exactly because of this pilgrim status that Augustine is
able to deftly analyze the false virtues of the earthly city and unmask its libido
dominandi. And as we have seen, while this pilgrim distance from the earthly city
springs from Augustine’s ontology (the natural order of being and desire), it is
fundamentally practiced through his soteriology (the re-ordering of desire).50 This
soteriology focuses on the mediation of justice and love in Christ as the self-immanenting
transcendence of God. The otherworldly God creates the possibility of critique within
this world through the mediation of Christ. This is a critique offered against the
dominating practices of the earthly city.
In offering this critical distance Augustine gives us something that Hegel could
not provide. As we saw in chapter 3 above, Hegel’s self-transcending immanence could
not provide a critical distance from which to move from a worse to better society (or for
Hegel, a more free society). A lack of critical distance is caused by uniting subject and
society in such a strong manner that fundamental change was no longer necessary within
Hegel’s system. This denial of change could not hold leading to the current
50

Of course I am not trying to pit Augustine’s ontology against his soteriology. As I
showed in the last chapter, they are intimately connected as creation and re-creation. But
when considering Augustine’s political theology and the ordering of desire the emphasis
must lay in the soteriological re-ordering of desire through the mediation of Christ. This
emphasis is lacking in Eric Gregory in his persistent emphasis on the ontological ordering
between love of God and neighbor without adequately investigating the soteriological
moments of mediation and change. Here I am emphasizing the soteriological how rather
than the ontological what.

279
interpretations between Pippin and Žižk. Pippin represents the Hegelianism of communal
practices and social normativity. Because there is no space outside of this social
normativity Pippin ends up foreclosing a subjectivity capable of true social change.
Pippin does this for the same reasons as Hegel: namely, that modernity no longer needs a
fundamental transformation, only continual piece-meal evolutions within a progressive
social normativity. Indeed, Pippin excludes the very possibility of an alternative society
into which one might transform.
Augustine, however, has made this transformation fundamental to his thought on
the will in particular and society in general. It is never the case that there is only one will
or one society that is under consideration. There are always two: either the fallen will
and its bondage to sin or the graced will and its regained freedom; either the earthly city
and its libido dominandi or the heavenly city and its love of God and neighbor. A
movement between two real alternatives is excluded by Hegel’s self-transcending
immanence where there is no real transition or change beyond the circle of immanence
where creation is coterminous with fall. Augustine, in affirming the necessity of creation
and the contingency of fall is able to hold the two in tension and, through God’s selfimmanenting transcendence, show how a transition between the two is possible. This
movement between two (two wills and two societies) is that through which a critical
distance is opened.
Pilgrim Love
But this critical distance is hardly the only benefit of the pilgrim status of the
heavenly city. It certainly is not Augustine’s emphasis. Rather, this pilgrim status
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enables citizens of the heavenly city to live in charity with one another in a noncompetitive and therefore non-dominating manner. We already noted this noncompetitiveness in book 15, but we can also see it in turning to book 19. In 19.14
Augustine gives an example of how a pilgrim citizen lives in charity rather than
domination. After discussing how irrational animals and rational souls desire peace,
Augustine turns to the dual love commands to show in what way peace is achieved within
human community. Each individual, in loving God and ones neighbor as oneself, will
then
be at peace with all men as far as in him lies: there will be that peace among men
which consists in well-ordered concord. And the order of this concord is, first
that a man should harm no one, and second, that he should do good to all, so far
as he can.
Here Augustine intertwines love and peace, and specifies that loving one’s neighbor
means not harming anyone and doing them good as far as possible.51 Passages like this
lend credence to interpreters like Gregory who emphasize the centrality of ordered love
for Augustine’s political theology. I affirm with Gregory that “the self that is ordered
toward God is released to love rather than grasp or posses the neighbor” because
‘for Augustine, it is not as if God and the neighbor are in competition for the
subject’s affections.’ Rather, Augustinian love aims to release the creative
generosity and receptivity that allows for genuine community.52
And I can certainly agree with how Gregory outlines this Augustinian love of neighbor as
a compassion fused with prudence, an equality expressed non-identically, all with an eye

51

Augustine describes the details of this “ordered concord” on different ontological and
social levels at the beginning of 19.13: the order between body and soul, cognition and
action, God and humanity, and within humanity (as an ordered household and an ordered
city.
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Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 329. Gregory is quoting Raymond Canning,
The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour, 12-13.
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to doing no harm.53 The non-competitive aspect of love of God and love of neighbor
makes all this possible and desirable. Only within the earthly city are God, neighbor, and
oneself in competition leading to division and domination.
By following Augustine farther in 19.14, however, we can see in which way
Gregory’s interpretation needs completing. After explaining how peace is accomplished
through the dual love commands Augustine offers an example introducing the concepts
of justice and mercy, the pilgrim city, and the libido dominandi. Augustine begins
saying, “In the household of the just man, however, who ‘lives by faith’ and now is still a
pilgrim on his way to that Heavenly City, even those who command are the servants of
those whom they seem to command.” Note that Augustine is speaking of the just man
who is a pilgrim. We know that a just person is one who has received the mediation of
justice and love through Christ, now living as a pilgrim in this life. And as one
participating in the justice and love of Christ, this just person now commands as a
servant, taking on the form of Christ’s humble service. Continuing in 19.14 Augustine
offers a contrast: “For it is not out of any desire for mastery (dominandi) that they
command; rather they do so from a dutiful concern for others; not out of pride in ruling,
but because they love mercy.” Here, in dual contrasts, Augustine alludes to the
fundamental difference between the earthly and heavenly cities. Those within the earthly
city command from a libido dominandi. But pilgrims of the heavenly city lead from an
express concern for others. The earthly city takes pride in ruling while the heavenly city
practices mercy. As we have seen in book 10, this practice of mercy through loving
others functions as the true sacrifice and is therefore a practice of justice. This practice is
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only possible through the mediation of justice and love in Christ. Only in Christ is the
dominating pride of the earthly city overcome allowing for the founding of true
community in justice and love. Only in the founding sacrifice of Christ, an act of love
and mercy for others rather than an act of domination over others, is a truly just and
loving community formed.54
The pilgrim status of the city of God, founded by Christ, does not deny or flee
from this world on its passage to the next. Rather, its pilgrim status allows for a critical
distance through which to judge the earthly city’s libido dominandi. But in addition to
this critical distance a constructive change is made possible through the mediation of
Christ. As a people entering the non-competitive practice of love, the pilgrim city reorders the structures of human society, from the household to the city and beyond.
The possibilities of critique and the practices of change flow from the pilgrim
status of the city of God. In fundamental agreement with Gregory, but attempting to push
him farther, this analysis argues that the charge of otherworldliness causing a disregard
for worldly politics should be turned on its head. Profound resources are found within a
pilgrim people for a worldly political praxis able both to protest the dominant social
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It might be objected that since I have been arguing for the convertibility of justice and
love through worship, does not my criticism of those like Gregory (and also of
O’Donovan) fall short in that while emphasizing love they were also, necessarily,
speaking of justice. If this is true, then am I not merely faulting them on matters of
emphasis rather than of substance? But the truth is that they are the ones denying the
convertibility of justice and love by driving a wedge between them in speaking explicitly
of the change from justice to love in Augustine’s definition of the commonwealth in
19.24 (for O’Donovan), or by failing to speak of justice and worship in relation to love
(for Gregory). They have done this to secure a more neutral region through which to
discuss Augustine’s political theology, but have done so at the cost of the intricate
coherence of his thought, specifically soteriology and ecclesiology.
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structures as well as the ability to practice concrete change.55 But in disagreement with
Gregory, these resources for critique and change cannot be gathered through a sustained
reflection on Augustine’s ontology of ordered love but only through his soteriology of
properly re -ordered love. This soteriology emphasizes an alternative society founded
and formed by Christ, of which Gregory all but ignores.
In offering this pilgrim love Augustine again gives us something that Hegel could
not provide. In Žižek’s hands Hegel is not bound to the perpetuation of social
normativity (i.e. Pippin’s interpretation). Rather, Žižek’s Hegel places subjectivity
beyond such social normativity as a persistent ‘tarrying with the negative.’ For Žižek, the
subject is nothing but the perpetual failure to become a subject. This perpetual failure
creates a critical distance from which one can condemn dominating social practices.
Žižek, however, has no positive account about the re-formation of human subjectivity
toward love leading his radical political subjectivity into a deadlocked space of criticism
without any orientation toward the good, love, or freedom (except the freedom of
subjective negativity). This deadlock comes from making the subject absolute, even in
its persistent failure. Žižek can only articulate the ‘subject’ beyond the status quo but
cannot articulate a ‘converted subject’ seeking the positive good of love of neighbor as
love for God.
The Žižekian form of Hegel’s self-transcending immanence focuses on the morethan-merely-immanent structure of the subject, but because this is only a ‘selftranscending’ he can never offer a theoretical or practical subject capable of constructive
social change. Žižek cannot because his fundamental contrast is between radical
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subjectivity and social normativity rather than the Augustinian contrast between two
societies and there respective subjectivities. Because Žižek opposes subject and society
he can never affirm a positive construal of subject and society ordered around love, even
a pilgrim love marked by confession and mercy. Augustine, however, does not
fundamentally oppose subject and society. Rather, as we have shown in Confessions and
City of God, subject and society are mutually reinforcing within the earthly and heavenly
cities, even while being open to a transcendence beyond both.
The most important difference between Žižek and Augustine concerns how one
transitions between the two societies. For Žižek, within a paradigm of self-transcending
immanence, it is the subject’s own heroic effort by which she separates herself from the
dominant social normativity even though this never really leads to an alternative social
construction. This heroic effort is experienced as a dying to oneself, a dying to the
process of knowing oneself through society’s norms. This is Žižek’s ‘subjective
destitution’ explored at the end of chapter one. Augustine, on the other hand, shows that
this self-transcendence never escapes the bonds of sin. Rather, God’s self-immanenting
transcendence is that by which humanity transcends its own captivity to its libido
dominandi. God’s self-immanenting transcendence breaks the social normativity of sin’s
libido dominandi and all is various guises, allowing for the reformation of the will toward
love of God and love of neighbor. For Augustine, the radical break from dominating
social structures does not come from humanity by itself, but only through the mediator
between God and humanity, who is both divine and human, who founds an alternative
society of freedom and justice. Only through the mediation of the Son is a transition, a
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conversion, possible. The pilgrim status of the city of God centers on this very
mediation.
Conclusion
Reordering Love
Certainly more could be said about the political significance and practice of such
a pilgrim distance and pilgrim love. We must, however, tend to the goals of this chapter
to show the centrality of not only love, but also of justice in Augustine’s political
thought. This was exhibited by seeing the reversibility of justice and love for Augustine,
as well as their unity through sacrifice. It was further shown that the true practice of
justice, love, and sacrifice is not possible for humanity because it is dominated by its
libido dominandi. Only in Christ’s sacrifice, the mediator between God and humanity,
can justice and love be properly ordered and implemented within humanity society. This
truly just human society, of which Christ is the founder, is really a pilgrim city sojourning
through this land on its way to its own native country. This interlocking complex of
ideas allows Augustine both the critical distance by which to condemn the libido
dominandi of the earthy city even while promoting an alternative practice of love issuing
in changed social practices.
Throughout it has been emphasized that Augustine’s political thought must center
on the soteriological issues of how love is properly ordered and true justice practiced.
This approach has been contrasted with those focusing on the ontological what of an
ordered love that balances love of self with love of God and love of neighbor, based in an
ordered hierarchy of goods allowing for the possibility of an overlapping earthly peace.

286
The approach taken here has been to show that Augustine is just as, if not more,
concerned with how love is re-ordered through the mediating work of Christ. It is
through this work that Christ, as the true statesman, acts to promote justice by giving an
adequate example and by creating the conditions by which others can follow this
example. As both the example (truth) and the means (way) Christ both unites subject and
society and promotes the transition from one society to its alternative. The mediation of
Christ, by uniting both subject and society and by promoting the change between
societies, offers a possibility of change closed off by Hegel and his various interpreters.
Self-Immanenting Transcendence
The mediation of Christ as God’s self-immanenting transcendence offers this
possibility for change by integrating transcendence and immanence rather than excluding
transcendence as inimical to the human freedom. In the Incarnation, God the immutable
becomes mutable; the eternal enters time. The One raised up above all takes on the
humility of a servant in order to raise up a humanity debased through pride. In the
Incarnation Christ mediates true justice and love to a humanity otherwise incapable of
justice and love. The self-immanenting transcendence of God allows for the breaking of
the mere immanence of self-love issuing forth as a libido dominandi.
If it has not been clear to this point, the self-immanenting transcendence of God
means that God remains transcendent. This is axiomatic for Augustine. The persistence
of this transcendence, however, is no threat to humanity for it is exactly in being
transcendent that God in Christ can do for humanity what humanity could not do for
itself. In considering the Confessions we noted how the Incarnation allowed for the
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congruence between God’s will and Augustine’s will such that true freedom is to will
God’s will as the human will of the Son. This is possible because the Incarnation affirms
the goodness of a material (embodied) will while converting it from the will subject to
carnal habit. In City of God the persistence of transcendence interrupts the libido
dominandi of sin governing human society, allowing for an alternative society of noncompetitive love and justice. Only in this community does true freedom flourish as it
opens to a transcendence beyond itself. If this transcendence did not remain transcendent
to humanity (and to creation itself) then Augustine’s position would collapse into the
Hegelian problematic offering no resources for true change.
Christ accomplishes the founding of an alternative society because he transcends
the human condition of sin (but not the human condition of embodied existence),
allowing him to act as true humanity ought to act, freely giving to God what is due to
God and therefore also able to freely love one’s neighbor. If God were merely
transcendent then humanity would be able grasp God’s nature and the nature of justice.
Humanity, however, would not be able to practice this justice because of sin. The goal
would be known but the way would be blocked (this is the problem of Platonism for
Augustine). But if God were only immanent (which would make God not God but
merely a god), then humanity could never truly break free of bondage to sin because sin
is exactly to will its own irrational immanence (Confessions), mistaking the masks of its
own libido dominandi for virtue (City of God). Holding these two positions in tension
requires affirming God’s self-immanenting transcendence rather than merely God’s
transcendence or God’s immanence.
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The self-immanenting transcendence of God through the Incarnation creates a
critical distance from dominating social practices and promotes constructive change
within and beyond these practices. This is possible because the Incarnation
simultaneously supplies a subjectivity free (or better, becoming free) of sinful habit along
with coordinated social practices that promote and sustain such a subjectivity. Hegel’s
self-transcending immanence only posits a duality between social practices and subject
positions (this is the opposition between Pippin and Žižek). As was shown in chapter
three, this supposed duality is united by emphasizing one to the exclusion of the other, a
situation that ultimately forecloses the possibility of true change. Hegel’s selftranscending immanence always collapses the two (subject and society) into one (either
normative society or radical subjectivity). Augustine’s understanding of God’s selfimmanenting transcendence holds together three terms: two societies and the transition
between them. This third term, or process of conversion, is linked to God’s own
transcendence. The two societies and the transition between them are sustained through
God’s transcendence. The transcendence of God disallows the conflation between
creation and fall while God’s self-immanenting provides for the conversion from sinful
society to its alternative. Hegel, in conflating creation and fall, ultimately destroys the
possibility of true change from fallen will and dominating society. For Hegel, selftranscendence is always still immanence and therefore disallows for true change from one
society to another. It is for these reasons that those concerned with true social change
should adopt a more Augustinian than Hegelian orientation regarding transcendence and
immanence.
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CONCLUSION

It is not God’s fault if we do not feel at home in our creatureliness
and in this creaturely world.1
Summary
This study began by asking about the fundamental relationships between
transcendence, immanence, and subjectivity. These relationships were filtered through the
issue of producing and sustaining a radical political subjectivity capable of both criticism
and change. Hegel and Augustine were examined according to the possibilities of each in
supplying such a radical political subjectivity. The issue between them concerned whether
transcendence is inimical or essential to freedom. Chapter 1 introduced us to two
competing interpretations of Hegel in the forms of Robert Pippin and Slavoj Žižek. Each
connected Hegel to a post-Kantian framework in opposition to the more metaphysical
interpretations of Hegel. And each regarded modern freedom as the sole premise of
Hegel’s system. But their non-metaphysical reading produced divergent results. We saw
Pippin representing a ‘normative Hegel’ focused on evolutionary social practices, and
Žižek represented a ‘radical Hegel’ focused on revolutionary subjective acts. But it was
found that each displayed problems in supplying a radical subjectivity capable of criticism
and change. Pippin’s ‘normative Hegel’ only suggested incremental changes as immanent
criticism, but could not account for those would stand against the status quo in its entirety.
Žižek’s ‘radical Hegel’ is articulated exactly to explode the status quo, but only in the form
of permanent critique, never allowing for the existence of new social formation. Each of
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these interpretations began showing the aporias of Hegel’s self-transcending immanence,
unable to fully integrate the subject and society in a process of social transformation.
Chapter 2 dove headlong into Hegel’s philosophy by showing that Hegel’s system
is both properly described as the self-transcending immanence of thought, and that his
philosophy failed to prove itself in a non-circular manner. We first examined the opening
movements of Hegel’s Logic, from the being-nothing to the finite-infinite dialects, showing
how the movements to becoming and the true infinite, respectively, were both based in a
pervious exclusion of ‘nothing’ as the non-thought of thought, which was then later reincluded as negation. It was shown that this encounter with nothing as non-thought was the
last attempt of Kantian Verstand in proving its independence from Vernunft. But this
failure of thought before nothing revealed the necessary presupposition from which the
Logic begins, the presupposition of the pure knowing of Vernunfts beyond all divisions
between subject and object, form and content. It was the Phenomenology’s job to prepare
thought for such a presupposition, undoing the divide between subject and object to which
Verstand ceaselessly clings. The second section of chapter 2 took three soundings from the
Phenomenology to see in what manner it engaged the divide between subject and object.
These three soundings focused on the encounter of consciousness with the ‘beyond’ as its
extreme other, finding that each followed the logic of nothing and the infinite encountered
in the Logic, preemptively configuring the beyond as the non-thought of thought. This
circular relationship between the Logic and the Phenomenology means that Hegel may
have given a persuasive interpretation of subjectivity and its operations without reference
to transcendence, but he has not necessarily proven this argument against other equally
plausible interpretations that include transcendence. This failure to truly discount
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transcendence (because Hegel never really encounters a transcendence that is not already
pre-configured by the self-transcending immanence of thought) means that choosing
between Hegel’s systems and one like Augustine’s must be made only grounds other than
the purely logical.
Moving from the purely logical to the practical led us to consider Hegel’s political
philosophy as it is outlined in his Philosophy of Right. In chapter 3 we saw Hegel offering
an interpretation of modern freedom that attempted to unify subject and society as the
cultivated system of rational habituation. The subjective will as drives and desires needed
to be rationally self-determining through an objective system of cultivated habits, allowing
for the seamless unity of subject and society within the institutions of modern ethical life
(family, civil society, and state). This chapter ended by claiming that Hegel supposed
synthesis between subject and society, based in the unity of substance and subject, fell
apart between of its own internal tensions. It was argued that Hegel could either be read as
too idealistically removed from political realities that he could not offer concrete directive
for forming a more free society, or he was too closely identified with existing sociopolitical realities that he did not feel a substantial change necessary. This conclusion
means that one must either agree with Hegel that modern institutions are basically good,
only requiring minimal changes (Pippin), or one must revise Hegel by emphasizing
subjectivity to the detriment of society (Žižek). But these options either lead to social
conformity without change or a subjectivity that can never truly be part of a society. In
either case, the resources for a radical political subjectivity capable of criticism and change
are lacking within the Hegelian framework, putting into question the plausibility of the
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Hegelian project as one through which a more free society might be established, a desire
emanating from modernity itself.
The failure of the Hegelian system of self-transcending immanence prompted a turn
toward Augustine. Chapter 4 introduced Augustine’s political theology through the
interpretations of John Milbank and Eric Gregory. Both examine Augustine through the
backdrop of modern liberalism, the former as standing against and the latter as standing
with it. Both focused on Augustine’s ontological vision. Milbank read Augustine’s
ontology of peace against the ontologies of violence offered by postmodern Nietzscheans,
seeking to offer an apology for theology amid secular reason. Gregory focused on
Augustine’s ontology of properly ordered love as a means toward offering the political
virtue of love to civic liberalism. In this way each affirms Augustine’s essential orientation
toward God’s transcendence. But it was noted that both focuses so heavily on the
ontological aspects of Augustine that they minimize the transformative processes in which
subjects are re-formed away from evil and toward the good.
Correcting this imbalance was the goal of chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 focused on
the bondage and freedom of the will. Through a reading of Augustine’s Confessions it was
shown how Augustine understood the process by which the will became bound to sinful
habit and the manner in which is was reformed again. The self-transcending immanence of
human will could not free Augustine from the bondage to habitual sin. Augustine’s
analysis of sinful habit offered a contrast to Hegel’s account of rationalized habit, showing
the pernicious problems of understanding subject and society only from within their own
immanence. The process of Augustine’s conversion was exhibited as the transition from
one society and its (sinful) subjective formation into another society and its (graced)
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subjective formation, all united through the mediation of the Incarnate Word through whom
comes creation and re-creation. The mediation offered through the Incarnation, as a
significant augmentation of Platonic participation, began to outline Augustine’s
understanding of God’s self-immanenting transcendence. This self-immanenting
transcendence united subject and society because it also united ontological creation and
soteriological re-creation.
Chapter 6 investigated the consequences of these transitions between societies on a
more general level. By looking at Augustine’s City of God we noted that, in opposition to
Hegel’s account that could only note change after the fact, Augustine’s affirmation of the
goodness of creation coupled with the perversion of sinful desire gives Augustine the
critical tools by which to talk about two different societies within humanity, the earthly city
and the city of God. The first is oriented around the immanence of self-love while the
second is oriented toward the transcendence of God- and neighbor-love. This critical
position, however, is only available to Augustine because of the mediation of justice and
love though Christ who established the just and loving city of God. Christ not only
ontologically unites God- and neighbor-love because he is both human and divine, but he
actively exemplifies this love and justice, and creates the possibility of following this
example. As the one who exemplified and enables love and justice, Christ is the founder of
a loving and just society. In these ways God’s self-immanenting transcendence moves
human society beyond its own self-immanenting abdication of freedom in its bondage to
sin.
Rather than posit a duality between subject and society as Hegel does, Augustine
posits a duality of societies and focuses on the transition (conversion) between the two.
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This transition between two societies, effected through God’s self-immanenting
transcendence, means that Augustine’s understanding of the subject is that it only
transcends its previous social formation and enters a new one because God is already
transcendent to both. The fundamental orientation for Augustine calls for “transcending
subjects” as the point of view from which unity between subject and society can be
accomplished and through which change can be prompted. In other words, the subject as
the primary category of thought (even the subject expanded into intersubjective sociality as
Geist) must be transcended. Hegel, on the other hand, has been shown to emphasize
“transcending subjects” as the basis of his thought, i.e. that subjects are self-transcending in
nature. In the specific arena of producing a radical political subjectivity, this fundamental
orientation of Hegel has been shown to be lacking.
Situating Results: Terrain
If this account between Hegel and Augustine is correct, then we can give a more
precise answer to the question posed in the Introduction between Romand Coles and
Stanley Hauerwas. There we noted an essential difference between Coles and Hauerwas in
regard to transcendence. While both are devoted to the establishment of justice and
freedom, Coles sees a positive commitment to transcendence as inimical to radical
democratic practice, and Hauerwas sees such a commitment as indispensible for such a
project. The question asked by Hauerwas was, “What do radical democrats do if they do
not confess sin?”2 After our passage through Hegel we can begin to see an answer to this
question. Indeed, Hegel provides Coles an answer because Hegel does have an account of

2

Hauerwas and Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, 326.

295
confessing sin and asking for forgiveness. As we saw in the Phenomenology, Hegel sees
the practice of the mutual confession and forgiveness as the apex and resolution of an
extended process of mutual recognition. In this mutual confession and forgiveness
humanity accomplishes its goal of mutual recognition as self-certainty, a self-certainty
existing above natural life but without recourse to a supernatural beyond.
But what, exactly, is being confessed and forgiven for Hegel. It is the ‘sin of
existence’, the ‘sin of finitude’. Confessing one’s own limited and one-sided perspective,
confessing that each individual cannot truly know anything, not least itself, by itself, is to
confess one’s finitude. Finite being, as we saw logically in the Logic and experientially in
the Phenomenology, is always contradictory and incomplete. Only by passing into the true
infinite can consciousness enter the truth of itself and others. On the socio-political level,
only by entering the infinite process of mutual confession and forgiveness of the sins of
existence can human society be reconciled. This is Hegel’s answer to the question of
confessing one’s sin. But we saw that this confession of the sins of existence, separated
into the perspectives represented by Pippin and Žižek (who do not speak of confession or
forgiveness), forego any true transformation.
Augustine, on the other hand, does not confess the sin of existence, but the sins of a
disordered desire seeking domination over others. This confession does not fault the
finitude of existence even while does not denying the finitude of existence. Rather this
confession is based on properly ordering of desire beyond the self toward God and others,
and the self-immanenting transcendence of God who actively re-orders this desire. While
Hegel began with the unity of sin and finitude and ends with the inability to unify subject
and society nor conceptualize change, Augustine begins with the separation of sin and
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finitude (creation for Augustine) and ends with the unity of subject and society and the
ability to conceptualize the transition between societies (sinful and graced). These
represent the fundamental differences in orientation between those who affirm God’s selfimmanenting transcendence and those who affirms humanity’s self-transcending
immanence.
It could be objected of course that to position this discussion around the
determination of ‘sin’ already prejudices the study toward theology and transcendence.
Indeed, the criteria used throughout concerning criticism and change could be thought to
unfairly lead toward the Augustinian orientation of self-immanenting transcendence. It
must be remembered, however, that it is Hegel who poses freedom as the fundamental
project for his philosophy, attempting to secure the self-determining freedom of thought
and action. In examining Pippin and Žižek we saw that each attempted to continue this
modern project through their interpretations of Hegel. For Pippin this meant focusing on
the normative social practices of a society as it develops its own expression of freedom.
For Žižek this meant focusing on the revolutionary subjective act of freedom against the
constraints of society. The former notes the place of incremental criticism as a continual
fine-tuning of social freedom, but rejects wholesale change of the system. The latter
promotes wholesale change through ‘subjective destitution’ from the dominant and
dominating social structures, but rejects a reconsolidation into a new social formation. It is
Pippin and Žižek, therefore, who set the criteria of social criticism and substantive change
by which we have judged both Hegel and Augustine. Essentially this study has drawn its
criteria from the proponents of Hegel and showed that Hegel cannot fulfill his own
promises within his system of self-transcending immanence. In regard to these criteria,
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Augustine was examined and found more successful in offering a subjectivity capable of
criticism and change, also uniting subject and society in a more integral manner.
Moving Forward: Trajectories
It could be argued there are more options than Hegel’s in understanding a political
subjectivity oriented around immanence rather than transcendence. This is certainly true.
This study cannot be too quickly extended beyond the scope of those who explicitly affirm
Hegel as a philosophical or theological resource. To show that other philosophies or
theologies of immanence are similarly faulty it would first have to be shown that these
other philosophies and theologies unknowingly repeat essential Hegelian perspectives and
arguments. This study has not attempted to do this and, therefore, future study could take
this analysis of Hegel and see if he represents a more general pattern or template within
contemporary philosophies or theologies concerned with politics and social change. If
significant similarities were found between Hegel’s conception of human self-transcending
immanence and others, then these criticisms could be applied.
Of course, philosophies and theologies of immanence need not begin with human
subjectivity at all. Here we return to issues set aside in the Introduction. We initially
discussed transcendence and immanence by conflating into two the three categories of
transcendence offer by William Desmond. He spoke of the transcendence (T1) of external
objects in the world, the transcendence (T2) of self-transcending subjectivity, and the
transcendence (T3) beyond, but in relation to, both nature/being (T1) and subjectivity
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(T2).3 We conflated T1 and T2 as immanence and regarded T3 as transcendence. We later
saw that Hegel further conflated T3 within T2 as self-transcending immanence. Those
desiring to explore a philosophy or theology of immanence, however, could easily ground
this in a philosophy or theology of nature that does not directly address T2 or T3 for its
basis. If plausibly accomplished, this philosophy or theology would escape the Hegelian
aporias explored in this study.
This question of nature returns us to the two issues bracketed in the Introduction.
While Hegel effectively reduces matter to the processes of self-transcending immanence,
Augustine relies heavily on his ontology for understanding the process of subjective
conversion. This study, for the most part, avoided exploring Augustine’s ontology except
as it related to subjectivity. Future study would need to press into this region, possibily as a
way of assessing proposals offering a philosophy or theology of immanence based in
nature. Augustine also utilizes a developed sense of time, history, and memory, all of
which were also bracketed from this study except as they helped elucidate issues pertaining
to subjectivity. Future study could also explore these themes with an eye toward outlining
their significance for God’s self-immanenting transcendence, either in relation to Hegel’s
own philosophy of history (unexplored here) or other philosophies or theologies of
immanence. These two studies (regarding matter and time) could just as easily follow the
same pattern here, pressing into the ambiguities of “transcending matter” and “transcending
events.” To these investigations I hope to turn soon.

3

William Desmond, Hegel’s God: Counterfeit Double? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003),
2-7.

299
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“fæthm.” In An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, eds. Joseph Bosworth and Thomas Toller, 268.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898.
Altizer, Thomas J. J. The Gospel of Christian Atheism. London: Westminster Press, 1966.
Archambault, Paul. J. “Augustine, Memory, and the Development of Autobiography.”
Augustinian Studies 13 (1982): 23-30.
———. “Augustine, Time, Autobiography as Language.” Augustinian Studies 15 (1984):
7-13.
Avineri, S. Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1972.
Ayres, Lewis. “The Christological Context of Augustine’s De trinitate XIII: Toward
Relocating Books VIII-XV.” Augustinian Studies 29/1 (1998): 111-139.
———. “Augustine, Christology, and God as Love: An Introduction to the Homilies of 1
John.” In Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God
ed. by Kevin Vanhoozer, 67-93. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001.
———. “Into the Poem of the Universe: Exempla, Conversion, and Church in
Augustine's Confessiones.” Zeitschrift fur Antikes Christentum 13:2 (2009): 263281.
———. Augustine and the Trinity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Avineri, Shlomo. Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1972.
Babcock, W. The Christ of the Exchange: A Study of Augusitine’s Ennarrationes in
Psalmos. New Haven: Yale University, 1971.
Barnes, Michel Rene. "Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology." Theological
Studies 56 (1995): 237-50.
———. “Rereading Augusitne's Theology of the Trinity.” In The Trinity: An
Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, edited by Stephen T. Davis, Daniel
Kendall, and Gerold O'Collins, 145-76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
———. “The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: Mt. 5:8 in Augustine’s Trinitarian
Theology of 400.” Modern Theology 19/3 (2003): 329-355.

300
Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics III/3. Translated by G. W. Bromiley and R. J. Ehrlich.
London: T&T Clark, 1960.
Bavel, T. van. Recherches sur la christologie de sant Augustin. L’humain et le divin dans
le Christ d’apres saint Augustin. Fribourg, 1954.
Bonner, Gerald. “Augustine’s Conversion: Historical Fact or Literary Device.”
Augustinus 37 (1993): 103-119.
Brabant, O. Le Christ: centre et source de la vie morale chez s. Aungustin. Gemblous,
1971.
Brandom, Robert B. Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive
Commitment. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994.
Breckman, Warren. Marx, the Younger Hegelians, and the Origins of Radial Social
Theory: Dethroning the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Brito, Emilio, La christologie de Hegel: Verbum Crucis. Paris: Beauchesne, 1983.
Brinkmann, Klaus. Idealism without Limits: Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity. New
York: Springer, 2011.
Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 2000.
Brunn, Emilie Zum. St. Augustine: Being and Nothingness. Translated by Ruth Namad.
New York: Paragon House, 1988.
Bosteels, Bruno. “Badiou without Žižek,” Polygraph: An International Journal of
Culture and Politics 17 (2005): 221-244.
Burbidge, John. On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of a Commentary. Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1981.
———. Hegel on Logic and Religion: The Reasonableness of Christianity. Albany:
SUNY, 1992.
Burnaby, John. Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine: The Hulsean Lectures
for 1938. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007.
Butler, Clark. Hegel’s Logic: Between Dialectic and History. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1996.
Byers, Sarah. “The Meaning of Voluntas in Augustine.” Augustinian Studies 37/2 (2006):
172-190.

301

Byrne, Lawrence. “Writing God’s Story: Self and Narrative Structure in Augusitne’s
Confessions.” Christianity and Literature 38 (1989): 15-31.
Canning, Raymond. The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine. Leuven:
Augustinian Historical Institute, 1993.
Capps, Donald. “Augustine as Narcissist: Comments on Paul Rigby’s ‘Paul Ricouer,
Freudianism, and Augustine’s Confessions’.” Journal of the American Academy
of Religion 53 (1985): 115-127.
Caputo, John. The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2006.
Carlson, David Gray. “The Antepenultimacy of the Beginning of Hegel’s Logic.” In
Hegel’s Theory of the Subject, ed. David Gray Carlson, 206-223. New York:
Palgrave Macmillian, 2005.
Cary, Phillip. Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian
Platonist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
———. Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
———. Outward Signs: The Powerlessness of External Things in Augustine's Thought.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Cavidini, John C. “The Darkest Enigma: Reconsidering the Self in Augustine’s
Thought.” Augustinian Studies 38/1 (2007): 119-132.
Chappell, T. D. J. Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom,
Voluntary Action and Akrasia. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.
Clark, Mary T. Augustine: Philosopher of Freedom, A Study in Comparative Philosophy.
New York: Desclée Company, 1958.
Coles, Romand. Beyond Gated Politics, Ordinary. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2005.
Connolly, William B. The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of
Morality. London: Newbury Park, 1993.
Crosson, F. J. “Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine’s Confessions.” Proceedings of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63 (1989): 84-97.

302
De Lubac, Henri. Augustinianism and Modern Theology. New York: Herder and Herder
Books, 1969.
Desmond, William. Hegel’s God: Counterfeit Double? Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.
———. The Intimate Strangeness of Being: Metaphysics after Dialectic. Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2012.
Dilhe, Albrecht. The Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1982.
Dodaro, Robert. “Eloquent Lies, Just Wars and the Politics of Persuasion: Reading
Augustine's City of God in a ‘Postmodern’ World.” Augustinian Studies 25 (1994):
77-138.
———. Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
Donnelly, Dorothy F. ed. The City of God: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York,
NY: Peter Lang, 1995.
Dunham, Scott A. The Trinity and Creation in Augustine: An Ecological Analysis.
Albany, NY: SUNY, 2008.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Augustine and the Limits of Politics. University of Notre Dame
Press, 1998.
Féret, H.-M. “Sacramentum-res dans la langue theologique de saint Augustin.” Revue des
science philosophiques et theologiques 29 (1940): 218-43.
Forster, Michael. Hegel and Skepticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1989.
Franco, Paul. Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
Freccero, John. “Autobriography and Narrative.” In Reconstructing Individualism:
Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought ed. Tm Heller, M. Sosa,
and D. Wellbery, 16-29. Stanford: Stanford University Press,1986.
Fredriksen, P. “Beyond the Body/Soul Dichotomy: Augustine on Paul Against the
Manichees and the Pelagians.” Recherches augustiniennes 23 (1988), 87-114.
———. “Augustine and His Analysts: The Possibility of a Psychohistory.” Soundings 51
(1978): 206-227.

303
Frede, Michael. A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2011.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies. Translated by P.
Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. Translated by L. E. M.
Lynch. New York: Random House, 1960.
Gregory, Eric. Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic
Citizenship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Grøn, Arne. “Subjectivity and Transcendence: Problems and Perspectives.” In
Subjectivity and Transcendence, ed. by Arne Grøn, Iben Damgaard and Soren
Overgaard, 9-36. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. K, 2007.
Guy, Jean Claude. Unité et structure logique de la ‘Cité de dieu’ de saint Augustin. Paris:
Études augustiniennes, 1961.
Hanby, Michael. Augustine and Modernity. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Hardimon, Michael. Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Harris, H.S. Hegel’s Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
———. “The Concept of Recognition in Hegel’s Jena Manuscripts.” In Hegel Studien:
Beifeft 20, Hegel in Jena, ed. K. Henrich and K. Dusing, 229-248. Bonn: Bouvier,
1980.
———. “Les influences platoniciennes sur la theorie de la vie et du desir dans la
Phenomenlogie de l’esprit de Hegel,” Revue de Philosophie Ancinne vol. 3 (1985):
pp. 59-84.
Harrison, Carol. Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Harmon, Thomas. “Reconsidering Charles Taylor’s Augustine.” Pro Ecclesia 20/2
(2011): 185-209.
Harding, Brian. Augustine and Roman Virtue. New York: Continuum, 2008.
Hart, Kevin. The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology, and Philosophy. New
York: Fordham University Press, 2000.

304
Hartmann, Klaus. “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View,” in G.W.F. Hegel: Critical
Assessments, vol. 3, ed. Robert Stern. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
Hartnack, Justus. An Introduction to Hegel’s Logic. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
1998.
Hassel, D. "Conversion, Theory and Scientia in De Trinitate." Recherches augustiniennes
2 (1962): 383-401.
Hauerwas, Stanley and Samuel Wells, eds. Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics.
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.
Hauerwas, Stanley and Romand Cole, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical
Ordinary: Conversations between a Radical Democrat and a Christian. Eugene,
OR: Cascade Books, 2007.
Henrich, Dieter. “Anfang und Mthode der Logik.” In Hegel im Kontext, 85-90. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971.
———. Between Kant and Hegel: Lecture on German Idealism. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2003.
Hodgson, Peter C. Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Honneth, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition, translated by J. Anderson. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press 1996.
———. “From Desire to Recognition: Hegel’s Account of Human Sociality.” In Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide, ed. by Dean Moyar and Michael Quante,
76-90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Houlgate, Stephen. The Opening of Hegel’s Logic. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University
Press, 2006.
Hyppolite, Jean. Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by
Samuel Cherniak and John Henkman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1974.
Jaeschke, Walter. Reason in Religion: The Foundations of Hegel’s Philosophy of
Religion, translated by J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley, LA:
University of California Press, 1990.
Jameson, Fredric. Valences of the Dialectic. New York: Verso, 2009.

305
———. The Hegel Variations: On the Phenomenology of Spirit. New York: Verso,
2010.
Jamros, Daniel P. The Human Shape of God: Religion in Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit. New York: Paragon House, 1994.
Johnston, Adrian. Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008.
Kahn, Charles H. “Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine,” in The Question
of “Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, eds. J. M. Dillon and A. A.
Long, 243-260. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
Kalkavage, Peter. The Logic of Desire: An Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit. Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2007.
Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 3rd ed, trans. by James W.
Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.
Kerdt, Jennifer. Putting on Virtue. University of Chicago Press.
Knowles, Dudley. Hegel and the Philosophy of Right. London: Routledge, 2002.
Kotzé, Annemaré. Augustine's Confessions: Communicative Purpose and Audience.
Leiden: Brill, 2004.
———. “‘The Puzzle of the Last Four Books of Augustine’s Confessions’: an
illegitimate issue,” Vigiliae Christianae 60 (2006): 65-79.
Kung, Hans. The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel’s Theological Thought as
a Prolegomenon to a Future Christology, translated by J.R. Stephenson. New York:
Crossroad, 1987.
Laden, A. “Evaluating Social Reasons: Hobbes vs. Hegel,” Journal of Philosophy, 102/7
(2005): 327-56.
Lee, Gregory W. “Republics and Their Loves: Rereading City of God 19.” Modern
Theology 27/4 (2011): 553-558.
Lewis, Thomas A. Freedom and Tradition in Hegel: Reconsidering Anthropology,
Ethics, and Religion. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.
———. Religion, Modernity, and Politics in Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011.

306
Lumsden, Simon. “The Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel,” Philosophical Compass
3/1 (2008): 51-65.
MacIntyre, Alastair (ed). Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dam, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1976.
Mackenzie, Jon. “Subjectivity as a Methodology in Augustine’s Confessions,”
Augustinian Studies 40/2 (2009): 205-216.
Madec, Goulven. "Christus, scientia et sapientia nostra. Le principe de coherence de la
doctrine augustinienne." Recherches augustiniennes 10 (1975): 77-85.
———. La Patrie et La Voie: Le Christ dans la Vie et la Pensée de Saint Augustin. Paris:
Desclée, 1989.
Maker, William. “Beginning.” In Essays on Hegel’s Logic ed. George di Giovanni, 2744. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990.
———. Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel. Albany: SUNY Press, 1994.
Malabou, Catherine. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic. New
York: Routledge, 2005.
Markus, R. A. Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Marion, Jean-Luc. In the Self’s Place: The Approach Of Saint Augustine. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2012.
Martens, P. W. (ed). In the Shadow of the Incarnation: Essays on Jesus Christ in the
Early Church in Honor of Brian E. Daley, S.J. Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2008.
Mathewes, Charles. "Pluralism, Otherness, and the Augustinian Tradition." Modern
Theology 14:1 (January 1998): 83-112.
———. “Augustinian Anthropology: Interior intimo meo.” Journal of Religious Ethics
27/2 (1999): 195-221.
———. “The Presumptuousness of Autobiography and the Paradoxes of Beginning in
Confessions Book One.” In A Reader's Companion to Augustine's Confessions,
ed. Kim Paffenroth, 7-24. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2003.
Meconi, David Vincent. “The Incarnation and the Role of Participation in St. Augustine’s
Confessions,” Augustinian Studies 29/2 (1998): 61-75.

307
Menn, Stephen. Descartes and Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998.
Milbank, John. Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason 2nd Edition. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1990/2006.
———. Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon. London: Routledge, 2003.
Neuhouser, Frederick. Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
Nuzzo, Angelica. “Dialectic, Understanding, and Reason: How Does Hegel’s Logic
Begin.” In The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, ed. Nectarios G. Limnatis, 12-30.
London: Continuum, 2010.
O’Brien, J.J. “The Liturgical Form of Augustine’s Conversion Narrative and Its
Theological Significance.” Augusitinian Studies 9 (1978): 45-58.
O’Connell, Robert J. St. Augustine's Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul. New York:
Fordham University Press, 1989.
———. Images of Conversion in St. Augustine’s Confessions. New York: Fordham
University Press, 1996.
O’Connor, Willian Riordan. “The Uti/Frui Distinction in Augustine’s Ethics.”
Augustinian Studies 14 (1983): 45-62.
O’Daly, Gerard. Augustine’s City of God: A Readers Guide. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999.
O’Donnell, James. Augustine: Confessions, Latin Text with English Commentary. 3 vols.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
O’Donovan, Oliver. The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine. New Haven, 1980.
———. “Augustine’s City of God XIX and Western Political Thought,” Dionysius 11
(1987): 98-110.
———. “Usus and Fruitio in Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana I.” Journal of
Theological Studies 33/2 (1982): 361-97.
———. “The Political Thought of City of God 19,” in Oliver O’Donovan and Joan
Lockwood O’Donovan (eds), Bonds of Imperfection: Christian Politics, Past and
Present, 48-72. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004.
O’Regan, Cyril. The Heterodox Hegel. Albany: SUNY, 1994.

308

O’Meara, John. Charter of Christendom: The Significance of the City of God. New York:
Macmillan, 1961.
Patten, Alan. Hegel’s Idea of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Peperzak, Adriaan. Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
———. Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy. Boston:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
Pinkard, Terry. Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
———. German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
———. Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012.
Pippin, Robert B. “Hegel's Political Argument and the Problem of Verwirklichung,”
Political Theory 9/4 (1981): 509-532.
———. Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
———. “Hegel, Ethical Reasons, Kantian Rejoinders,” Philosophical Topics, 19:2
(1991): 99-103.
———. Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European
High Culture, 2nd Ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
———. Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997.
———. Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies: The High Tide of Prophesy: Hegel,
Marx, and the Aftermath. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
Rist, J.M. “Augustine: Freedom, Love and Intention”, in Il Mistero del Male e la Libertà
Possibile (IV): Ripensare Agostino, eds. Luigi Alici, Remo Piccolomini,
and Antonio Pieretti, 7-21. Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1997.

309
Rose, Gillian. Hegel Contra Sociology New York: Verso, 1981/2009.
Rosen, Michael. Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The First and Second Discourses and Essay on the Origin of
Languages. Edited and translated by Victor Gourevitch. New York: Harper and
Row, 1986.
———. “Of the Social Contract.” In Social Contract and other later political writing, ed.
and trans. by Victor Gourevitch, 39-152. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997.
Ruokanen, Miikka. Theology of Social Life in Augustine’s City of God. Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993.
Schlitt, Dale M. Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim: A Critical Reflection. Leiden: Brill, 1984.
Shanks, Andrew. Hegel’s Political Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991.
Solignac, Aimé. Les Confessions. Biliothèque Augustinienne 13/14. Paris: Desclée de
Brouwer, 1962.
Stephany, William A. “Thematic Structure in Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian
Studies 20 (1989): 129-142.
Stern, Robert. “Hegel’s Doppelsatz: A Neutral Reading,” Journal of the History of
Philosophy 44 (2006): 235-66
Stock, Brian. Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of
Interpretation. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998.
Stout, Jeffrey. Democracy and Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Studer, B. “Sacramentum et exemplumchez saint Augustin,” Rcherches augustininennes
10 (1975): 87-141.
———. “Zur Christologie Augustin,” Augustinianum 19/3 (1979): 539-46.
———. The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God in Augustine of Hippo :
Christocentrism or Theocentrism? Translated by Matthew J. O'Connell. Collegeville,
Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1997.
Talyor, Charles. Hegel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

310
———. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1989.
Taylor, Mark C. Erring: A Postmodern A/theology. Chicago: University Of Chicago
Press, 1987.
Toews, John Edward. Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
———. “Transformations of Hegelianism: 1805-1846,” edited by F. C. Beiser, 378-413.
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Trout, Dennis. “Re-Textualizing Lucretia: Cultural Subversion in the City of God.”
Journal of Early Christian Studies, 2/1 (1994): 53-70.
Wallace, Robert M. Hegel’s Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Westphal, Kenneth. “The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,”
in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. by Frederick C. Beiser. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Westphal, Merold. Transcendence and Self-Transcendence: On God and the Soul.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
Wetzel, James. Augustine and the Limits of Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992.
———. “Will and Interiority in Augustine: Travels in an Unlikely Place,” Augustinian
Studies 33:2 (2002): 139-160.
———. Augustine: A Guide to the Perplexed. New York: Continuum, 2010.
White, Alan. Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics. Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 1983.
Williams, Robert R. Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1997.
———. (editor). Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel's
Philosophy of Right. Albany: SUNY, 2001.
Williams, Rowan. “Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God.” Milltown
Studies 19/20 (1987): 55-72.
Wills, Gary. Saint Augustine’s Conversion. New York: Viking, 2004.

311

Wolin, Sheldon. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political
Thought, Expanded Edition. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Justice: Rights and Wrongs. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008
Wood, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990.
van Oort, Johannes. Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine’s City of God and
the Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities. Leiden: Brill, 1991.
Yerkes, James. The Christology of Hegel. Albany: SUNY, 1983.
Young, Frances. “The Confessions of St. Augustine: What is the Genre of this Work?”
Augustinian Studies 30: 1 (1999): 1-16.
Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso, 1989.
———. They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor. London: Verso
Press, 1991.
———. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. Durham:
Duke University Press, 1993.
———. The Indivisible Remainder: on Schelling and Related Matters. London; New
York: Verso, 1996.
———. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. NY: Verso, 1999.
———. The Fragile Absolute: or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?
New York: Verso, 2000.
———. Belief. New York: Routledge, 2001.
———. Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related
Dates. NY: Verso, 2002.
———. Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity. Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2003.
———. The Parallax View. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.

312
———. Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London:
Verso, 2012.

